I'm not as confident as Peter Fosl about the testability issue: perhaps we need to know a bit more about what counts as "the theistic hypothesis".

After all, a lot of theistic hypotheses look perfectly testable by ordinary scientific standards. Take, for example, the claim that Zeus exists. I take it that no one now reading this site believes that that claim is literally true! But why? Well the existence claim, taken literally, is bound up with a range of stories about how the world works; and we now know the world just doesn't work that way. Mount Olympus is not populated with gods; bolts of lightning are naturally caused discharges of electricity; clouds and rain are not gathered by supernatural agency; burnt sacrifices to Zeus do not increase the chances of better crops or victory in battle; and so it goes. Science -- in the broadest sense of our empirically disciplined enquiries into how things work -- has shown we have no need of the Olympian gods to explain anything. Of course, that doesn't mean that the Greek myths aren't full of insights into the secrets of the human heart! But in so far as they essentially embody creation stories and stories about the origin of natural phenomena like storms and tempests, science -- in the broad sense -- uncontroversially shows that they are literally false.

So if someone claims that the empirical testing methods characteristic of science can't in general impact on the questions about the existence of various gods, then that's surely wrong. Which raises a nice question: why should the question of the existence of the Judeo-Christian God (the theistic hypothesis, perhaps) be different in this respect from the question of the existence of Zeus?

Well, the questions won't have a different status if we take the God-story also to be essentially bound up with e.g. certain biblical creation stories. Science has more than adequately shown that those stories aren't literally true. And again, petitionary prayer to God is no more effective in bringing about worldly goods than sacrifice to Zeus (it does no better in helping you recover from illness, say, than can be explained as a placebo effect). In so far as claims about the existence of God are bound up with specific such claims about how the world works, science can impact. And indeed, does impact strongly negatively.

But of course, sophisticated, scientifically knowledgeable, believers can and do react to that point in (at least) two different ways. One way is to disentangle the theistic hypothesis from the creation myths, and other stories about how the world works: though you might well begin to wonder, as God becomes more and more abstract, more remote from the quotidian world in which we live our lives, why we should care. Another way (characteristic I think of one strand of English Anglicanism) is to agree that in so far as talk of God is bound up with stories about how the world works, it is encroaching on the province of science, and is mostly literally false. However, that doesn't mean that the Christian myths, say, aren't very good myths to live ones life by, or that sharing Christian ritual practice isn't a sustaining prop to living a good life in a community.

No.

But that's no limitation on such a god's power. We're not saying that there is some possible task that this god fails to be able to pull off. We're saying that there isn't any task that is coherently describable as "making a square triangle".

For consider: what could possibly count as making a square triangle? To be a square requires having four sides. To be a triangle requires not having four sides but only three. So nothing can possibly count as being both a square and a triangle. Hence whatever the god (or anyone else) does, it couldn't correctly be described as "making a square triangle" for that isn't a coherent description of anything.

Take a mundane case. I pass you the cookies. You can take one. Or you can take none. Both are within your power. But you can't simultaneously both take one and not take one. But saying that plainly isn't to say that there is some limitation on your powers of choice vis-a-vis cookies! The point is that nothing could count as simultaneously both taking one and not taking one -- it's just not a coherent description of a possible action. Likewise to say that some god can't make a square triangle isn't to limit his creative powers: the point is that nothing could count as succeeding at that.

Yeah, I think that's right. The theistic hypothesis is not testable through the procedures of natural science. That in itself has led many, myself included, to a kind of agnosticism about theism. That's also one of the reasons why neither creationism nor much of what is described as intelligent design are scientific.

Do note, however, that testability may not be the only basis for rejecting (or accepting) theism. Some reject theism because they find theistic language itself intolerably confused and senseless. Others point to the political and moral problems associated with theisms (the violence, the intolerance, the blunting of norms of reason and critical thinking). (I frequently find that line of reasoning attractive.) Some object to the way theism fails to produce agreement and generates divisions and sects. (Often compelling to me, too.) Along similar lines, others have concluded that it's simply undesirable to commit to beliefs that are excessively complex or, alternatively not as simple as possible. (Think of how many, many logically possible theisms there are.) The scientist Laplace, for example, to a question from Napoleon as to why his book contained no reference to God responded with: "Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là" (I had no need of that hypothesis).

On the other hand, many people do seem to need that hypothesis and derive many benefits and satisfaction from belief in a deity. Who's to say for sure that they are wrong?

So far as testability goes, however, you're dead on.

No and yes. Historically, the idea of toleration developed along side streams of philosophical scrutiny of religious belief that suggested, rightly I think, that there's just not very good reason for zealous commitment to religious beliefs. So, while a zealot may, as you describe it, be exceedingly confident or dogmatic in his or her belief, there's no sound justification for doing so. In this sense, strains of modern skepticism have tempered religious belief in the form of what early modern thinkers called "enthusiasm." But, on the other hand, there are many ways of holding a belief "strongly." There are, one might say, ways of holding religious beliefs strongly that are consistent with tolerance and ways of holding beliefs strongly that are inconsistent. Tolerance itself commonly suggests that contrary views are considered wrong and even, perhaps, obnoxious. So, analogously, we speak of a body's capacity to tolerate a toxin or to tolerate the cold, etc. So, just as we might speak of a person who is able to tolerate extremely cold temperatures, we might meaningfully speak of someone with the capacity to tolerate views with which he or she is in profound disagreement. Furthermore, tolerance is ultimately about conduct. One might believe very strongly that atheists are going to be damned but still not think that the state or anyone else ought to coerce them to become religious believers. I think this has also been one of the inheritances of early modernity. Early modern religious conflict became so unpleasant to people that simply as a practical matter they agreed that society is better off tolerating religious difference than trying to enforce uniformity. Part of that agreement was that while believers in a given dogma would not attempt to enforce their beliefs upon others, others would not enforce contrary beliefs upon them. So, for many the network of thinking surrounding the cultivation of tolerance did temper religious belief; and for others it created a space where it remained possible to hold strong religious beliefs but not enforce those beliefs where others are concerned.

Same as they are if God does exist. The idea that God (if such there be) has control over truths of math and logic is one that a few philosophers have argued for (Descartes, for instance, if I'm not mistaken) but even staunch believers in omnipotence typically understand omnipotence in a way that doesn't call for the puzzling idea that God could change the laws of logic. Briefly, the view of many theists would that God can perform any logically possible task.

One reason for saying that is that logical "constraints" help us make sense of what omnipotence might mean.Why anyone would want more is hard to fathom. Suppose someone asked God to light up a set of pixels on an infintely high-resolution screen so that these pixels made a figure that was perfectly round and perfectly square. What would count? Is there actually a genuine task to be done here? If not, then it hardly seems to be a limitation on God's power (or anyone else's) that s/he can't complete the task.

If by "proof" you mean something like "sound a priori" argument, then there are no uncontroversial examples. But then, there are few things that can be shown to exist that way, so lack of proof in that sense doesn't mean much. If you mean something like "purported good argument for the existence of God," there are plenty of those, but people disagree over their merits. The paragraph-length caricatures one sometimes encounters in Phil 101 aren't up to the task, but that's no surprise either. But there are serious people who offer extended defenses of the claim that God exists, as a look at any good Phil of Religion text will make clear. Needless to say, people differ on the question of how good those defenses are.

As for what would count as evidence, I take you to be asking what we might observe that could raise the probability of God's existence. Some would say the kind of order we find in the universe -- and others would disagree. Some would say the existence of apparent miracles, but others argue that in the nature of the case, natural explanations for supposed miracles are more likely. Some would say religious experience. And others would say that these experiences can be perfectly well explained without any supernatural assumptions.

And so it goes. I recommend picking up a good intro to philosophy of religion. The one by William Rowe is excellent, but I like to think that the one I wrote with Christopher Bernard has its virtues too.

Note, desiring something isn't needing it. I may desire a villa in Tuscany, but I don't need one. And, whatever is the case with needs, plainly it isn't the case that for every human desire there is a way of fulfilling it (especially given other people's desires). Maybe lots of us would love a villa in Tuscany; but we can't all get one. And in fact we often desire flatly impossible things. Lots of humans would love to time-travel: but of course that desire doesn't make it possible. And maybe lots of us would love to live for ever: but there's no reason to suppose that merely having the desire makes eternal life possible either.

Although I think the argument is fraught with difficulties, I don't think it simply begs the question. Suppose this hypothetical theist -- call her Thalia -- is arguing with an agnostic, Agatha, who nonetheless believes that there are objective moral standards. Agatha has real-life counterparts, and some of them are even sophisticated philosophers. Suppose Thalia makes a case for premise one: that moral standards really do presuppose the existence of a divine lawgiver. At that point, Agatha has a choice: give up belief in objective moral standards, or take up theism. Depending on how convinced she is that there really are moral standards, she might well decide that she should opt for theism.

Notice that from Agatha's point of view, there's no need for proof that there are objective moral standards. She already believes that. What she'd need to be convinced of is that premise 1 is true. And although I'm personally skeptical of premise 1), I do think there's more to be said here than meets the eye (though that's a long story.)

What philosophers are up to in cases like this, I'd suggest, is looking for the most coherent, satisfying overall story -- with the story that does the most justice overall to our various convictions. The little syllogism you've formulated is a stand-in for a much more complex debate.

The Bible tells us all sorts of things -- e.g. that wheat ripens later than barley (Exodus 9:31-33). Now, when farmers arrange their work so the barley gets harvested first, then I suppose you might say that they are acting according to what the Bible says about crops. But of course, they don't arrange their work thus and so because the Bible says wheat ripens later, but because it actually does ripen later.

The Bible also tells us that we should help each other out -- for example "If you see your brother's donkey or his ox fallen on the road, do not ignore it. Help him get it to its feet." (Deut: 22:4). Now, again, when I stop to help a broken-down motorist on a country road, for example, I suppose you might say that I am acting according to what the Bible enjoins. But I don't act that way because the Bible says that it is the decent thing to do, but because it actually is the decent thing to do. (After all, there are plenty of things the Bible enjoins that I don't think decent at all, and very probably nor do you, and we wouldn't dream of doing them: consider all those injunctions about whom to stone to death.)

So we must distinguish between acting in a way that happens to accord with some part of the Bible, Qur'an, or another book of moral precepts, and acting because the Bible, Qur'an, or whatever, tells you to act thus and so. The fact that people are in this or that way acting in accord with some of the more admirable precepts of e.g. the Bible doesn't ipso facto give their behaviour any distinctively religious character. And, of course, supporting the secularization of public life does not mean thinking that people shouldn't act decently, i.e. shouldn't act in accord with the more admirable bits of morality shared by various religious codes as well as by non-religious ethical codes. Removing religion from inappropriate places doesn't entail removing morality!

You have some rather inaccurate views on Islam. Islam has nothing to say about female circumcision, although it is true that the practice is not uncommon in some Muslim societies. It is also not an Islamic practice to assault wives for leaving the house without permission, although again it does go on. Just because such practices exist in Muslim societies does not mean that they are Islamic.

But you raise an interesting issue, how far can the mutilation of an infant or child be justified if carried out for religious reasons? It is accepted now I think largely because it is held to be good for the child, not as you suggest for religious reasons. This is the difference between male and female circumcision, the former is generally supposed to be a benign and helpful procedure, the latter the reverse. I suppose the question is how confident we are that the procedure is helpful, and how important is it that it be carried out at such an early age, as against interfering in the rights of the individual to hold onto his various bits and pieces. I do not know what science suggests on this issue, but it had better be a pretty strong argument. Otherwise assault on the individual in this radical sort of way would be very difficult to justify.