great point -- I think I largely agree -- but there may, still, be some disanalogy between the two cases (the Irish legend v. 'God') -- namely once you begin describing God's various attributes (omnipotence, creator, goodness, etc.) then it may well be plausible to seek independent/direct evidence of his existence in the world around you, independent that is of the 'source' of the 'tale' itself -- and that might not be equally true, or true to the same degree, as in the Irish legend case -- after all, you may not need to know who thought of the idea of a 'Creator' God first in order to evaluate, perfectly rationally, whether the world around us exhibits any evidence of intelligent design or creation -- of course, when you do learn more about the 'source' of the idea of God that may increase your skepticism about the truth of the claim that God exists, but it does seem to me that claim may also be evaluable independently of its sources --

best,

Andrew

I am not a vegetarian but I think I should be. I would not couch the issue in rights language but putting animals through suffering just so I can have my New York Strip Steak just seems wrong to me. Given human history, I cannot imagine what kind of arguments we humans could muster if aliens came down and proposed to us as a food source.

The medieval philosophers used to think of existence in terms of degrees, and some in modern philosophy entertained such an idea (Kant, for example, described God as the most real being). but usually existence is not treated as something that comes in kinds or degrees or in different senses. Actually, some philosophers seek to avoid the term 'exists' unless really pressed upon. So, for example, a philosopher might think it less misleading to say that Dumbledor is a character in Rowlings' novels rather than to say that Dumbledor exists in Rowlings' novels.

There are, however, two areas when 'existence' as a term / concept gets a bit tricky: some theologians believe that to claim 'God exists' is to treat God as simply one of any number of things that exist. Some of them, therefore, prefer simply to refer to God without the word 'exist' or 'existence' (e.g. affirming there is a God of love rather than claiming there exists a God of love). One philosopher in the last century speculated about whether there may be objects that neither exist or do not exist; he thought some things may subsist.

Yes, we do think that things exist which we cannot pick up or see. (For instance, we say that numbers exist, or that the center of mass of the solar system does.) What precisely do we mean by "exists" then? That's one problem you raise. I'm not sure how to answer it: the notion of "existence" seems so basic, it's hard to imagine much light being shed on it from other, yet clearer, notions.

But you raise another question: whether there's something problematic in even asking what "exists" means. Your thought is that there is, since the question itself involves the notion of existence. I'm not sure that it does: In asking for clarification of a notion, we're not asking whether that notion exists (whatever that means). You might say that we're asking what "exists" means. And although it's not clear exactly what we're doing when we ask what a word means, it doesn't seem right to say that we're asking whether something exists.

Of course, your paradox could perhaps be reinstated by shifting our focus to the word "means". What does "means" mean, you might now ask. Here you might argue as follows: either we know what "means" means, in which case, there's no point in asking this question; or we don't know what "means" means, in which case we don't even understand the question. In sum, if we understand the original question then there's no point in asking it. This issue has been kicking around since Plato's day! It's sometimes known as the paradox of analysis. You can find some information about it here.

I see your point - asking, "What is existence?" does seem to be like asking about the existence of existence. That is, the question seems to presuppose the very "thing" that is being inquired about. Existence surely does seem to evade clear definition. Maybe we define things in terms of attributes and to exist is to be a kind of place holder for predicates. Got me. Thanks for a great question

And one might add that the cells themselves are hardly immune from "renewal" at the molecular level. So the short version is: If identity requires complete coincidence of matter, then essentially nothing but sub-atomic particles survive over any reasonable stretch of time. That does rather suggest, though the contrary view is certainly held, that identity over time simply does not require complete coincidence of matter. What it does require is not very clear, but that is no reason to despair.

Of course, the question didn't ask about complete coincidence of matter. But it's unclear why anything less might suffice. And, if it does, then you run into issues about transitivity: A might share much of its matter with B, which shares much of its matter with C; but A and C do not share much of their matter.

It's an interesting question, and to answer it, I'm inclined to turn things around. Let's start with what's clear: the fact that the rapist committed the rape seven years ago (supposing for the moment that this is the magic number) isn't a reason to let him off. In fact, the very way you pose the question makes the point. You ask about "the rapist" who committed "his crime" long ago. You've already take it for granted that we can say: this man is the one who committed the crime. And we can say it without worrying about how many cells have come and gone.

So yes: there is something more -- or something other -- to the notion of a person than just the idea of a collection of cells. The something needn't be anything spooky. After all, a corporation can exist for a hundred years, even though all the people have changed and all the buildings and equipment it owns have gradually been replaced. Although saying exactly what sameness amounts to here is complicated, it won't call for talking about anything strange. It will be a matter of various continuities and connections among perfectly ordinary agents, entities and events.

In fact, the word "agent" gives us a clue to the case of persons. John Locke famously observed that 'person' is a forensic notion. What he meant was that personhood has to do with accountability, agency and the like. To decide whether it makes sense to hold this human being accountable for what a certain human being did twenty years ago isn't a question that we approach by reviewing the history of the cells in his body, and someone who thought it did would show that they don't understand what was being asked.

Once again, detailed account will be complicated. But we can say at least this: when we ask whether a human being at one time is the same person as a human being at another time, we're asking about various kinds of connections and continuities. And what seems clear is that there can be enough of the right sorts of connections and continuities even if the cells that make up the present body are not the ones that made up the one from long ago.

You might try the first few chapters of Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy and see if that is relevant to what you have in mind.

You exist right now, right? You have some specific number of hairs on your head, and your toenails are some definite shape, etc. Nobody's keeping track of any of these things, though. Now flash forward to the year 3000, when you've completely and totally faded into obscurity. There is no possibility whatever of retrieving any information about you. Did you every exist, with your specific attributes? I suspect you're going to say "of course." Ditto for all the people who preceded you. To be is not to be remembered!

I hope Jennifer Church will also answer this one. But I don't quite see why the decision to commit suicide must be based upon the fallacy of thinking that one will be better off. The value of eliminating something bad does not have to derive from some (other) benefit achieved in the process. (See step (C) in the argument below.)

(A) S's life now involves unbearable and irremediable pain and/or suffering of some other sort.

(B) If the life is ended, so will the pain and/or suffering of some other sort.

(C) Ending unbearable and irremediable pain and/or suffering of some other sort is at least sometimes a good reason to do something.

Hence, (D) There can be a good reason to end a life of unbearable pain and/or suffering of some other sort.

I see nothing in this argument that presupposes the fallacy you mention--for example, it is not assumed that by ending the pain and/or suffering of some other sort that the one whose pain or suffering has been ended will be "better off." As you say, they won't be "better off," they will simply be gone. But the pain or suffering will also be gone, and that's not such a bad thing.