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<title>AskPhilosophers.org | "Gender"</title>
<description>You ask. Philosophers answer.</description>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender - Richard Heck responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Normally, I would refrain from piggybacking on other people's questions, but I am not sure when I will again find occasion to ask the kinds of questions I have in mind. Very recently, a woman asked a question about transsexuals and how they could feel that they were of a certain gender (Question #4282). I have some related questions, although it does not exclusively concern the transsexual and transgender identities. I will focus for now on the transgender identity in asking my questions, but I hope it is clear that my question applies just as much to the cisgender identity.<br><br>It seems to me that many people whom I encounter confidently hold both of these beliefs:<br><br>(A): Gender, as distinct from sex, is a social construction.<br><br>(B): People can be transgender.<br><br>I have struggled to reconcile what has struck me as a glaring contradiction between these two beliefs. For people to be able to be transgender, it must be possible for them to have genders; this cannot be possible lest, in some fundamental sense, gender exists. But if gender is a social construction and nothing more, then gender does not exist in this fundamental sense.<br><br>If my reasoning so far is sound, then it cannot both be the case that gender is a social construction and that people can be transgender. If we assume the reality of gender (thereby rejecting the social construction thesis of gender), then it follows almost as a matter of course that people can be transgender. It may even be our conviction that people can be transgender that leads us to affirm the ultimate reality of gender itself.<br><br>But what if we aren't ready to abandon the social construction thesis of gender? If what I have said thus far is right, then it seems that not only can people not be transgender, but they cannot be of any gender whatsoever. And indeed, I must confess that I cannot help but wonder why people in general put themselves through hell and back solely in the pursuit of gender, costing themselves immensely in the way of their time, their energy, their money, and even their health and well-being. For if I am understanding the social construction thesis and its implications correctly, then gender identity must be itself a falsehood.<br><br>If everything I have said is sound, then my line of thought leads to two questions:<br><br>(1) If gender itself is a social construction and nothing more, are we committed to an error theory or a false consciousness thesis on gender identity?<br><br>(2) If gender itself is a social construction and nothing more, is it possible for us to see a person's pursuit of gender as being a worthwhile enterprise, even for her?<br><br>I mean no offense in asking these questions, and my apologies if I have caused any offense. These sorts of questions about the existential nature of gender and gender identity have fascinated me for years now but I have been afraid to talk about them openly for fear of how people might react to my asking such questions. Furthermore, I have not had much luck in finding relevant literature pertaining to these kinds of questions, making me wonder if there is some obvious and embarrassing flaw in my reasoning or if I just happen to be a minority of one in holding the views I do.<br><br>Thank you for considering my rather long-winded set of questions. :)
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Response from: Richard Heck<br />

<blockquote><p>Since I answered the original question, I will try also to answer this one.</p><p>We need to reconsider the phrase "social construction and nothing more", or at least to what you take to be the implications of such a description, that somehow what is socially constructed isn't real. One would need a lot of argument to establish that conclusion. Prima facie, socially constituted facts are no less real than biological or anatomical facts; they are just different. Consider, e.g., facts about political and legal authority. Surely these are socially constituted, but I would not suggest you tell a military tribunal that you can't be guilty of disobeying an order from a superior because social facts are unreal. That should answer question (1), I hope.<br /></p><p>Similarly, socially constituted facts matter to people every bit as much (and in some cases more) than biological facts. As I pointed out in response to the previous question, the mere fact that gender is a social (not merely anatomical) matter does not imply that people do not experience it as a fundamental part of their identity. Indeed, since humans are "social animals", there is nothing at all surprising about this. How we relate to ourselves is bound up very much with how we relate to the world around us, and that includes the social world. And that, I hope, answers question (2): Whether gender is a social construction just doesn't bear upon the question whether one's gender identity can or should be important to one's sense of self. Indeed, since it is just obvious that gender identity is important to people's sense of self, it's not clear what's left to discuss here.<br /></p><p>So, people do have genders, and they can have them even if gender does not "exist in [the] fundamental sense", meaning, I take it: even if gender is not a biological notion. People can have jobs, and friends, and husbands and wives, and stand in relations of authority to one another, too, even though these do not "exist in [the] fundamental sense" either. One ought not get carried away with the language here, even if one does think there is something to be made of this "fundamental sense" language (as I am not entirely sure there is).</p><p>I'd love to be able to point you towards more to read, as I do think these are fascinating issues. Unfortunately, I'm no expert. But you might start with the article on <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-metaphysics/" target="_blank">Feminist Metaphysics</a> over at the Stanford Encyclopedia. The soon to be out book <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/?view=usa&ci=9780199740406"><em>The Metaphysics of Gender</em>, by Charlotte Witt</a>, will be technical, but it might be something to which you would be sympathetic.<br /></p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2011 12:58:13 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4302</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender - Richard Heck responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Although I don't doubt the pain of transsexual people who feel that their bodies do not match their gender, I find myself skeptical of their claims. I am female, I don't doubt that I am female, yet I do not have any idea what it means to "feel like a woman." It also happens that I have no interest in hairdos, high heels, or the notion of "femininity." Although I am undoubtedly a woman, I would guess that a person who feels like a man trapped in a woman's body does not feel like I do, or aspire to being a woman such as me. When a MTF transsexual person insists that they are genuinely women and must change their male bodies to match their internal state, how can their conviction be based on anything but imagination, speculation and stereotypes? How can they possibly know what it feels like to be a woman if I, a woman, do not know that feeling? (Please note that I do not mean any disrespect to transsexuals; I'm genuinely trying to understand.)
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Response from: Richard Heck<br />

<blockquote>While I agree with Oliver's judgements, I also think many people are genuinely puzzled about how someone could feel as if they had the wrong sort of body, so let me try to say a few things that might help to clarify it. I should say, however, that I am no expert on these issues, and so I'm sure to get some of the established terminology wrong.<br /><br />Let's start with a different sort of example. I am of Irish descent. But I do not think of myself as Irish-American. From my point of view, the fact that many of my ancestors lived in Ireland is just that: a fact about my family's past. For other people, however, being of Irish descent is very important to their sense of who they are. They value Irish traditions and customs, participate in Irish celebrations, and so forth. It is, as we say, part of their identity to be Irish-American. And so, if someone tells a rude joke about "the Irish", I wouldn't really take it personally; I'd just dismiss that person as a jerk. Someone who identifies as Irish-American would, on the contrary, rightly feel as if they had been insulted.<br /><br />Lesson: The "external" facts about one's family are very different from the "internal" facts about one's identity. Ethnicity is not the same as ancestry.<br /><br />Similar things can be said about gender, though here it gets even more complicated, because there are at least three different things "male" and "female" can mean. First, and most obviously, one might have in mind what we could call "anatomical sex". This is a matter of what sort of external genitalia one has: A penis or a vagina. A closely related but still different notion is what we might call "genetic sex". This is a matter of what kinds of chromosomes one has: XX or XY. But neither the anatomical nor the biological notion is what people have in mind when they speak (in contexts like this one) about gender. That notion of gender is <em>social</em> in character. It has to do not with genetics or anatomy but with social roles and expectations. It is, as people say, socially constructed.<br /><br />None of these notions is as "clean" as people usually think. It just isn't as simple as XX vs XY; there are intermediate and other states. Anatomically, there are various sorts of hermaphrodites and other combinations, and if we include secondary sex characteristics (breast development, facial hair, etc), things get even more confusing. One should also realize that genetic sex and anatomical sex can come apart, even at birth. Some people who are XY are born anatomically female, due to issues connected to the expression of the so-called SRY protein during fetal development. (This already makes it a very interesting question what it's supposed to mean that marriage must be between "one man and one woman".) As far as social gender is concerned, most people, it is true, strongly identify with the social gender that goes with their anatomy. But some people  (the androgynous) don't strongly identify with any gender. (Perhaps you do not, since you say you have "no interest in the notion of 'femininity'".) Other people find themselves identifying with aspects of each gender, either moving between them in different situations (the bi-gendered) or stably experiencing themselves as partly male and partly female (the ambi-gendered).<br /><br />But what does it mean to "feel female" or "feel male"? Well, the first thing to say is that, when someone who is anatomically female speaks about "feeling male", it is (usually) the social notion that is in play. What they mean is that, as a matter of their own self conception, they identify as male, not as female. OK, so what does that mean? Since the notion of gender in play here is social, we might think, in the first instance, that "feeling male" has something to do with how the person wants to be perceived and treated socially. As we all know, people who "present" socially as male are treated very differently from people who "present" as female. Men and women are expected to like different things, and to do different things, and so forth. So it is easy to understand how someone might feel a kind of "disconnect" between the social role they are assigned, in virtue of presenting as female, and how they feel inside, that is, how they feel they ought to be treated. <br /><br />Now, the really crucial point is that this can perfectly well be a matter of how one feels, and not just a matter of what one thinks. Although gender is a social notion, it is one that we all internalize through the process of socialization. It isn't at all a matter of what one thinks about gender: whether you think women like hairdos and high heels, to use your example. How we interact with other people is affected simply by our knowing of such stereotypes, even if we reject them, and psychologists and sociologists have gotten very, very good over the last few decades at designing experiments to prove this point. <br /><br />Here's an example. Suppose you take some kids and ask them to do a moderately difficult math test. Half of them you ask just to put their name at the top; half you ask to put their name and gender. Then the girls in the second group will do worse than the girls in the first group! It doesn't matter if they really think that girls are no good at math. It's enough if they know of the stereotype, and then you remind them that they're girls. What's really amazing is that, if the test is really easy, then the girls in the second group will do better than the girls in the first group. It's as if they're thinking: We'll show them who's bad at math!!<br /><br />Lesson: Conceptions of masculinity and femininity, and the associated stereotypes, are so deeply ingrained in our brains that, whether we agree with them or not, they shape almost all of our social interactions. (That is not much of a surprise, if you think about it in evolutionary terms.) Now, I'm sure all of us feel, at times, as if society assumes things about us, in virtue of our gender, that don't fit who we are. But can one imagine what it would be like to feel as if society <em>almost always</em> assumed things about us that didn't fit? It would be similar to what would happen if everyone assumed that, since I have red hair and freckles, I must be interested in how the Irish rugby team is doing this year, or that I must love Guinness and soda bread and get real excited about St Patricks Day. (OK, I do love Guinness!) But, of course, compared to how one's gender determines one's life, that would be but a minor annoyance. Surely being treated, as a matter of course, as if you were someone you were not would be very difficult and very painful. (And yes, this does extend to racial stereotyping, too.)<br /><br />If all of that makes sense, then maybe we can also understand, at least a bit, why someone might want to change their body to conform to the gender with which they identify. It isn't, in the first instance, as if they feel they have the wrong body. In the first instance, it's a matter of their self-identity: who they feel they are and how they relate to others socially. But, although anatomical sex and gender are two different things, matters concerned with the body are about as central to how our society understands gender as anything could be. So, as part of feeling as if one is really male, not female, one might well also feel as if one had the wrong kind of body. In fact, not all trans-gendered people do feel that way, though many do.<br /><br />So, well, I hope that helps.</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2011 18:27:15 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4282</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender - Oliver Leaman responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Although I don't doubt the pain of transsexual people who feel that their bodies do not match their gender, I find myself skeptical of their claims. I am female, I don't doubt that I am female, yet I do not have any idea what it means to "feel like a woman." It also happens that I have no interest in hairdos, high heels, or the notion of "femininity." Although I am undoubtedly a woman, I would guess that a person who feels like a man trapped in a woman's body does not feel like I do, or aspire to being a woman such as me. When a MTF transsexual person insists that they are genuinely women and must change their male bodies to match their internal state, how can their conviction be based on anything but imagination, speculation and stereotypes? How can they possibly know what it feels like to be a woman if I, a woman, do not know that feeling? (Please note that I do not mean any disrespect to transsexuals; I'm genuinely trying to understand.)
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Response from: Oliver Leaman<br />

<blockquote><p>What is wrong with speculation, imagination and stereotypes? If someone feels that he or she is in the wrong body, I think we have to treat their feelings with respect and if they are prepared for the long and difficult process of changing their gender, then even more so. </p><p>Sometimes a child is enthusiastic about a sporting activity in which he or she is clearly entirely lacking in skill, yet they see themselves very differently, perhaps, and this motivates them to carry on. It is just speculation, imagination and stereotypes, yet it represents who, at that stage, they are. We may be dubious, but who are we to say what someone should do, or become, provided of course that it does not harm others in the process of realization? <br /></p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2011 18:27:15 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4282</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Feminism, Gender, Sex - Miriam Solomon responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ In this question, I'm going to assume there are strictly two human biological sexes, male and female. That assumption isn't exactly true (chromosomal variations), but it's a close enough approximation to ask the question.<br><br>At restaurants such as "Hooters," provocatively-clad females serve food to patrons. There are no male waiters. No one seems to think too much about it.<br><br>I think, however, that many people would be appalled if we had restaurants whose theme was to have provocatively-clad Jewish people serve food, or provocatively-clad African Americans serve food, or provocatively clad [insert religious or ethnic or national group] serve food.<br><br>There are, of course, ethnic restaurants. So we might think of Hooters as nothing more and nothing less than another type of ethnic restaurant, this one peculiar to sex instead of ethnicity.  Is this good reasoning? <br><br>Maybe that reasoning is not valid.  Women have a sex (female) and men have a sex (male).  There can't be anything intrinsically more sexual about women than about men; they obviously both have a sex.<br><br>Completely separate from biological sex, there is something we might call "sexualization,"  achieved through dress and behavior. So Hooters sexualizes one group -- women -- to the exclusion of another -- men.<br><br>So maybe the correct analogy here really would be a restaurant to sexualize all waiters (both male and female) of a particular ethnicity.   Is this good reasoning? <br><br>Why is Hooters socially normative, while a restaurant based on the sexualization of an ethnic or religious group would be considered inappropriate?    <br>
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Response from: Miriam Solomon<br />

<blockquote>The questions that you are asking are terrific!  They can also be taken further.  E.g. is it necessary for you to assume that there are strictly two biological sexes? (I don't think so).  Or e.g. What is wrong (if anything) with sexualization of a group?  What is wrong with sexualization of a subordinate group?  It is not difficult to turn up inconsistencies in what society considers to be socially normative.</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Sep 2011 11:17:23 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4274</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender, Identity - Oliver Leaman responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ I am transitioning from male to female, along with physical changes I notice changes in my thinking and emotions. Am I the same person or am I becoming some one else? How do we know who we are and do we become different people over time?
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Response from: Oliver Leaman<br />

<blockquote>You are a good guide here since you are undergoing the changes. Presumably you have initiated this process because you feel that you are really not the gender you started off as, and so your notion of personal identity was quite complex even before the process got underway. Clearly we change all the time, and sometimes so radically we come to believe that we are quite different from how we were in the past. You are in the interesting position of perhaps feeling that you are finally approaching becoming the sort of person you "really" were all the time, and you are thus in the best position to report on how your feelings make up this changing self-perception. Self-identity is clearly far from a simple notion and nothing evidences that so much as your course of action.</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Sep 2011 20:02:34 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4275</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Children, Gender - Nicholas D. Smith responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Parents who are conscious and critical of rigid gender norms face a problem.  If they raise their children without regard for traditional gender norms, then their children run the risk of being ostracized for not conforming to these gender norms.  Yet if a parent enforces gender norms on their child, then they are closing off potential spaces for self-fulfillment.<br><br>This kind of problem is most easily recognizable with regards to homosexuality - many parents say they have nothing against homosexuality, but wish their own children would be heterosexual, because of the social difficulties and ostracism faced by homosexuals.<br><br>As a parent, where must one stand?  Must one teach one's children to conform to rigid gender norms that one disapproves of, because it will make life easier for the children?  Or should one liberate one's child from these norms, and run the risk of them suffering greatly for their disregard of these norms?
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Response from: Nicholas D. Smith<br />

<blockquote>Seems to me your question poses what is known as a false alternative.  I see no reason why a parent cannot help to inform a child about gender norms, so the child can understand these norms, while still making clear that such norms are really not necessary, not appropriate, and stifling.  Don't we try (well, those of us who are decent folks, anyway!) to do the same with racism and other forms of prejudice?</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Aug 2011 13:34:30 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4201</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender, Justice, Medicine - Oliver Leaman responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Would the possibility of women competing on equal footing with men be thinkable without contraceptives, birth control, and access to abortion?
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Response from: Oliver Leaman<br />

<blockquote>Certainly. The fact that women have children does not mean that they are obliged to be the main carers for those children once they are born, nor does it mean that while pregnant they are in any way incapacitated. If childcare were to be shared equally, or adequately organized by the state or community, the fact that women have children would be no hindrance to any of their other putative activities.</blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Sun, 24 Jul 2011 05:32:01 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4186</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender - Miriam Solomon responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Does the existence of intersex people invalidate the binary conception of gender?
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Response from: Miriam Solomon<br />

<blockquote><p>You ask a complicated question very simply!  Here's some advice about how to pursue this topic, with a few oversimplifications of my own.  Sex (physical sex) is often distinguished from gender (gender identification in people, often culturally influenced) as well as from sexuality (sexual orientation).  Intersex people have bodies that are not "typically male bodies" or "typically female bodies" but have elements of both.  This ranges from (controversially) hypospadias in men (the urethra not opening at the tip of the penis) to individuals with both an ovary and a testis.  Anne Fausto-Sterling's excellent book <em>Sexing the Body </em>describes the range.  Then the question is, do we regard intersex individuals as "abnormalities," and thereby preserve our traditional understanding of biological sex as a binary, or do we regard intersex individuals as counterexamples to our traditional understanding of biological sex?  Some (including Fausto-Sterling) appear to think that the answer to this depends at least in part on the prevalence of intersex persons.  I prefer the approach of Joan Roughgarden <em>Evolution's Rainbow</em>, who explores the biological significance of sex and its variability across the plant and animal kingdom.  I think she shows that are biological reasons (from evolutionary considerations etc) for giving up the binary conception of gender.</p>  <p>(Intersex should be distinguished from "transsex" in which individuals have sex typical bodies but different gender identity.  Both should be distinguished from sexual orientation.)</p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Jul 2011 12:13:49 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4160</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Feminism, Gender, Justice - Richard Heck responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Suppose a very well to do doctor was married to a very bright man who happened to be a house husband. They had no children but he worked very hard maintaining their household. One day however the wife loses her job unexpectedly and asks her husband to help pitch in and get a job. He says, "well I don't want to do that." and in reply she says, "well then maybe we should get a divorce. And he says "Well, yes you can divorce me but I am entitled to half of your earnings for during the time we were married." I don't know this for sure but my gut tells me that most women would find something very wrong with that situation. It would seem wrong because it would seem like the man is responsible for his own livelihood after the relationship terminates. In most situations however the man is the bread winner and the women is the housewife and I think most people don't have a problem with a man paying half his earned income to his divorced wife. Am I wrong in my assumption that women (and men) would balk at the idea of a woman paying a house husband a hefty divorce settlement? Am I wrong in my assumption that most people wouldn't balk if the genders were reversed? Do divorce laws imply that there are fundamental perhaps ontological differences between men and women? Are there fundamental differences in the social situation of women that would justify the difference in how I imagine most people perceive the appropriateness of paying a house husband versus a housewife? What is feminism's stance on this question? Is there something fundamental and obvious here that I missing out on?
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Response from: Richard Heck<br />

<blockquote><p>Certainly nowadays the law would require the woman to pay alimony in this situation, and I am sure there have been many such cases. </p><p>I find it hard to see how anyone who wasn't just flatly sexist might think it should be otherwise. Perhaps vestiges of sexist thinking with which we have all been saddled by our society would make our gut reaction a little different, but fortunately we have brains and do not have to be ruled by our guts.<br /></p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jun 2011 19:04:48 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4111</link>
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		<title><![CDATA[ Question about Gender, Identity - Thomas Pogge responds]]></title>
		<description><![CDATA[ Is it moral for me as a transexual to expect others to treat me as female? Is this a basic right of self-identification or am I inappropriately impinging my will on others?
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Response from: Thomas Pogge<br />

<blockquote><p>You mean the word "expect" in a normative sense, I take it. You are asking others to accept and respect your self-identification and suggesting to them that they ought to accept and respect it. So you are asking for more than a basic right of self-identification. Still, I think what you ask is reasonable and something we others ought to accept and respect much as we <strong>ought</strong> to accept and respect another person's (newly changed or old) religious identification, sexual preference or choice of lifestyle when such choices do not harm us or third parties. </p>  <p>Obviously, a choice like yours may be hard for some persons to accept -- a wife may find it hard to accept that the man she loved and married now asks to be treated as a female. But leaving a narrow class of such exceptions aside, I don't think you are asking too much. Many may find it difficult to express their acceptance and respect in an easy and natural way as any explicit expression may strike them as awkward for themselves and also for you. But I don't think you really ask for, or need, such an explicit verbal acceptance. In fact, it may be more accepting just to treat you as a female, as you say, as just another woman -- without making a big to-do about it. Yes, we can do this, and we should. </p></blockquote> ]]></description>
		<pubDate>Sun, 29 May 2011 17:26:35 EST</pubDate>
		<link>http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4075</link>
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