Hello, I was reading the answer to question 726, where Jay L. Garfield discusses Andrea Dworkin's argument about whether a woman can consent to a man's sexual advances: "The person most associated with this claim was Andrea Dworkin, though she was not alone in asserting it. The claim was a bit hyperbolic, but reflected an interesting, controversial claim. Consent, she argued, presupposes rough equality. If you are a violent person holding a gun, and ask me politely for all of my money, even if you don't threaten me, my handing it over is nonconsensual. And that is the case, on this view, even if, had you not had the gun, I would have consented, out of generosity, to give you the cash you wanted. The presence of an unequal power relationship, and the background of potential violence renders consent conceptually impossible." That may be so, but consider that I am on very friendly terms with the violent person holding a gun - that is, I have a good history with her or him and that I know he or she won't...

I agree with you that Dworkin's arguments "horribly simplify" the relationships between men and women. But I would also say that this kind of simplification is unavoidable in arguments of the general kind she makes--from any point of view. For one thing, notice the difference in how I put my agreement with you--from the way you put the point. In my agreement, I put "relationships" in the plural. Dworkin understands well the generality of male domination and oppression. But arguments such as hers fail (and cannot help but fail, by their very nature as generalities) to take into account the indefinitely great variety of ways in which human beings can be related and can interact. This is not at all to say that Dworkin's arguments do not deserve our attention and respect. But we should always take care not to allow such arguments to obscure the fact that the generalities to which they point are, to some degree and by many individual cases, not at all without exceptions.

What is philosophical intuition? How is it different from common sense?

I suspect that "philosophical intuition" really has something to do with one's capacities to do logical and analytical reasoning. But your question really depends upon what you mean by "intuition." Plenty of the most significant and controversial philosophical theories would not qualify in anyone's view as common sensical (consider Plato's theory of Forms, Berkeley's immaterialism, Quine's nominalism), but the brilliant philosophers who arrived at these theories applied their talents and capacities in developing them. If it is these talents and capacities (which I suspect are both natural in their basis, but also highly developable into their fullest realization) are what you mean by "intuition," then "philosophical intuition" is certainly not the same thing as common sense. Moreover, from many years of observation, I can say with certainty (and with some personal embarrassment over being an exemplar of the sort of thing I am about to note) that there seems often to be little correlation between a...

Is there a particular theory against the philosophical possibility of eternal life? I ask this because it seems to me that if eternal life were possible, men may lose the incentive to philosophize, hence the demise of philosophy.

I agree with Richard Heck's response, but would like to respond to the first part of this question. I think there are some fairly persuasive reasons for thinking there is no such thing as eternal life--though I doubt that an argument could be given to show its impossibility. So: (1) If we agree that the body dies and is ultimately destroyed as an entity, then the only way there could be eternal life would be if the living self is entirely distinct from the body. But the kind of mind-body dualism that might make this possible has been shown (in many ways and by many philosophers) to be at least profoundly problematical, if not simply incoherent. Indeed, many philosophers regard the very idea of "disembodied existence" as problematical, if not simply incoherent. (2) Even if survival of death means re-embodiment in some form, it would still appear that the living self is entirely separable from the body that dies, so that does not solve the problems of (1). Similarly, there seem to be fairly...

Is there pleasure in the melancholic? I like reading sad films, I enjoy solitary walks getting sad about sad things, puffing cigarettes that I know will kill me, alone in cafes, half-drunk and looking out at swarms of people buzzing around me, getting sad that I might turn out to be one of them. Is there pleasure in the melancholy? Why?

You have given a number of examples, each of which probably deserves specific responses. But as a general reaction, I think your cases do show that there certainly can be pleasures taken from things that also arouse or contribute to sadness or melancholy. There may be any number of reasons for this, though I suspect that many of these reasons have to do with the ways in which we have evolved as a species. For example (and purely speculative at that!)--as a social beings, we often take pleasure from the experience of being put in a position to see or empathize with the way other people experience things. Seeing a sad film may induce a kind of empathic sadness in us...but even so, we may experience some pleasure at seeing things "through the eyes" of the characters in the film. According to a general approach to virtue theory, there is nothing wrong with "getting sad about sad things." What would be inappropriate, surely, would be to fail to get sad about sad things. On the other hand,...

Could thoughts and thinking be considered as some kind of an element or energy source? If not then what exactly are thoughts and thinking; how do they come to be?

It really depends upon what you mean by "element" or "energy source." If you mean by these what these terms mean as they are used in contemporary science, then at least in principle we could understand and explicate thoughts and thinking wholly in the terms of contemporary natural science. But there are a number of reasons philosophers have given for doubting that a full explanation of thoughts and thinking can be given in such terms. Let me just mention a few: The problem of qualitative content or qualia : Thoughts have aspects that seem as if they would, in principle, resist wholly physicalistic explanation--for example, the experiential properties of what it is like to have such thoughts. Conscious beings who are thinking understand that the experience of thinking is a certain kind of experience-- different, for example, from the experience of having an itch or the experience of being about to sneeze. Even if we can correlate these experiences with certain states of the brain, it...

Could you please describe what you believe are the best arguments for the existence of God?

Most philosophers, when they teach the philosophy of religion, actually teach their classes the arguments they regard as the best ones for (and also against) the existence of God. These include several versions of the cosmological argument (in which God figures as the first cause, or as the cause of the universe as we know it), the teleological argument (in which the universe is understood as showing signs of having been intelligently designed, indicating a Designer), and the ontological argument (in which God's existence is argued to be derivable just from the definition or conception of God). I find the argument that works best with students who are inclinded to be atheists or agnostics is some version of the ontological argument. I usually teach several versions, but here is a version of one of the most famous of those arguments, by Anselm: Even the atheist grants that God is that being than which no greater can be conceived. Hence, even for the atheist, God exists at least in the...

If no one ever loves me during my lifetime - if I don't ever have a relationship - will I have not lived properly? Is love that important to life, or is it something you can choose to engage in if you like? Thank you.

I assume Alan Soble's response is at least partly tongue-in-cheek: Anyone who calls Aristotle a "pinhead" is surely either joking or provides a decisive example of that disability. I rather suspect that most of us who have actually managed (at least sometimes!) to have loved and been loved in return would prefer this condition to the alternatives. A good life may be possible without love, but anyone who says that it is not important is surely a pinhead!
Sex

Why is sex (a legal act) censored to a much higher degree than extreme violence (an illegal act)?

I agree with Joseph Moore's insight, but have some reservations about the question itself. As squeamish as our own culture is about sex, I think it would not be wise to generalize this fact about our culture to all others at all times. The varieties of practices and taboos across cultures can be striking. The degree to which prostitution, for example, is anathematized in our own culture is not at all to be found in many other cultures. For the ancient Greeks, prostitution was entirely socially acceptable ("everything in moderation" still applied, of course), whereas free males were expected never to commit oral sex (on any sex partner, male or female). Most cultures are completely intolerant of extreme violence against the members of that culture, and the punishments for murder, for example, are generally much more severe than any sanctions put on (especially legal) sex acts. So I do not think I accept the assumption behind the question.

Is the existence of God more important than the existence of religion?

Important in what sense? Religions, in one sense, are more important in the actual lives of people--for the obvious reason that they influence people's lives whether God exists or not. But if God doesn't exist, then much of what religions say is based upon falsehood. Truth is sometimes less important to people's actual lives than falsehood. But don't you think that truth has value in itself--intrinsic value--even if people find it easy or desirable to ignore it? If truth has value apart from what people want or do with it, in that same sense, then, the existence of God is more important than the existence of religion--since religions can exist and even flourish even if most or all of what they proclaim is false.

Philosophers / Journalism / Truth If we can agree upon the premiss that Man is not a solitary creature and that Man wants to belong to a group, why isn't there more movement towards getting the mass-media to use this longing to propel mankind to a higher level by 'punishing' (exposing) the Bad and 'rewarding' (admiring) the Good? Is this at all possible, you think? And if not, why not? As far as I am aware there is not a single major/popular newspaper or news program or internet site that reports a selection of objectively gathered news in a framework of comparison to the eternal value of 'Good vs Bad' on which the great philosophers agree. For example: Only reports (aknowledge and admire) of true 'good' deeds - esp. from role models - and ignore all the other trivial actions (non-news) as much as possible. Sorry for my poor English. Please translate into proper English ... Compliments for the site!!!

I suppose that at least part of an answer to your question would come from a clearer picture of what we take to be the proper role of journalism (or the mass media). Your question seems to suppose that it is the proper role of the media to "propel mankind to a higher level." But why shouldn't those involved in the mass media simply reject this, claiming instead that it is their role, at most, to keep us informed about what we are most interested in? In this view, the media serve--rather than fundmentally shape--public opinion and our actual interests (as opposed to what, perhaps, we should be interested in). In fact, of course, it is not quite as simple as this--for surely the media also help to shape our interests, which is why, for example, businesses and industries use the media to advertise their products, thus shaping our interests to suit their commercial goals. But I do think there is a very delicate and ethically precarious balance between provisions to allow freedom of the press,...

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