Many people criticize the concept of an "open relationship", that is, a relationship in which both partners are allowed to have sexual relations with people other than the primary partner. There are also other forms of so-called "polyamory", for example a three-way relationship which excludes sexual relations with anybody besides the other two partners. While in some cases such relationships may only benefit one party, may involve coercion or neglect, or sacrificing for one's partner, there are some such relationships in which both or all partners find themselves more fulfilled and happy than they otherwise would. Yet these "good" polyamorous relationships are the subject of the same moral aversion and disdain as the abusive, coercive ones. What kind of moral argument could lie behind the idea that such relationships are wrong - surely not a morality based on happiness. Is some kind of deontological sexual ethic at the root of the criticism of open relationships and polyamory? What does this ethic...

I will leave it to others to supply whatever they may think is a good reason for supposing that there is some kind of rule written in Heaven (about which, more in a moment!) as to why "one size fits all" in terms of fulfilling sexual relationships. As you quite rightly point out, it is one thing not to abjure any kind of relationship that amounts to abuse or coersion, and quite another to lump in with these any sort of relationship that deviates from the social norm of a single partner. Nor can it even be said that single-partner relationships are a norm that is or has been always realized in human societies, even if it is endorsed in most (but not all) cultures. Were that the case, prostitution would not be, as the saying goes, the world's oldest profession, and polygamy would be unknown. I rather suspect that the historical basis for the very restrictive ideal to which you refer goes back to a time when women were regarded as men's property, which is why in so many cultures the sexual...

Is it ethical to have pets? Wouldn't a dog or cat be happier in the wild, where it could procreate on its own, run freely, interact with its own kind etc.? As a pet, these animals do experience joy, but most are spayed or neutered, are bored or generally trapped inside while people are at work, have their nails clipped when they wouldn't like it (or declawed altogether), etc. I think the animals would have more happiness living in the wild. I know the animals would live shorter lives on average, but I am not convinced that a longer life necessitates a better life.

You are right that a longer life is not necessarily a happier life, but there are other things that go with longer life that are probably relevant to your question. I am not sure what the exact statistics are, but I see to recall that feral cats (felis domesticus) have an average life span of something like two years. The question is, what is the quality of those two years, relative to the very long average lives of cats that live as household pets? In addition to the factors that you mention, how should we think about the quality of life of an animal that has to be: Constantly alert to the danger of predators (feral and domestic dogs, coyotes, etc., who will kill cats for amusement or food). Depending on the environment, constant risk of accidents with automobiles. Constantly in search of food, with starvation and malnutrition always serious risks--especially if the cat should suffer from some injury that prevents it from hunting or scavenging effectively. Constantly...

Society A believes that morally right to sacrifice children to their god. Society B believes that this belief is morally wrong. On what basis can I say that Society B is morally superior to society A?

On what basis? On any reasonably held ethical basis at all! Your question seems to be based on the idea that we cannot be justified in judging another society, but I see no reason why that would be true. The consequences of sacrificing children looks pretty bad (oops, there goes the society's future!), so on a consequentialist ground, the practice can be condemned. No sensible person would make "sacrifice your children" aa universal maxim for all to follow, so it looks like there are good deontological grounds for condemning it, as well. And what kind of peerson sacrifices his or heer own children to some "god"? Looks pretty baad from a virtue-theoretic point of view, as well. If this were baseball, I'd say, "Three strikes and you're out!"

I read an article by a pshychologist agony aunt which said that we should be carefeul with forgiveness, that when we forgive we are at some level accepting that we deserved the wrong done to us. The lady went on to say that it is not recommended that children or people who suffered abuse (physical, sexual, psychological and or emotional )as children be encouraged to forgive the offender - especially when forgiveness involves reconcilliation with the offender (does forgiveness always involve reconcilliation with the offender?). I think that this makes sense - however, it seems that this is not the general view. I feel that there is pressure on people to forgive and we often hear the phrase "you must forgive". People who cannot forgive feel bad because they feel that they have failed or are mean spirited. Are people who claim to always forgive merely forgiving petty slights or are they refusing to deal with the offence by ignoring it /putting it out of their minds? What are our views on the...

Having not read the article, it is difficult to provide a very direct response. But perhaps it will help to make a distinction. Forgiveness can be the process by which people who were in conflict become reconciled. There can be value in such reconciliations, but it will also depend on what the costs are. I can think of no good reason for encouraging anyone to accept what is unacceptable (e.g. child abuse), or for someone who has been the victim of unacceptable treatment to be reconciled to the unrepentant agent of that victimization. So if we mean by "forgiving" that we no longer hold someone responsible for some wrong they did, I'm inclined to agree that we should not do that. On the other hand, it seems to me that the very logic of forgiveness is that it wouldn't come into play unless we actually do recognize that the person to be forgiven aactually did something wrong. If we have reason to think that they have changed in such a way as not to do that sort of wrong again, and they feel...

What is the difference between being mentally ill and being a bad person?

A bad person is one who is inclined to act in bad ways. A mentally ill person, accordingly, can also be a bad person. We might think of a mentally ill person as someone who simply can't help doing what they do--where those who are not mentally ill can actually make real decisions. But just because I can't help doing something terrible doesn't make it not terrible when I do it. But I doubt that the expression "mentally ill" is one that iss very clear-cut or well conceived. Plainly, there is something wrong with anyone who acts badly--just exactly what is wrong with them (whether some "mental illness" we now have a name for, or just a lousy background, or poor education in values, or ...) may be somewhat unclear to discern, aand the border between "illness" and other factors may get extremely blurry. My guess is that the more we know about the brain, the more we are going to find out that "mental illness" will be replaced in our descriptions of the world with several other options that make what...

Is time-wasting immoral? The books I read tell me many times not to waste my life doing nothing, but if I choose to do it by the way, would it be immoral?

Like so many questions in ethics, this one seems to me to depend on which actual ethical theory we apply. If we take a very strict kind of consequentialist theory (according to which the goodness or badness of an action is to be measured by the value of the consequences of that action, "wasting time" will be fairly neutral--not as good as actions that yield good consequences, and not as bad as those that produce bad consequences. On some version of deontological theory, "wasting time" would also be neutral in any case in which no moral duties needed to be satisfied at that time. On the other hand, it does not look like "wasting time" could possibly satisfy Kant's notion that right actions are those we are prepared to universalize for all agents and times--plainly, if everyone "wasted time" all the time, we'd be in pretty bad shape! From a virtue-theoretic point of view, we might ask whether the best sort of person would be one who "wasted time," and the answer would seem to be "no,...

Is it right to kill in self-defense or use any type of violence?

I think there is a difference between saying that something is right to do, and saying that something is morally justified (or justifiable). I think, accordingly, that killing in self-defense should be understood as morally justifiable (and justified in some cases), rather than insisting on saying that it has to be either right or wrong . The same goes for violence--it can be morally justifiable (and justified in some cases). Understanding this, we will not have to think of it as (simply) right or wrong.

Your marriage of 10 years is "in a bad place" and you find yourself seeking "compensatory" emotional gratification through extra-marital sex, with a) an acquaintance and then b) briefly, while drunk, with the spouse of your sibling. You realise your mistake. You tell no-one, out of cowardice, but also out of sorrow that it has happened and a knowledge that you love your spouse and you know that your spouse would be devastated by what you have done. You return to the marriage with determination to do better and the behaviour never reoccurs. You devote yourself to loving and caring for your spouse and you both enjoy a deepening relationship in which both parties commit and contribute wholeheartedly. Over the next ten years your spouse becomes progressively more sick and eventually dies without ever discovering your earlier treachery. Almost simultaneously, your sibling's marriage breaks up and the "in-law" behaves shittily, claiming that the break-up of the marriage is entirely the fault of your (innocent...

Some approaches to ethics hold that dishonesty can never be the correct policy, on the ground (very roughly, for brevity here) that such a policy could never be recommended generally (or universally), and/or because dishonesty is in itself and inherently wrong. One can understand some sympathy for such a view but still not be completely convinced by it in some given case. So much as we might well have serious misgivings about dishonesty generally, we should also be extremely wary of the potential for a given case of honesty to amount to unwarranted (and unjustifiable) cruelty. You feel guilty. Well, you should! But you obviously don't need me to tell you that, because you're "in agony" over what you have done and what some of the ramifications are now. But what to do about it? First, the situation with your spouse sounds like, once the wrongdoing ceased, you handled things about as well as you could, given that you changed the relationship in fundamental ways and permanently by your...

Should prominent adults (e.g. athletes) be held responsible as role models for young children even if they do not consider or present themselves as such?

I do not think we have a right to expect prominent adults who do not represent themselves as role models to serve in that capacity, or to be held responsible for failing in that capacity, when they do. To take a very controversial recent example, Tiger Woods became a celebrity because he is extraordinarily good at golf. He did allow and encourage that celebrity to be constructed into a highly marketable persona for endorsements and advertisements, and for these, he did take on a certain responsibility to behave in certain ways--or at any rate, not to behave in certain other ways (and I am sure that, as a matter of contract, his responsibilities were stipulated clearly). In failing to live in accordance with these quite legal stipulations, many of those who had contracted his services or used his name have now decided to hold him responsible for some things he has been discovered to have done, and many of his most lucrative contracts have thus been revoked or not renewed. But he is still, we...

Should people who engage in health damaging choices like smoking, drinking, drug abuse, overeating be denied organ transplants if their organs where to fail as a result of their actions?

I don't see why. If there is reason to think that these bad choices would continue in such a way as to make the transplant likely to fail, then I can see having them be a factor. But if a patient needs a transplant, then it does not seem to me to be up to the medical profession to deny that transplant on some moralistic ground. Consider two cases, where both need a kidney transplant. In one case (A), we have good reason to believe that the patient needs the transplant because of drug abuse earlier in their lives. (Let's not complicate the issue further by going into how likely we think it is that the person might return to drug abuse if the transplant is done successfully.) In the other case (B), we see no such evidence, but we also do know that B has been guilty several times in his life of physically or sexually abusing members of his family in numerous ways. Imagine finally that only A and B could be plausible candidates for this transplant--the kidney will spoil and be useless to anyone...

Pages