Can the well-documented placebo effect in medicine be applied to the comfort religious belief gives many? In the case of religion, should such an affect be encouraged, discouraged, or dismissed? You could argue that none of us will ever know until we die, and if we were wrong in being religious we will never know we got it wrong. If various monks or nuns in various religions (to take an extreme example of devotion) got it wrong - and some would have to have had if you subscribe to the logical view that only one religion can assure you an afterlife, what possible advice can be given? If you feel someone is wasting their life on a misguided religious quest should you just preserve silence, salute the meaning it lends their life and leave well alone? What duty do we have here, if any? Philosophers understand the points involved better than most and can see through many misconceptions in religious belief that believers are unaware of. Each-to-his-own is surely a tragic cop-out.

This isn't really an answer to your question but, rather, a point I find interesting about the framing of your question. (You could still ask your question in slightly different terms, of course...) Although the idea of a "placebo effect" is common, there is actually some reason to doubt that it is "well-documented". A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine by Asbjorn Hrobjartsson and Peter C. Gotzsche, (May 24, 2001) argues tha t the trials aiming to establish a placebo effect are, for the most part, not sound. http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/abstract/344/21/1594 For example, in some cases the studies don't take into account the fact that the condition of some percentage of people will improve without any medication at all. Although the studies compare people who take medication with people who take a placebo, they don't always compare people who take the placebo with those who take nothing. This, as you might expect, doesn't settle the question, but...

There is a strong enough moral argument for vegetarianism. However, it does seem that if applied globally, such a standard would cause a loss of livelihood (e.g for African nations that export tons of beef to Europe). In the dramatic event that a panel of EU ethicists decided to ban all non-vegetarian commodities (leather, meat, some forms of milk) on the grounds that these were borne from the undue suffering of animals, would the inevitable suffering of human beings that would result from such a move (through job losses, economic stagnation, etc. - assuming that in countries that thrive on the meat industry, e.g. Botswana, alternative livelihoods are virtually unsustainable, due to the poor agricultural space) provide a suitable argument for the continued non-vegetarianism of human beings on Earth, or is this a mere technicality?

These are really good questions and there are definitely many empirical issues that should be settled before we can adequately evaluate a proposal such as global vegetarianism, or a ban on animal products by the EU. First, it is worth noting that not all vegetarians are utilitarians, or even consequentialists, and some may think that animals have rights that should be considered even at the expense of some degree of human suffering. How much human suffering is a hard question for such views. Second, for the reasons you suggest, those who support global vegetarianism should probably not support the immediate end to all use of animal products. The goal would be, I think, to find alternative ways to feed and clothe ourselves in ways that are consistent with the well-being of animals. This won't happen over night. But we can take steps every day to reduce the pain, suffering, and death we cause to animals. (A nice statement of this "do your best" approach is in Sue Donaldson's Foods that...

I've always been kind of puzzled by religious people who claim both that (1) their faith is devout and that (2) they are uninterested in converting people to their beliefs. I feel as though persons of this sort are trying to have their cake and eat it too; they want to affirm their faith, on the one hand, and be tolerant on the other. In an age where multiculturalism is lauded, this sort of pluralistic worldview can seem ideal. And yet, if you really believe that a person who does not acknowledge God will go to Hell, or that contraception is immoral, how can you NOT urge your convictions on other people? When it comes to religious belief -- especially beliefs which pertain to morality -- can "tolerance" be reconciled with true conviction?

It isn't clear to me exactly what the tension is. It will, no doubt, depend on the religion in question. Some religions do not hold that the non-believer will be punished or that there is a special religious basis for morality. In my experience, many who do believe that the non-believer will go to hell make an effort to "save" souls; those who don't may be shy or preoccupied with other things. Being uninterested in converting others is not the same as being opposed to it (though more on this below). On the broader issue of morality, I'm not sure why the religious person is in a position any different from any moral person. If believe that eating meat is morally wrong (for whatever reason), should I try to convince others to become vegetarian? Well, one's answer will depend on the broader moral theory one subscribes to. If I'm a utilitarian, I'll have to determine whether trying to convince others to be vegetarian will have the best consequences; maybe I'm terrible at such efforts and...

In the 12-step program, used by Anonymous Alcoholics and other similar organizations, the 4th step talks about a "moral inventory of ourselves", while the 8th step is mentioning "persons we had harmed". Some of my friends say that they did morally harm themselves only and no one else. I'm sure that one can easily cause material or psychological damage to oneself, but is it possible to morally harm oneself?

I'm not sure what you have in mind by "moral harm" but one thought would be that moral harm to someone results when a moral obligation to that person is violated. So if I have a moral obligation to respect your bodily integrity, then if I assault you, I violate that obligation and not only cause you pain and suffering, but moral harm. If this is the idea, then the question really turns on whether we have moral obligations to ourselves. It seems plausible that we do. One might argue that just as it would be wrong for another to violate my bodily integrity, it would be wrong for me to do so as well, e.g., by chopping off my own hand. Here it might be worth asking: if I am morally entitled to a certain kind of treatment, e.g., say that there is a moral requirement that persons be treated with respect, can I ever legitimately exempt myself from the rule, even when my action is directed towards myself? If not, then it seems one can morally harm onself by not according oneself due respect.

I am thoroughly confused by the ethics of vegetarianism, which to my mind seems more of a religious objection towards eating meat than a scientific point of view. Recently I attended a lecture by Peter Singer ( Animal Liberation ) on the ethics of eating meat. One thing he did not address was differentiating between the 'killing' of the (sentient) animal and the 'eating' of it. OK- so here is my question: is it ethical to eat roadkill, or animals that have died of "natural" causes or of "old age"? Further to this, is being killed by a human primate not a "natural" cause of death of a cow? If humans shouldn't kill cows to eat (because we know better), perhaps we could let lions kill the cows, then we can eat them afterwards? Isn't it unethical to tell people in the developing world they shouldn't eat meat? - especially when a huge percentage of women in the developing world are iron deficient? Thanks, Grant M.

There are at least three different kinds of argument in favor of vegetarianism, and each of the arguments have slightly different implications for what is OK. One argument is concerned with human health (so is more prudential than moral). The idea is that eating dead animals is not healthy for humans, or at least a balanced vegetarian diet is more healthy. This view is not really compatible with eating roadkill, but would be compatible with eating meat if there was insufficient vegetarian food to keep one healthy. Another argument is concerned with the environment. The idea is that factory farming wastes precious resources (like water) and is inefficient in producing the nutrients humans need. (For details, see "Environmental vegetarianism" in Wikipedia.) This argument also doesn't preclude killing or eating animals where the practices used to raise them are environmentally sound (but it can be developed into a case for a qualified veganism, given the parallel concerns about the...

Socrates said "It is better to suffer evil than to do it". I am trying to work out if a consequentialist could make good sense of this claim, if anyone can!

From Socrates' point of view, doing wrong harms the soul. Since on his view the soul is the most valuable thing there is, it is important to protect the soul from this harm. Suffering evil, in contrast, doesn't harm the soul. It might harm the body. It might be psychologically difficult. But it doesn't harm the most valuable thing. So doing evil is worse than suffering it. Is it possible to make sense of this without accepting that there is a soul? You might think that there are different sorts of value: aesthetic value, moral value, individual well-being, etc. You might also think that some of these can "trump" others. So, for example, occasionally I am required to sacrifice some amount of well-being in order to do what is right. There may also be times when I must suffer at the hands of others in order to do what is right. When there is a conflict, fulfilling one's moral obligations is more important than achieving individual well-being. But this comes close to what Socrates was...

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