I desire to produce a Great Work - the term I will use to avoid a lengthy, linguistically-bound dissertation on its specifics - but I find that, while I long to produce and offer a work (a work of art - writing, animation, film, or a combination) of Content (something with meaning and value beyond surface value; also, thought-provoking, e.g. the animated series Neon Genesis Evangelion or Franz Kafka's Metamorphosis ,) I hate the thought of ignorant persons maiming the work, or enjoying it in a puerile manner for superficial reasons alone (e.g., thinking Metamorphosis was just some cool story because the guy turns into a bug, or Evangelion because it has giant robots.) This makes me reticent to create anything. Is this purely some sort of narcissistic elitism, or is it a legitimate concern? How have prior artists worked through misanthropy towards the ignorant to continue to create? Is there an established explanation of why myself or others feel this way about the full value of a work being...

Great works--and also not-so-great works--are a bit like children to us. We bring them into being as a result of our desire , we do our best to nurture and to preserve them, and to advantage them in the world as best we can...and then we turn them loose into a world that may love or hate, may celebrate or destroy them. Once our children (fleshly and otherwise) are "out there," we have little to no continuing control over how things will go for them. And the surest thing of all, I'm afraid, is that not everything will go well for them. I will venture to advise you that so long as you are fixed on how your work will be received by others , you need not worry about producing anything Great. Indeed, the greater the work, the less likely it is, I think, that the work will be received or understood both completely and very generally. If there is true greatness within you--or if some great Muse (take that any way you will!) elects to speak through you--then the Great Work will be created...

When philosophers try to answer a question like 'is it right to do X?', or 'do I have a soul?', they are asking the same questions which we all ask, and answer for ourselves, in everyday life. If philosophers research these questions intensively (perhaps for many years) before publishing their findings, and if even then there will be some counterarguments, how can we ever hope to find approximately true answers in our less formal, everyday musings? Thank you.

I very much like your expression, "approximately true answers." That, it seems to me, is all that any of us can realistically hope to achieve in our thoughts about many things. So, perhaps, the only difference between the musings of the best philosophers and the most ordinary of people would be the degree of approximation they strive for--and in the best of cases, achieve. One of the things that has always concerned me on this sort of issue is the worry that our questions themselves betray us in their presumptions. Let me give you and example of a blatantly presumptuous question: Have you stopped abusing your lover? Blatantly presumptuous questions, of course, are fairly easy to deal with, because we can spot their false presumptions so readily. But might some of our most basic questions also have flawed presumptions? Let me use the ones you mention as examples. "Is it right to do X" obviously presumes that there is such a thing (or, if not a "thing," at least some applicable concept) as...

Hello, I would like to ask a question about ethics involved when nudity is permitted in public places. I live in Sydney, Australia. At one of the most popular beaches here (which hosts tens of thousands of people per day and is freely available to anyone who wishes to go there), a man was arrested and fined $500. This was punishment because he had been on the beach with a camera, surreptitiously photographing women who were lying on the sand, with no tops on. He was discreet such that almost none knew at the time that he had photographed them - after they apprehended him, police went around with his camera, identifying people and approaching them with the images in hand. Many people using this beach choose to sunbathe disrobed, of their own free will. The man admitted that his actions were intended to further his own sexual gratification. Although I think the man's behaviour was in poor taste, using others as mere means to his own selfish ends, on consideration I cannot see why it should be held...

As a matter of prudence, I am inclined to agree with the arguments of the questioner--if one does not want others to photograph one's exposed breasts (or other body parts), one should keep them covered in public. On the other hand, I don't think that the issue is quite as simple as this. The man who was arrested admitted that he used the photos for his own sexual gratification. But what if he was posting them on a website--perhaps for profit? I think there are somewhat thorny issues here, and do think that the most important ones have to do with legal protections of personal privacy, and where the lines get drawn on this issue. Does appearing in public mean that anyone can photograph me for any purpose whatsoever? That does seem a bit much to me! Here is another example--what do you think of the idea of a pedophile photographing children swimming or running around on a beach in the nude (as one can see in lots of places in the world)? No problem here? I guess I would caution the questioner...

Has anyone come up with an adequate or nearly adequate reply to the Euthyphro Dilemma or has it so far proved the nail in the coffin to the Divine Command Theory? Thanks.

Although I agree with Peter Lipton (having actually recently made such arguments in a commentary I did with Thomas Brickhouse on the Euthyphro itself, in the Routledge Guidebook to Plato and the Trial of Socrates , I think it is also fair to mention that some theistic philosophers have recently attempted to defend the Divine Command Theory (DCT), by arguing that it makes sense to think that something might become morally required as a result of God commanding it. Have a look at Philip Quinn's Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford, 1978), 30-52. I personally do not think this avoids the problem (because we can still ask why God would command it in the first place, in which case, the only available options seem to be "because it is good," which seems to defeat the DCT, "for no reason," which seem to make divine commands completely arbitrary, or "for some reason other than that it is good," which would seem to there being some non-good reason for God's commands, or perhaps...

What if a person continues to wish evil, (e.g., that someone dies) but is only refrained from action (murder) by practical concerns (such as fear of incarceration)? What is the moral difference between that wish, and the act? (Btw, thanks Nicholas D. Smith for your excellent answer [to a related question: http://www.amherst.edu/askphilosophers/question/974].)

Obviously, there are better reasons for desisting from some evil wish than others--it would be better not to murder someone, when you experience the wish, because you feel some compassion for others who might grieve the death, or because you realize that you could never forgive yourself for such an act...and so on. Worse reasons might include: Someone pays you not to knock the so-and-so off! Wishing to avoid incarceration is also not a very noble reason, as you notice--but it is understood by lawmakers (following the deterrent theory of punishment) as the very kind of consideration that is supposed to deter people from such crimes. The best person, it would seem, is one who does not even wish for such things--bad things, that is. But it is hard to be perfect--and few (if any) of us are...so we end up wishing for things it would be better not to wish for. Applying something like a Kantian universalizability principle, however--consider which of the following principles we would...

I am a a high school teacher working for the Los Angeles Unified School District. I have been given approval to begin teaching a Philosophy survey course for the next school year. Although I am well read and schooled in Philosophy (I think?), I am unaware of possible textbooks for the study of Philosophy. I am looking for something that might be high school student friendly. Thus the Adorno Reader might be out of sorts for my pubescent high school students. In addition, I am fielding advice on the best approach to teaching Philosophy to high schoolers. I am interested in possible methods, assignments and projects. Any advice would be welcomed. Thank you, Ramon

I would recommend Theodore Schick's and Lewis Vaugn's Doing Philosophy : An Introduction through Thought Experiments (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005--3rd edn.) Its use of thought experiments makes the theories more readily accessible than most anthologies. By the way, I have actually worked with another teach in LAUSD (at Palisaides High and at Hollywood High) on some philosophical topics. If you think it would help to have a guest come to your classes for some discussion, I would be glad to do so (for no pay), as I am in the Los Angeles area often for various reasons. Feel free to contact me directly if your are interested: ndsmith@lclark.edu .

How do we know that what is morally right and wrong is actually supposed to be right or wrong? Was there actually any intent for what is to be good or bad? -Tom Simmons (age 13)

I think there will be different answers to your question, depending upon what kinds of examples you specify. But as a general rule of thumb, I would be inclined to say that for the most part, we don't necessarily know what is right and what is wrong--we have to use our judgment about this, and human judgment, as I suppose you already realize, can be very fallible and faulty. But just because we don't know something, it doesn't mean that we should just give up or not try--questions of right and wrong are really, really important ones, and so we need to try and do our best when we make these kinds of judgments. The way we philosophers try to do our best is to consult with the main theories and explanations of right and wrong that very smart and thoughtful people have offered and then think about how those theories apply to the cases we have to judge. So let me give you three different sorts of theories (and these are not the only ones, but they are commonly regarded as three of the...

What is the origin of human ethics? How did ethics come into existence?

I am inclined to think that any very definite answer to this question would amount to a "just so" story--in other words, it would be pure speculation, as we obviously have no access to the origins of ethics, which would appear to be pre-historic (that is, before anything was written down so as to be preserved for future generations). But doesn't it seem plausible to think that ethics will become a topic of interest just as soon as (a) human beings start to congregate together, and (b) human beings wonder about what might make their lives better. Since my guess is that it would be difficult for some creatures to qualify as a human population, if the members did not do (a) and (b), my own speculation would be that ethics has its origin in human nature itself. (That, by the way, is anything but an original speculation--have a look at the very much more sophisticated version of this idea in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics , especially Book I.)

Do you think philosophical counseling is a legitimate form of philosophizing? Are there indeed situations, cases or problems better addressed or answered by philosophers (rather than psychologists)?

I am not sure what an "illegitimate" form of philosophizing would be--though different forms can be of varying quality. I also see quite a bit of activity at this website that looks to me like philosophical counseling, and I do think that philosophers are better equipped than others to handle most (if not all) of the questions that get posted here. Plainly, there are issues that would be better suited for psychologists (or psychiatrists, or other physicians). But looking around this site should provide pretty good evidence that we are able to answer--or at least respond intelligently and with certain special skills--to some kinds of questions (namely, philosophical ones)!

Do human beings search for questions that cannot be answered on purpose, or does it happen by chance?

Hmmm...so do you think this question is also unanswerable? How do you know the questions you refer to are actually unanswerable (as opposed, say, to be not yet answered)? At the beginning of Aristotle's Metaphysics , he says that philosophy begins in wonder. It seems pretty clear that the human race is strongly inclined to this activity--wondering. If sometimes we wonder about questions that actually can't be answered, I doubt if we got there on purpose. When we wonder, it seems that we seek answers! Anyway, I would humbly propose to you that neither you nor I are in a position to say that some (wonderful) question is actually unanswerable-- so far unanswered, perhaps, but not necessarily unanswerable. I suppose there are some questions that are unanswerable (or at least some that would need further specification before being answered)--for example, if I were to ask now, "Is it?" (Is it what ? What "it"?) Similarly, there are questions that cannot be answered in the...

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