Greetings philosophers! I’ve always wondered if free will is a problem for atheism. In particular, if there was no designer (God), isn’t it unlikely that something as strange as free will would arise?

As always with questions about free will, the answer to this one depends on how one understands free will. If one defines free will as a God-given power, then yes, atheists who accept that definition would conclude that there is no free will. But that's not a very good definition of free will. If one thinks free will requires a non-physical soul, then atheists who believe there are no such souls, would also think there is no free will. Atheists could believe in such souls, however (just not that they are God-given). Some scientists who say free will is an illusion (I call them 'willusionists') seem to think that the materialist worldview that science seems to provide evidence for rules out free will, because they assume free will, by definition, requires non-physical powers. But I don't see any good reason to define free will as God-given or instantiated only in souls (and some of my work studying folk intuitions about free will suggests that most people agree with me). Rather, free will is...
Art

Are certain artistic mediums more adept at expressing human experience than others?

Yes, here they are in order from most to least adept at expressing the human experience: 1. Theater (plays) 2. Movies 3. Novels (and short stories) 4. Music 5. Dance 6. Painting 7. Sculpture 8. Architecture Who says philosophers can't give straight, objective-looking answers to questions that clearly don't have a single correct answer? Anyway, that's my answer, and I could give arguments for that ordering, but others could surely give arguments for a different ordering (or for none at all). If philosophy counts as an art form, then it comes in somewhere right above or below novels (says the English major who abandoned it for philosophy!)

I am in the midst of applying to a master's program in philosophy and am wondering if a 5 page writing sample will necessarily disqualify me.

It might not disqualify you at some programs, but it will certainly count against you at most. The writing sample is the primary way of distinguishing applicants' philosophical talents, at least once they have been narrowed down using other criteria (such as coursework in philosophy and grades, letters--though for the competitive candidates, they tend to be equally gushing--and perhaps GRE). A 5-page sample is unlikely to provide evidence that you can develop an argument responding to a particular position that you have adequately and charitably explained. (Of course, Gettier's famous paper is quite short!) I say all this with empathy--I was a philosophy minor (not major) and did not have a good, long piece of writing to submit when I applied to grad school. I had to use a mediocre, long piece, and was lucky to be accepted in the few places I was. But that was (too) many years ago when the competition was a little less fierce. I would try to work with one of your professors to develop one of...

Recently a question was asked about the nature and value of philosophy. I was surprised that only one panelist chose to respond. In his response, Gordon Marino wrote the following: "There are people who make their living doing philosophy who are really into it because they enjoy unlocking intellectual puzzles and building models." By not replying, is the implication that the other panelists agree with this assessment of what professional philosophy is? And if this is an accurate characterization of professional philosophy, why is it a department at the college level? It sounds more like the description for one of the many enrichment activities offered after school at the local elementary and middle schools. It seems to me that this cannot be an accurate description of the field, as the amount of professional philosophy done would not thereby be accounted for by the economic demand for it. Thoughts?

No, my not replying was not tacit agreement with Gordon's assessment of professional philosophy, and I suspect some other panelists also disagree. We're philosophers--you'll always find differences of opinion. But, looking back at his answer, he simply said there are some people who enjoy the puzzle-solving aspect of philosophy, not that all or most of professional philosophy works that way. I suspect that many or most professional philosophers enjoy both the puzzle solving and the engagement with the big questions about the meaning of life, morality, what we are, etc., and many probably like the intersection of the puzzles with the big questions. But trying to find a single accurate description of philosophy or philosophers or even academic philosophy is like trying to find a single accurate description of the meaning of life. Ain't gonna happen. Having said all this, I am sometimes disappointed at the rarity of professional philosophers who are able to connect their academic...

Hello. Thanks for all the great answers so far. A (seemingly) quick question. If everything is determined, does this mean that everything is necessary and nothing is contingent. Because if determined means 'could not be otherwise' then isn't that the same as saying it is necessary? Thank you, Christina

Determinism is a thesis about the relations between states (or events) in the universe. A deterministic universe is one in which, holding fixed the past states (or events) and the laws of nature, there is only one possible future set of states (or events). So, it might appear that determinism means that nothing is contingent or could happen otherwise. But that appearance is misleading, because the past or the laws were not necessary and they could have been different. If they had been different than they actually are, then the future events would be different than they actually will be. If determinism meant that everything is necessary, then it would mean that there is only one possible universe. Nothing could be or could have been different than it is. That doesn't fit with the way we think about possibility. There are lots of possible universes--lots of ways things might have been or might be. But if determinism is true, the only way the present or future could be different than they...

Hi I have a hairy one for you. Imagine if you will that you have a mystical experience and you encounter the Supreme, Ultimate Absolute i.e. God. And that you can ask this being any question you desire. But being a bit of a skeptic you ask it "what question should I ask you?" Would this constitute a good test or would I simply be acting cute and incur Gods wrath? But in all seriousness if you did encounter a being claiming to be God, what would constitute proof? I figure we would probably know anyway, because I can't envision God not installing some sort of Truth recognition factor, but then I've been influenced by a lot of New Age mumbo jumbo, so I want to know what a philosopher thinks. Cheers Pasquale

I like the ploy of asking an apparent Supreme Being (SB), "What would be the best question to ask you?" but only if you can also make sure that the SB answers that question. How frustrating would it be if SB responded, "You should ask me, 'What is the meaning of life?'" and then laughed at you as you realized you'd used up your one and only question! But I don't see how this question would help you determine if the SB was really God or whether your vision was real or a hallucination, dream, or matrix-like experience induced by a powerful but not supreme being. Heck, you could ask me what question you should ask, and I could give you a good answer. (Ask what is the meaning of life!) So, what would constitute proof that your vision of an SB was genuine? Nothing, if your standards are set at Descartes' level of proof--you could be dreaming or in a matrix and never be able to tell, no matter what the SB said or did. But you could use a more reasonable standard, like best explanation for the observed...

I've been in education of some kind for over fifteen years now, and over these years I've had many history classes, concerning a variety of topics. Something strange happens in all of them, though - without exception, the classes never seem to spend more than a single session on anything that happened after the 1950s. In high school, we had a single class to talk about the Cold War; two other years of history didn't even go that far, except in the broadest of strokes with mentions of decolonialism. In a college course on American history, our last session was the origins and beginnings of the civil rights movement, with nothing beyond that. The social, technological, political and ideological shifts in the past half-century seem to be deemed unworthy of teaching. Why is this? Aren't the social and technological developments of the last sixty or seventy years at least as critical to the understanding of modern society as the sum of all that came before? What is the importance of teaching the history...

I've always thought it would be interesting to do a history course in reverse. Start with the later events (beginning in present) and have students consider what history might have looked like to lead to these later events, working backwards as far as possible. I always hated that my history classes ended before things got interesting (where "interesting" means, you know, when I am on the scene). (If you are ever in DC, the Newseum offers some good exhibits to learn recent history.)

A former college roommate of mine, with whom I lived for a semester over two years ago, was recently arrested for the murder of a young woman (whom he apparently stalked for quite some time), and I have been called to the police to testify as a witness, presumably to his character. Being in this situation, and being a bit philosophically inclined, I have been facing down a lot of questions in my mind, and I would like to hear your thoughts on them. First, and most abstractly: at the time, was I living with a future murderer, or with someone who had the seed of a murderer in him? Or was he just a regular person? Also, when I look back, I seem to remember him as a bothersome person without much respect for personal boundaries. I certainly didn't like him, and after a month or two I did my best to avoid getting caught in a conversation with him. But can I be sure this is what I really thought of him, and not a feeling I am projecting back onto those memories now that I know what he has done? Is it...

That is unsettling. If true. Most of your questions suggest that you're already assuming he is guilty of the crime. Perhaps you should try to do what the legal system aims to do: assume he is not guilty until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm not sure why the police are interviewing you, but you should probably "stick to the facts" and describe your former roommate's behavior and habits, leaving them to interpret whether that offers any relevant evidence to this crime. To me, that would make you a more "reliable witness." Now, if he is guilty, then I think it's an interesting question whether he had "the seed of a murderer in him," though it's not clear what that might mean. It may also be an interesting question whether you could have done anything differently such that things might have turned out differently (again, assuming they turned out the way you are assuming). But it's also a question that is almost impossible to answer, certainly without finding out a lot more...

Is this a valid argument? If not, what is the fallacy committed? (1) A hypocritical agent is one that says one thing, but does another. (2) The government kills people. (Through wars, the death penalty, etc.) (3) The government tells us not to kill. (By making it a law to not murder. Murder is a form of killing, thus making it a law to not murder is a form of making it a law to not kill.) __________________________________________________ Therefore, (4) The government is hypocritical.

I think your argument is logically valid--that is, IF the premises were true, then the conclusion would be true. And I don't think it commits any formal or informal fallacies (except perhaps equivocation in the sense I'll explain shortly). The problem is that it is unsound , because it has at least one false premise; hence the conclusion is not "made true" by the premises. Premise 3 is false. The government does not tell us not to kill no matter what . As you point out, it tells us not to break specific laws against specific types of killing. Typically, citizens are not breaking the law (and are morally justified) in killing in self-defense or to protect others from an immediate and deadly threat. And (legal) killing in war and use of the death penalty (where it is legal) are also not forms of killing the government tells us not to commit. Now, we may have reasons to think that some or even all killing in war is morally problematic and even more reasons to think the death penalty is...

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