There is the fact that it is possible to treat something badly or to damage it, whether or not it is sentient. A pair of shoes can be badly or well looked after, and it is wrong not to look after a good pair of shoes properly. A living thing like a hedge can be properly maintained or attended to, but something more is involved. Sometimes, it seems to me, the aesthetics of the "art object" (horrible phrase) can reflect what it actually is. So it is natural to trim a box hedge in one way, and a mixed hedge in another way, perhaps a less formal and more undulating, the shapes reflecting the different kinds of growth - hawthorn, or privet or beech. (A hedge that is full of straggly and unwanted sycamore looks awful, and the holes soon begin to show.) Pugs and poodles may be perfectly happy qua sentient beings, though often there are specific health problems with specific breeds, but it is perfectly coherent to object to the whole process of breeding and thinking of living things as being objects for our use - manipulation - and enjoyment only. Much the same comments can be made about the wilderness, and your question and suggestion raise profound and important questions of ecological ethics and aesthetics. For some, the ethics of GM foods has a spiritual dimension too.

"Fulfill" is a bit of a weasel word, isn't it? Suppose one partner would like to make love every night. The other, less libidinous spouse is more a two-or-three time a week type. We might say that the first spouse is "unfulfilled," but that sounds like a really poor excuse for adultery.

If the lack of "fulfillment" amount to some deep incompatibility, a good question to ask first might be: have the partners in the marriage talked about what's not working? Can it be fixed? If the answer really seems to be no, then the next obvious question is whether the marriage is worth saving.

Life is complicated, of course and blanket generalizations don't do justice to the complexity of people's relationships. But the old question: "How would I feel if the tables were turned?" is always a good one to ask when we're trying to decide if we're acting rightly. It's not just an old bromide; it gets at something pretty deep in our notions of right and wrong.

There's a lot of subtext in your question--you seem to be suggesting that if there are genes that influence whether one is homosexual or heterosexual, that indicates that being gay is a mental illness. That would be a very strange argument, since the fact that there are genes that influence traits or behaviors says nothing about whether that trait or behavior is good or bad in either the biological or ethical sense.

Perhaps you are thinking that because homosexuals do not have the desire to mate with the opposite sex, any genes that may underlie homosexuality are "maladaptive" in the way some mental illnesses are caused by maladaptive genes. But that is also a mistake, since (a) in humans' past evolutionary environments homosexuals may have reproduced (they wouldn't be the only humans who have had sex for procreation without being particularly attracted to their mates!), (b) there are interesting data suggesting that homosexuality in some animal species (perhaps including humans and their ancestors) is a biological adaptation (the short story is that homosexuality might be associated with increased altruism towards relatives and hence cause a net increase in related genes), and (c) any genes related to homosexuality may have been selected for because they "code for" other traits that are adaptive, while homosexual feelings or behaviors are simply byproducts of those traits (this would not mean homosexuality was "maladaptive" any more than our ability to do calculus or dance the tango is maladaptive--the useful desires and abilities to do calculus and to dance are byproducts of other traits that were selected for).

So, all of this is to say that even IF there are genes that influence humans' sexual preferences (and that has not been demonstrated yet), then that does not suggest that homosexuality is biologically "unfit" or maladaptive in any way (as mental illnesses generally are). But whether there are such genes also says nothing about whether a pill could be created to suppress homosexual desires (or to suppress sexual desires in general, which may be useful for some politicians to have!). Such pills seem feasible as long as these desires and behaviors are influenced by the sorts of things pills influence (e.g., our brain states), as they surely are.

This brings us to another problematic implication of your question--that the lack of a desire to procreate (or lack of procreating behavior) is a bad thing that should be suppressed. In our current environment, it might be a good thing for humans to procreate less (and for some politicians to procreate less "diversely"). Of course, if no (or too few) humans wanted to have sex with the opposite sex, well, we might need to do something, but in that case I doubt it would take a pill to get people to either have heterosexual sex or to use the artificial means we have to reproduce.

I should add that if it turns out that homosexuality is shown to be more a matter of genes than upbringing or choice, then it seems like that would help people arrive at the ethical conclusion that there is no reason to discriminate against homosexuals (as we have, too slowly, arrived at that conclusion about race, gender, and indeed, some mental disorders). But the worry is that, using the weak arguments I discussed above, people may instead think that homosexuality is unnatural or maladaptive or an illness that needs to be cured (or worse, eliminated). So, if you did not mean anything like this by your question, I apologize that my answer sounds a little grumpy!

Such work is surely often unethical or downright wrong -- for the reasons you suggest and also for the additional reason that such work may well be used by others to commit great crimes (e.g., to single out for torturous interrogation French citizens suspected of having ties to the Résistance). But your question, I think, is whether such work is unethical, or wrong in itself. To this my answer is no, for two separate reasons.

One reason derives from what I call the "sucker exemption": in some cases, ordinary moral constraints on one's conduct toward others are weakened or canceled by how these others are behaving or have behaved. If you have various agreements with another person, for instance, and he turns out routinely to violate these agreements whenever it suits him, then you are not morally required to honour your agreements with him when it does not suit you. Similarly here, it may not be wrong to spy on spies or, more generally on people who themselves flout serious moral constraints.

I hasten to add that this cannot be a blanket permission to treat suspected transgressors in any way we please. First, we need a high degree of confidence that the other is indeed a constraint violator. Second, our constraint-violation must be proportionate and related to the other's constraint violation (so the other's violating his agreements with you does not justify your beating him up, for example). Third, our constraint violation may not be permissible when it would adversely affect third parties (e.g., by spying on a spy we will often also spy on his innocent contacts -- but see next paragraph). Fourth, our constraint violation must not be fortuitous: there should be a plausible reason for it (as when by spying on a group of people we may be able to prevent or solve or punish a serious crime, something that we could not accomplish otherwise). -- I add these cautions because we have in recent years massively violated these four provisos in our treatment of suspected terrorists and suspected resisters to our occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Another reason derives from the harm that spying might prevent (or the good it might accomplish). To be sure, this is implicit in the fourth proviso to the sucker exemption above. But it has force also outside the sucker exemption, that is, it can justify spying on perfectly innocent people. Thus, to give an obvious example, it would have been alright surreptitiously to tap the phones of French citizens in occupied France in order to learn something about German troop movements in their local area and thereby to hasten the defeat of the Germans. More controversially, it would be permissible to spy on an innocent secretary in order to obtain access to his boss's life-saving pharmaceutical invention, which this boss wants to hold back in order to obtain a higher price later when the pandemic disease will have become much more widespread.

Now, "working in intelligence" raises yet further issues because the hired spy may not be given full information about her assignments ("need to know") and may not have the freedom to turn down assignments on a case-by-case basis. Taking on such a job requires a high degree of confidence that one's prospective superiors have carefully thought about, and are committed to observe, the limits on spying as sketched above. From what I know, I would place such a high degree of confidence in only a handful of national intelligence services. Shrouded in a cloak of secrecy, the operations of an intelligence service are fully understood only by a few top officials who may not have much of a prudential incentive to keep these operations morally decent. They get rewarded for results and very rarely punished for abuses. Putting oneself at the service of such people, one is likely to become involved in wrongdoing.

Given the way many in the wealthy parts of the world live, this is a compelling question. I think, however, that as posed the answer must be "no." For one thing, the best paying jobs may sometimes contribute more bads than goods to the world. For example, in some circumstances criminal activity or highly polluting industry may offer the best paying job. Also, it is not morally obligatory to live off as little as one can manage, giving away the rest to charity. People have obligations to themselves as well as to others, and one must balance what one owes to others against what one owes oneself. Finally, it's important to understand that some acts are morally admirable without being morally obligatory; and from where I sit extraordinary self-sacrifice for the sake of charity to others counts as just such an act. Having said that, it remains true, I think, as a matter of judgment, that many people in wealthier parts of the world live in ways that have tipped the balance excessively in the direction of self over others--becoming, in short, selfish and gluttonous. Given the serious environmental consequences of our excessive population and excessive consumption patterns, it has become morally obligatory for many of us to live off significantly less than we have been, whether we donate the remainder to charity or not. Living in less consumptive ways may, in fact, require not acquiring the best paying job possible, as many of the best paying jobs are part of highly consumptive enterprises.

Sometimes the argument you allude to is put like this: animals kill animals, so why can't we? I've heard many people say this to justify eating chickens, pigs, lambs and the like, and that's just strange, if you think about it. Somehow because a chicken and a tiger are both "animals"--that is, non-human--the chicken is supposed to be accountable for the tiger. If people would just restrict themselves to making this sort of argument in advance of going tiger hunting, it wouldn't be so bad. But then, I think in that case your answer is a good one. Because of our big brains and our capacity for morality, we should hold ourself to a higher standard. Unless under attack or just trying to survive, I can't think of any good reason to kill a tiger.

There is always a more elegant and thorough way to address any philosophical question--that's why we're all still at it here in the world's second-oldest profession!

But granting this, it seems to me that your own assessment is precisely right--our epistemic advantages over (at least most) other animals also bring with them greater ethical responsibilities. The cat can't consider whether playing with the live mouse until it dies (and then some more afterwards) is something he or she should be doing, but for us to be cruel or cause needless and excessive suffering is blameworthy.

A further point, however: Some of what constitutes our greater epistemic advantages can also yield a degree of epistemic disadvantage, which is why the exercise of epistemic modesty and an open-mindedness to relevant evidence is essential to good reasoning on questions like yours. Human beings, at their best, can indeed comprehend suffering and recognize it as having negative value. Part of the way in which we are able to do this is via our capacity to imagine ourselves undergoing such suffering. But this empathy, which can yield great advantages in our ethical reasoning, can also mislead us: Many of the animals (and, in extreme cases, even plants) that some count as worthy of such empathy are actually very poor targets for it. One who worries about the suffering he causes to the tomato plant in picking its fruit should probably find some other target for concern! What we need always, to make the best decisions, is the best information thoughfully assessed.

Congratulations both on your nomination and on your pangs on conscience - the latter is too rarely seen among more experienced politicians!

However, I am happy to set your mind at rest. Voting for oneself in an election poses no moral hazards that I can see. (I would change my mind about this if we were talking about a corrupt system, where the vote is rigged or certain voters are unfairly excluded.)

I suspect your worries come from two fronts. First, it may seem egotistical to vote for oneself. This would explain your shy refuge in the anonymous vote. Rather than think of it as egotistical you might instead see this vote as confident: you are confident in your ability to work hard and take the job seriously. One thing that tells me this confidence is justified and not ego-driven is the very fact that you wrote in to us. You are already taking the post seriously before it is even yours.

Second, you raise the interesting idea that your belief in your candidacy is not due to your diligent interpretations of the manifestos, but your subconscious motivations. The only way to really tell if your proposals for the school are superior is to talk to other students about your ideas and see what they think. This is what campaigns ought to be about. You need not go about it in a boorish way, kissing babies and shaking hands (or whatever the school equivalent is). Of course, rational dialogue and campaigns frequently don't spin in the same orbit so don't be horribly disappointed if the student response is less than what you would like.

Good luck and remember to spell your own name correctly!

Actually, I very much doubt that you do try to root out beliefs as much as possible. After all, you believe -- on very good grounds! -- that apples aren't poisonous, that butter keeps better in the fridge, that New York is east of California, that Obama is President, that the moon isn't made of green cheese, that 2 + 2 = 4, and a whole host of other truths. Why on earth would you want to root out beliefs such as these? And if you did try to do so, how could you live any sort of life? If you had no beliefs one way or the other about what is safely edible, then you'd very soon poison yourself! We need true beliefs to guide successful action.

So, I take it that it isn't beliefs in general that you are trying to root out (that way madness lies!), but much more specifically it is those of your beliefs for which there are insufficient rational grounds and/or which are not generated in reliable ways. Beliefs which are not appropriately supported are too likely to be false, and we need our beliefs to be true if they are to lead to successful action. So quite right to want to root out the beliefs that don't pass scrutiny. Of course we should all be alert to the dangers of jumping to conclusions, of being swayed by bad arguments, of believing things just because those around us do (particular dangers, indeed, when thinking about e.g. religion or politics). A dose of self-critical scepticism is a very healthy thing, even if sometimes unconfortable to administer.

And what if we think others are holding onto (say) religious or political beliefs that are dubious? Well, again the same applies: a stringent dose of scepticism is what is needed. (Which isn't to say that it is always appropriate or polite to try to administer it!) For if a belief doesn't stand up to vigorous rational scrutiny it really isn't worth having. So in fact the way to show respect for those we disagree with is indeed precisely to engage critically with their ideas and argue: which is, of course, how we learn to improve our own views. On the other hand -- and I take it that this is perhaps the thought behind the question -- the opinions of believers who try to insulate certain of their beliefs from such vigorous scrutiny, or who try to block open critical enquiry of their ideas, deserve no respect at all.

'[I]n general truth-telling is morally preferable to lying . . .', Peter Fosl writes. This doesn't seem quite right. Lying is wrong, and telling the truth is right, not just a bit "morally preferable", even if there are worse things than lying. There seem to be too many ways of avoiding or deflecting the question to make it seem plausible to say that one has to respond, morally speaking, by saying something. Why not simply ignore the question? That might be rude, or even a bit cold, but it's better than telling a lie, surely.