<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" href="http://www.askphilosophers.org/rss.css"?>
<rss version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>AskPhilosophers.org | "Children"</title>
<description>You ask. Philosophers answer.</description>
<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/</link>	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Environment, Ethics - Oliver Leaman responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Given ever-increasing population compared with the fixed size of the Earth, is it ethical for me to want to raise my children in a house with a yard, when a handful of houses could make room for apartments that could house hundreds of people?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Oliver Leaman<br />

<blockquote><p>I don't see what is wrong with doing things that you want to do in a case like this. One is not perpetually obliged to think of whether one could be doing more for people. Right now instead of responding to this query I might be more suitably employed doling out food for the homeless and the computer on which I am now typing could be sold to provide water for villages in the developing world which require it. I could right now be doing things that save lives, yet here I am selfishly typing away unnecessarily and satisfying my desire to make my opinions public. </p><p>To allow all my personal interests to be submerged under the interests of others, though, is to dissolve one's personality. For some of course taking this step is in fact a reflection of their personality, but in the example you say you want to bring your children up in a house with a yard. We are not under the obligation to be saints and there is no reason why you should feel guilty about the reasonable ambition to own a yard. <br /></p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><br /></p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Jan 2012 12:52:59 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4498</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children - Oliver Leaman responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ In some schools where I live, children are made to sing the national anthem every morning at school.  Children who do not wish to do so can opt-out, in which case they are made to take their chairs outside the classroom, sit, and wait until the singing is over.<br><br>Those working for the education board claim that the possibility of opting out means that nobody is being forced to do anything.<br><br>Yet if the de facto situation is that children are made to sing the anthem, and that they are visibly segregated from the other students for their or their parents' choice, can that really be true?  Is there no form of coercion going on whatsoever here?  It seems that this situation is more coercive than an alternative, in which nobody sings the anthem at all.  Is this perception correct?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Oliver Leaman<br />

<blockquote><p>I wonder, because it might be argued that in general people would be expected to know the national anthem, and while provision should be made for those who do not wish to, it would be a shame if no-one could sing it at school. After all, it is not as though singing it is likely to coerce one into patriotic feelings that one would be better without, or even better with, since as we know however people are brought up often has very little to do with how they eventually  behave or what they believe. </p><p> I used to teach in a school where a small group of students had to be removed from the classroom whenever Christmas was discussed, since it was held to be a largely secular holiday and they were the children of committed Christians who disapproved of this secularity. Should one have just not spoken about Christmas at all in order not to exclude them? How about if some parents object to music or sex education, should teachers not play music or provide sex education at all? </p><p>Exclusion is not desirable, but it preserves some balance between the wishes of individual parents and the desire of the education system to introduce children to central aspects of their culture, surely a worthwhile aim on the whole.<br /></p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Dec 2011 14:45:37 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4456</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Ethics, Philosophers - Thomas Pogge responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ It seems to me that Kant's categorical imperative implies that we all have a duty to procreate.  Is this actually the case?<br><br>I say this because it seems that any person choosing not having children would be forced to admit that, if their behavior was made a universal law, society would collapse, with a slowly aging and ailing population and nobody to take care of them.  Society would die out, and the last generation before the end would be helpless geriatrics suffering the problems of old age with nobody younger to look after them.<br><br>So do Kantian ethics actually demand that we have children?  Or is there a subtler way of looking at the issue?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Thomas Pogge<br />

<blockquote>I used exactly this example in an essay published over 20 years ago as one of the arguments in support of a more subtle interpretation that had been first proposed by Tim Scanlon. On this reading, it is the <strong>permission </strong>one is claiming for oneself that is to be universalized. So instead of asking whether one can will that all people act on one's maxim of remaining childless, one is to ask instead whether one can will that all people be permitted to remain childless. In the world as it is, we can certainly will this universal permission (because enough others would decide to conceive even without a duty to do so), and therefore each of us is permitted to act on the maxim in question.<br /></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 2011 14:13:47 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4379</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Philosophers, Philosophy - Andrew Pessin responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ A philosopher pointed out the the big questions of philosophy are also the ones asked by all children.<br><br>I'm thinking Quine, or Bertrand Russell<br><br>But I can't remember.<br><br>Anyone know?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Andrew Pessin<br />

<blockquote><p>I've made the same point in my book "The 60-Second Philosopher," though I think it has to made with some finesse to count as being particularly accurate.  Young children seem quick to recognize questions about basic principles -- that there is a causal order -- that there may be a supreme being of some sort -- basic moral principles -- but that's still pretty far from saying they ask the same questions as the big questions from philosophy.  (Tom Wartenburg has a recent book out on doing Philosophy with Children and on focus groups he's done, which might offer support for your question ....)</p><p>hope that helps--</p><p> ap<br /></p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Oct 2011 01:13:35 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4357</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Medicine - Miriam Solomon responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[  Is there any validity in the following argument? <br><br>By medical science we keep people with severe chronical diseases alive and these people are free to reproduce. Already there has been an increase in people with chronical diseases, maybe because of our progression in medical science. <br>So, in the future, it is possibly that we will all struggle with many chronical diseases, unless we accelerate in stem-cell research  or genetic manipultaion. With this I see only two opportunities: either deny the chronically diseased to reproduce (Which I think is quite unethical) or "play God" and rid our selves with these plagues with either genetic manipulation or stem-cell research (which is also unethical, for some).<br><br>But not matter what ethical principles one leans on, these two options are the only sensible ones, of course to the exception of not doing anything (which is also unethical).<br><br>So we have here, three unethical options, depending on one´s ethical affiliation: 1. Everyone will be chronically diseased. 2. Chronically diseased will be refused to reproduce, and 3. We excel in stem-cell research and genetic manipulation.<br><br>If you ask me, I would say that everyone would agree that being in a state where everyone is diseased is the least ethical one, we should intervene if we can. The second most unethical option is refusing people to reproduce, as this is a fundamental aspect of human life, without it it could cause mass depression. The third option, although for some is unethical, is the least, because the stem cells that are extracted can not feel pain, and it does not hinder anyone in fulfilling a good life, it only makes some people angry.  
 <br /><br />
Response from: Miriam Solomon<br />

<blockquote>We have been grappling with these ethical issues since the mid-nineteenth century and the beginning of the Eugenics movement.  You have obviously done some deep thinking yourself, and perhaps it is time for you to engage with some texts in history and ethics in order to see how to take the questions further.  I suggest Diane Paul's "Controlling Human Heredity" and "The Politics of Heredity" (both cheap paperback books) and an essay by Erik Parens "The Goodness of Fragility" widely reprinted in bioethics texts  (there are many other bioethics resources, such as bioethics.net and <a href="http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/publications/scopenotes/">http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/publications/scopenotes/</a></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Oct 2011 12:46:17 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4318</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Ethics, Punishment - Charles Taliaferro responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ John is 30 years old. Jack is 10 years old. They are clinically sane.<br><br>One day, John feels a sudden, uncharacteristic urge to kill. He murders an innocent stranger.<br><br>On the same day, Jack feels the same urge to kill. He also murders an innocent stranger.<br><br>John and Jack both admit responsibility for the murders.<br><br>They acted in the same way for the same reason. Their actions had the same result.<br><br>Should they be punished in the same way?<br>
 <br /><br />
Response from: Charles Taliaferro<br />

<blockquote>Great question!  In practice, at least in the United States, the punishment and even the trial will be different.  The 10 year old would be tried in juvenile court.  The jury would not be made up of only 10 year olds.  John, on the other hand, would have a jury (if there was a jury) of fellow adults or peers, and the possible consequences would be different.  I suggest that one reason for a difference in punishment is that while both John and Jack admit responsibility (which I assume involves admitting that they knew that what they did was wrong) the child (and a 10 year old is a child, based on international standards, e.g. UN definition of childhood) did not have as full of a grasp of the wrongness of the action as the adult.  It may also be the case that the child had / has less resources mentally to address deviant desires / urges.  I think we expect adults to engage in greater self-mastery, to exercise greater restraint and control of desires than children.  Although the claim may seem odd: sanity for a child may differ at least in degree from sanity for an adult.  It would be odd, but not insane for my four year old nephew to think he could put on a ring that would make him invisible (after all, Bilbo Baggins did this in The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings), but I would be quite insane to think so.  <br><br>There might also be another way to think of punishment: if a 10 year old is found guilty and given a 10 year sentence, by the time he is 20 he will have spent half of his life in prison.  Insofar as part of the role of punishment through prison / incarceration is rehabilitation and reformation, this may be more likely to hurt Jack's chances of reforming.  Under such circumstances, perhaps less than 10 years incarceration is warranted (especially if there is admission of guilt, reform, parole, reliable supervision when released...).  Perhaps a lesser sentence would be less likely to harden him into a life of such crime.  John getting a 10 year sentence would perhaps also harden him, though it would mean that he has spent less of his life time in prison than Jack.  It may be that John is more likely to think that he is not a hardened criminal, but someone who made a mistake and paid for it with one third of his life...as opposed to Jack who might (again "might") think: "Half of my life I have been branded a criminal.  That is who I am."<br><br>That's my best shot at this point in replying to your most excellent question.<br><br>Allow me to add that your question really forces one to think about a philosophy of age or aging.  When do the values, the virtues and vices of childhood, differ (if at all) from what we think of as the virtues and vices of adulthood?  Along with Elizabeth Olson as co-author, we address this in a chapter in a forthcoming book The Catcher in the Rye and Philosophy.  There are no easy answers, I am afraid, but there are some good suggestions by other contributors to the book, due out in 2012.</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Aug 2011 19:36:13 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4263</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Ethics, Medicine - Eddy Nahmias responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Over the past few years, my wife has become a staunch antivaccinationist. (We have a son on the autism spectrum; she has bought into the discredited vaccine causation theory of autism.) She is unreachable on this topic; no facts or reason will move her from her position. Unfortunately, she has decided that our children are to have no further vaccinations. She will not compromise on this. I, of course, want our children to be protected from dangerous diseases and thus want them to be vaccinated.<br><br>My question: What are my ethical obligations in this situation--to my wife, to my children, and to society? Going behind my wife's back and having the children vaccinated without her knowledge does not seem ethical. Agreeing to her demand that the children receive no further shots also seems unethical--this would put my kids at risk of disease, as well as other people. Telling my wife up front that I'm taking the children to get their shots, despite her objections, also seems problematic--they are her children also. <br><br>What are my best choices here?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Eddy Nahmias<br />

<blockquote>I agree with Professor Smith.  The only thing I would add may be obvious and may be something you've already tried.  It sometimes helps to have third parties intervene to provide all the facts and arguments you would use to try to persuade your wife to change her mind.  Here, your knowledge of who might influence her is useful.  Would she trust your family's pediatrician or react harshly against him/her as a member of the 'vaccine conspiracy'?  Her parents or yours?  Mutual friends?  While an 'intervention' would be extreme, making friends and family aware of a serious issue that affects the health of your children (and others) and enlisting their help might make it easier for your wife to back down without feeling pressured to do so solely by you.  But should these methods fail, then Prof. Smith's suggestion seems appropriate.</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2011 09:16:37 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4217</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Law, Punishment - Nicholas D. Smith responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Should a parent report their own children to the police if they are aware that the child has commited a criminal offence. Does the age of the child or the seriousness of the crime matter. Example should you report your child if you suspect they have commited shoplifting or should you only report them for serious crimes like armed ronbbery.<br> What about other family relations such as your brother or cousin commiting criminal acts. Do you owe any loyalty to your family or is it more important to obey the law.<br><br>             Michael.  
 <br /><br />
Response from: Nicholas D. Smith<br />

<blockquote><p>I don't think there is a hard-and-fast rule to give here.  Do you call the cops when you see your kid litter?  Of course not!  Just make them pick it up and give them a good lecture about why that is unacceptable behavior.  But if you see them commit murder?  Well, yes, then it seems appropriate.  If I caught one of my children shoplifting, I would try to come up with a way to make them repay the store--but I don't think I would be supportive if people at the store gave me an indication that they aggressively prosecute every case of shoplifting.</p>  <p>I think our responsibilities change in different relationships.  I would also try to "correct" minor misdemeanors (like littering) when done by friends or more distant family members.  The worse the crime, the more it seems to me to call for a legal report.  But I think we are, in a way, much more responsible for the behavior of our minor children than we are after they have reached the age of majority, and we are much less responsible for distant relatives, acquaintances, and the like.  So my own culpability in failing to report some law-breaking is relative to the degree of my responsibility for the behavior of that other person.</p>  <p>Do I call in every case I see of someone speeding past me on the freeway?  No.  That's not my responsibility.  But if I see evidence that they are seriously impaired in some way (weaving dangerously, etc.), well, yes, I would call that in.  </p>  <p>I think the only good advice I have to give here, beyond such rules of thumb, is that you exercise the best judgment of your own level of responsibility (to the criminal, to his or her victims, and to your fellow citizens) and of what you can do that is most likely to provide the best available resolution to the situation.</p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Aug 2011 14:07:58 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4221</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Ethics, Medicine - Nicholas D. Smith responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Over the past few years, my wife has become a staunch antivaccinationist. (We have a son on the autism spectrum; she has bought into the discredited vaccine causation theory of autism.) She is unreachable on this topic; no facts or reason will move her from her position. Unfortunately, she has decided that our children are to have no further vaccinations. She will not compromise on this. I, of course, want our children to be protected from dangerous diseases and thus want them to be vaccinated.<br><br>My question: What are my ethical obligations in this situation--to my wife, to my children, and to society? Going behind my wife's back and having the children vaccinated without her knowledge does not seem ethical. Agreeing to her demand that the children receive no further shots also seems unethical--this would put my kids at risk of disease, as well as other people. Telling my wife up front that I'm taking the children to get their shots, despite her objections, also seems problematic--they are her children also. <br><br>What are my best choices here?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Nicholas D. Smith<br />

<blockquote><p>Oh boy, I really feel for you.  I also have a son with autism spectrum, and as we both know, it is difficult enough dealing with that, even without the additional problem of an unreasonable spouse.  </p>  <p>My advice is that you do a little homework and find some support in your area (and <em>not</em> among the nutbags who have bought into the antivaccinationist nonsense, because it has been medically proven that nonsense is absolutely what it is).  Because your wife needs <em>help</em>, to put it rather bluntly.  She is feeling victimized by something that is just terrible luck and that has nothing whatsoever to do with where she is pointing the finger of blame here.</p>  <p>But the other thing is that you really, really have a serious ethical problem here, which your questions shows you are aware of.  Because your wife's adamant views now affet your otheer children, which puts not only <em>them</em> at risk--it also puts at risk any other children who might be exposed to your own children's (preventable) diseases.  This could get <em>really nasty</em>, and could result in death and disability that is <em>entirely preventable</em>.  if you think with compassions about the other children and those who love them, I think you will see that going along with your wife's mandate <em>is simply not an ethical option</em> for you.</p>  <p>I don't know if you feel that you two have talked this out, so that your powers of persuasion are exhausted.  (Maybe you could present her with some of the medical evidence I mentioned--it's all over the internet, so find it!)  But if you are at that point, then, as tough as this may sound, I think you are actually ethically obligated to take your children in for their vaccinations.  And once you have done this (but not before, lest she try to do something to prevent you), then you must tell her that you have done it, and face the music of what this does to your relationship.  </p>  <p>I realize that my advice may lead you into a world of difficulty with her.  But I frankly see no other ethical option.  <em>You do not have the right to put minor children</em> (yours or those of other parents) <em>at risk for such grave diseases, which are preventable</em>.  </p>  <p>I think it is time for some "tough love," unless you still think you might be able to convince your wife to be more flexible heere!</p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2011 09:16:37 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4217</link>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Gender - Nicholas D. Smith responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Parents who are conscious and critical of rigid gender norms face a problem.  If they raise their children without regard for traditional gender norms, then their children run the risk of being ostracized for not conforming to these gender norms.  Yet if a parent enforces gender norms on their child, then they are closing off potential spaces for self-fulfillment.<br><br>This kind of problem is most easily recognizable with regards to homosexuality - many parents say they have nothing against homosexuality, but wish their own children would be heterosexual, because of the social difficulties and ostracism faced by homosexuals.<br><br>As a parent, where must one stand?  Must one teach one's children to conform to rigid gender norms that one disapproves of, because it will make life easier for the children?  Or should one liberate one's child from these norms, and run the risk of them suffering greatly for their disregard of these norms?
 <br /><br />
Response from: Nicholas D. Smith<br />

<blockquote>Seems to me your question poses what is known as a false alternative.  I see no reason why a parent cannot help to inform a child about gender norms, so the child can understand these norms, while still making clear that such norms are really not necessary, not appropriate, and stifling.  Don't we try (well, those of us who are decent folks, anyway!) to do the same with racism and other forms of prejudice?</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Aug 2011 13:34:30 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4201</link>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
