Recent Responses
When philosophers say that something is morally relevant or that a reason is a moral reason, what does "moral" mean? What makes moral reasons different from other reasons? Can something be both selfish and moral?
Roger Crisp
September 7, 2006
(changed September 7, 2006)
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As you'll have noticed from the responses by Peter and Thomas, philosophers can suggest different ways of defining 'morality'. So here's another one, which owes a good deal to the British empiricist tradition, and J.S. Mill in particular. Morality can be seen as a system of social control a... Read more
Dear Philosophers, When philosophers write about scientific method, are they proposing a description of the actual practices of scientists or are they attempting to produce a normative theory of what science should be like? If it's the former, then shouldn't this be answered by historical study and not philosophy? If the latter, why do philosophers talking about scientific method bother to look at the history of science at all if one cannot gurantee an 'ought' from an 'is'? BMW
Peter Lipton
September 3, 2006
(changed September 3, 2006)
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Here is another way in which the normative and factual mix in the philosophy of science. One of the central normative issues is whether we are justified in saying that our best scientific theories are (at least approximately) true. The best known argument for saying that our best theories... Read more
In the end of the movie <i>The Good Son</i>, two children are about to fall over a cliff. One child is good and the other is evil. A lady, who is the evil child's mother, catches them so that she is holding the wrist of one in her right hand and the wrist of another in her left hand but she only has the strength to pull up one, so she has to choose which to let go. She chooses the good child. Did she make the right choice?
Oliver Leaman
August 31, 2006
(changed August 31, 2006)
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One thing it might depend on is how she chose. Did she choose the good child over the evil one, or did she choose to save one child? If the former is the case, then her action is questionable, since all life is valuable and it is invidious to distinguish between different sorts of life. She w... Read more
Today's world seems to be highly critical of war. It is seen as destructive, inefficent and deeply immoral. Though I very much agree with this view, don't wars -and conflicts in general- build cultures and identities? Don't they push civilization to grow? Don't they set history in motion? The real question I have is: Does culture need conflict?
Oliver Leaman
August 31, 2006
(changed August 31, 2006)
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It probably does, and a state of affairs in which everyone was blissfully happy would be very unproductive of anything except happiness. It is a bit like what we tend to think of as normal stress. If an individual is overwhelmed by stress, that is obviously a bad thing both for her and her w... Read more
Dear Philosophers, When philosophers write about scientific method, are they proposing a description of the actual practices of scientists or are they attempting to produce a normative theory of what science should be like? If it's the former, then shouldn't this be answered by historical study and not philosophy? If the latter, why do philosophers talking about scientific method bother to look at the history of science at all if one cannot gurantee an 'ought' from an 'is'? BMW
Peter Lipton
September 3, 2006
(changed September 3, 2006)
Permalink
Here is another way in which the normative and factual mix in the philosophy of science. One of the central normative issues is whether we are justified in saying that our best scientific theories are (at least approximately) true. The best known argument for saying that our best theories... Read more
Imagine I know all the songs ever made by a particular musician, and I listen to his music over and over again, so that I know them off by heart and they mean a lot to me. How well then can I claim to know and love that musician as a person? Can I assume that his songs reflect his personality and self? If I know them, can I assume that what I understand them to be gives me some insight into him? Could I fall in love with him just by virtue of his music?
Thomas Pogge
August 31, 2006
(changed August 31, 2006)
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It is surely possible that a person's music reflects his or her personality and self, and possible that, by listening to this music, you gain insight and understanding of him or her as a person. But I would be very reluctant simply to assume that this is so. Here are three reasons why.
First,... Read more
If there is a person that feels no remorse over their hurtful actions, is incapable of feeling love or being loved, is severely emotionally restricted and has no interest in other people apart from using them for selfish means (maybe a psychopath), does that person have humanity? And if that person doesn't - and human rights is a concept of 'shared humanity' as Ronald Dworkin says - does that person have the same human rights as 'normal' human beings?
Thomas Pogge
August 30, 2006
(changed August 30, 2006)
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Human beings can and do change. They may lack important attributes at one time and yet come to possess them later. So we must choose whether to tie the ascription of humanity in the relevant sense to attributes they have or to ones they can have. Your formulations go back and forth between the... Read more
People equate certain qualities with femininity. E.g. soft, irrational, emotional. On the other hand, certain other qualities are equated with masculinity: e.g. hard, rational, analytical. Some feminists have said that this is an example of prejudice towards women: firstly, those qualities are largely viewed as negative, secondly, the 'male' qualities are held in higher esteem than the 'female' qualities. It seems to me that men can be just as emotional or irrational as women - but apart from this, is the connotation with those things an accident or is it purposeful and does it actually lead to prejudice? Some people also complain that words associated with blackness - darkness, black, etc, are used negatively and that is racist. Is that actually true or is it a stretch?
Karen Jones
August 29, 2006
(changed August 29, 2006)
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Masculinity and femininity have been associated with different properties at different times and in different cultures. Despite all this variation, however, that which is associated with masculinity is valued, and is often identified with the human, while that which is associated with the femin... Read more
If I lied and told Bob that I was very pleased to see him when I really am indifferent to his existence and couldn't care less if I never saw him for the next two thousand years. My lie made him very happy. Is that as bad a lie as if I lied in an 'ordinary' way, for example lying to my father about why I got home so late or telling my mother I didn't break her favourite vase? What if it didn't make Bob happy, but it just meant that we didn't have an awkward moment since saying that to Bob is what was socially expected of me?
Karen Jones
August 28, 2006
(changed August 28, 2006)
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You might enjoy reading Annette Baier's essay, "Why Honesty is a Hard Virtue" in Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty (eds) Identity, Character, and Morality which discusses just the issues you raise. There are very complex contextual rules for determining when something counts as a lie. Do adults li... Read more
Hello, I am just a concerned college student. I have read the <i>Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals</i> by Kant and I am particularly convinced by Kant's Humanity as an End formulation. On this formulation, I refuse to randomly hook-up with girls at fraternity parties because I believe that would amount to using (and letting myself be used) merely as means and not as an end, which would violate the dignity of being a human. For the same reason, I deny to dabble in any sort of sexual contact unless I have a flourishing relationship with the person. My question is: Am I interpreting Kant in the right way? That is to say, does sexual contact of any sort or intensity (i.e. from making out to sexual intercourse) without a relationship amount to using someone as merely means?
Alan Soble
September 1, 2006
(changed September 1, 2006)
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Yes and no. Although, mostly yes. For the most comprehensive treatment of the issue (Kant and/on sex) that I know, see my essay "Sexual Use and What to Do about It: Internalist and Externalist Sexual Ethics," Essays in Philosophy 2:2 (June, 2001) [online journal, at Humboldt State] or, bette... Read more