"Fulfill" is a bit of a weasel word, isn't it? Suppose one partner would like to make love every night. The other, less libidinous spouse is more a two-or-three time a week type. We might say that the first spouse is "unfulfilled," but that sounds like a really poor excuse for adultery.

If the lack of "fulfillment" amount to some deep incompatibility, a good question to ask first might be: have the partners in the marriage talked about what's not working? Can it be fixed? If the answer really seems to be no, then the next obvious question is whether the marriage is worth saving.

Life is complicated, of course and blanket generalizations don't do justice to the complexity of people's relationships. But the old question: "How would I feel if the tables were turned?" is always a good one to ask when we're trying to decide if we're acting rightly. It's not just an old bromide; it gets at something pretty deep in our notions of right and wrong.

There's a lot of subtext in your question--you seem to be suggesting that if there are genes that influence whether one is homosexual or heterosexual, that indicates that being gay is a mental illness. That would be a very strange argument, since the fact that there are genes that influence traits or behaviors says nothing about whether that trait or behavior is good or bad in either the biological or ethical sense.

Perhaps you are thinking that because homosexuals do not have the desire to mate with the opposite sex, any genes that may underlie homosexuality are "maladaptive" in the way some mental illnesses are caused by maladaptive genes. But that is also a mistake, since (a) in humans' past evolutionary environments homosexuals may have reproduced (they wouldn't be the only humans who have had sex for procreation without being particularly attracted to their mates!), (b) there are interesting data suggesting that homosexuality in some animal species (perhaps including humans and their ancestors) is a biological adaptation (the short story is that homosexuality might be associated with increased altruism towards relatives and hence cause a net increase in related genes), and (c) any genes related to homosexuality may have been selected for because they "code for" other traits that are adaptive, while homosexual feelings or behaviors are simply byproducts of those traits (this would not mean homosexuality was "maladaptive" any more than our ability to do calculus or dance the tango is maladaptive--the useful desires and abilities to do calculus and to dance are byproducts of other traits that were selected for).

So, all of this is to say that even IF there are genes that influence humans' sexual preferences (and that has not been demonstrated yet), then that does not suggest that homosexuality is biologically "unfit" or maladaptive in any way (as mental illnesses generally are). But whether there are such genes also says nothing about whether a pill could be created to suppress homosexual desires (or to suppress sexual desires in general, which may be useful for some politicians to have!). Such pills seem feasible as long as these desires and behaviors are influenced by the sorts of things pills influence (e.g., our brain states), as they surely are.

This brings us to another problematic implication of your question--that the lack of a desire to procreate (or lack of procreating behavior) is a bad thing that should be suppressed. In our current environment, it might be a good thing for humans to procreate less (and for some politicians to procreate less "diversely"). Of course, if no (or too few) humans wanted to have sex with the opposite sex, well, we might need to do something, but in that case I doubt it would take a pill to get people to either have heterosexual sex or to use the artificial means we have to reproduce.

I should add that if it turns out that homosexuality is shown to be more a matter of genes than upbringing or choice, then it seems like that would help people arrive at the ethical conclusion that there is no reason to discriminate against homosexuals (as we have, too slowly, arrived at that conclusion about race, gender, and indeed, some mental disorders). But the worry is that, using the weak arguments I discussed above, people may instead think that homosexuality is unnatural or maladaptive or an illness that needs to be cured (or worse, eliminated). So, if you did not mean anything like this by your question, I apologize that my answer sounds a little grumpy!

We might think of this on three levels. First, is it permissible for a liberal state to outlaw necrophilia? The argument for an affirmative answer could appeal to various public health reasons as well as to the fact that this practice may give considerable offense to others even while the cost of abstention is relatively small and borne only by a few. This argument might run roughly parallel to that justifying the permissibility of outlawing nudity or defecation in public places. The case of gay relationships is substantially different for two reasons: the cost to gay people of not having the opportunity of a romantically fulfilling and socially recognized relationship is enormous and, with roughly three percent of all people being gay, the number of people who would be (and have been) bearing this cost is substantial.

Second, is there something ethically wrong with practicing necrophelia? Taking ethics in the broad sense, its concern is the good life for human beings. A good life centrally involves close personal ties, friendships, and romantic relationships with people who we regard as our equals and with whom we engage in a wide range of communicative interactions. Compared to such interactions, necrophilia is an inferior activity, a waste of time. But so are many video games and TV shows. And it's surely not a serious failing for people to take a little time out here and there for something dull or silly.

Third, is it more narrowly morally wrong to practice necrophelia, would doing so wrong other people? Setting aside the wrong one might do to others by endangering public health and/or by violating the laws of our common legal system, and assuming the free and informed prior consent of the person now deceased, it is hard to see who might be wronged if the act is performed in a private setting.

I agree then with what you are suggesting: the strength of our reaction to necrophelia cannot be explained by reference to our modern moral-ethical thinking. It is presumably related to religious commitments, aesthetic tastes, and even biological responses.

But note there's no conflict being saying that "if it's consensual, it's ok" while also saying there can be more to sex than pleasure and a bit of temporary (maybe very, very temporary) bonding. After all, saying something is ok is saying it is permissible, it isn't positively wrong, it isn't to be condemned. And something can be permissible without being optimal; it may not be positively wrong but may fall well short of being particularly to be admired or sought after.

Woody Allen jested "Sex without love is an empty experience, but as empty experiences go, it's one of the best". And there's nothing wrong with a fleeting consensual sexual romp (assuming neither partner is committed elsewhere, or is underage, etc. etc.). Which is worth reiterating in the face of the crabbed puritanism of screwed-up moralists, religious or otherwise. And cheap music and cheap booze have their moments too, contrary to other kinds of puritans. But that's quite consistent with the thought that we can and should strive to do better than always going for cheap and cheerfully empty experiences (whether it's with wine, wo/men or song).

There's a kind of deep intimacy that can be bound up with sex -- but doesn't have to be -- that is immensely worth pursuing (and which hiking probably won't get you!). But, to repeat, it doesn't follow from that that sex without the intimacy has to be deemed not even permissible, not even ok.

I'll leave it to Freudians and others to speculate on what part of some people's psyches makes virginity seem valuable. Suffice it to say that I share your bewilderment. Obvious caveats and qualifications assumed, there's no clear reason why staying a virgin should be considered virtuous. (Odd, by the way that there is a close conventional association between virtue and virginity.)

That said, it's not really so strange that we might think about the first person we made love with -- or even kissed, for that matter -- with a certain wistfulness. But that's different from wishing that the person we eventually end up with should have been the first.

There are at least two different sorts of moral questions one might ask about prostitution and modeling. On one hand one might ask about the moral status of a particular agent's engaging in modeling or prostitution, and whether one action is morally worse than the other. On the other hand, one might ask about the moral status of the general practice of modeling and the general practice of prostitution, i.e., is it worse for the society to tolerate prostitution than modeling? (I'm assuming you don't have in mind by modeling the sexual display of one's body, but the modeling of clothes for the LLBean catalog and such.)

Regarding both sorts of questions it seems to me that much more should be considered beyond whether the practice or the act is an instance of "selling one's body". In the case of an agent, the moral evaluation of the choice would plausibly depend on the circumstances, the beliefs, desires and intentions of the agent and others involved, the consequences of the choice, etc. And in the case of the broader practice, modeling and prostitution potentially have quite different effects on a society (I'm assuming that modeling need not be sexualized).

As a result, I don't think it can be assumed that it is right to judge an individual prostitute to be doing something wrong, or a model to be doing something harmless. It depends on the circumstances. What you seem to be after, however, is whether there is a moral difference between selling visual access to one's body and selling sexual access to one's body. And if there is a moral difference, what is it?

One strategy for establishing a moral difference would be to argue that in the case of modeling, one isn't really selling one's body at all. One is displaying one's body for others to look at, but there is no sense in which the veiwer "possesses" or controls the body of the model. In the case of prostitution, the implicit contract seems to involve a giving of one's body for another's use. In order to develop this argument, one would need to be clearer about what sense of "possession" is at issue in "selling one's body" as a model or prostitute, and who the buyer is. (Maybe the buyer of the model's time does take possession of the model's body, but then the question is whether this is also true of all employers -- if I am a construction worker, have I sold my body to my employer? If so, then it doesn't seem that selling one's body is, in itself, morally wrong.)

Another strategy would be to argue that there is an important moral difference between selling visual access and selling sexual access, because looking at someone or being looked at is profoundly different than having sex with someone. Sex involves vulnerability of various sorts (vulnerability to disease, pregnancy, emotional pleasure and also emotional scarring); sex is something that is considered by many to be an expression of a deep emotional connection; and sex is often considered central to one's personhood. On this approach, it isn't just that selling one's body is a problem, the problem is that one is selling something central to one's personhood, in a way that makes one especially vulnerable, and trivializes something that carries deep significance. Since visual access to one's appearance isn't meaningful in these ways, there is nothing morally wrong with selling it, even if prostitution is morally problematic. This argument too needs some work, however, since more would need to be said about the significance attributed to sex.

Finally, it isn't clear to me why the question frames the question of the morality of prostitution in terms of the morality of the prostitute rather than the morality of the individual who buys the prostitute's services.

Lorraine ends with "which is why most people think sexual relationships between minors and adults are exploitive." Yes, but it is also the reason that some philosophers, legal scholars, and feminists think that heterosexual relations are also coerced and exploitative. Men have power, woman have less. Hence female consent is in doubt. Assuming women are subordinated, how do we then argue against pedophilia but for adult heterosexuality?

I'm not sure that the questioner is seeking an excuse or explanation to "explain away" the condition. The words "wrestled" and "compulsion" suggest some psychic pain about the questioner's transvestism. If that is so, the pop-psychological advice to "be who you are," to accept yourself in the face of the negative assessments other people make about the condition, is short-sighted. According to the American Psychiatric Association (see DSM-IV [1994] and DSM-IV-TR [2000]), "fetishistic transvestism" is a sexual mental disorder if the condition [the sexual desires, in part] is accompanied by psychic pain (or, which we can ignore for our discussion, functional impairment). The goal of therapy is to cure the patient by eliminating the psychic pain/distress (this is a modification of the medical model of physical ailments). This elimination, however, can be sought and/or attained in two very different ways. The root problem is a conflict between the patient's desires and the patient's own negative belief-dependent assessment of the condition. One solution (or attempted therapy) is to attenuate the psychic pain by eliminating, if possible, the desires, leaving the personal assessment intact. This re-integration of the personality should relieve the psychic pain. The alternative solution (or therapy) is to leave the desire structure intact but to alter, if possible, the patient's own negative assessment of his/her condition. Again, the re-integration of the personality should bring relief. In both cases, relief from psychic pain marks the "cure," and the person is no longer sexually mentally disordered. Which therapy is the best bet will be determined, on a case-by-case basis, by whether the desires are more easily changed or the belief system that gives rise to the negative self-assessment is more easily changed (or even, which of the two--the desires or the assessment--the patient would prefer to try to change). Nicholas rather nonchalantly opts for the second therapeutic intervention. Sure, that's the PC/liberal response to this sort of psychological problem. But ask yourself, seriously, whether it makes sense (ever, at all, mostly, or always) to think that it is easier to change one's belief system than one's desire structure. Nicholas tells you to accept yourself. If only you could follow his advice by snapping your fingers. Notice that whether the condition is "organic or developmental" may, after all, bear on these questions about therapeutic efficacy.

I tend to doubt that the correct answer to your question will come from philosophy, as opposed to psychology or neuroscience. But I would pose back to you a philosophical question: Why would it matter to you whether it is organic or developmental? Either way, you are what you are, and I see no reason to think that there is any fault here no matter what the process was that led to your being the way you are.

Maybe I have misunderstood what lies behind your question, and if so I apologize. But it sounds to me like you feel you need an excuse or explanation to "explain away" your difference. If so, I disagree. Just be who you are and be prudent about foolish and prejudiced people who might respond to you in ways you would rather avoid.

I think the problem with cheating is the cheating part. You and your husband made an agreement, presumably in good faith, that you would not do the very thing he did. I doubt if at the time he stipulated that he might have "merely sex," but would abstain from sex + love. So...he violated your agreement, and this gives you a reason to regard him as in the wrong. Period.

As to whether his violation is forgivable, I suppose it is. But that is entirely up to you--not up to him. He doesn't get to tell you that he deserves forgiveness--that adds presumption as an additional violation to the one he already committed. So the issue of forgiveness is yours to decide. He may ask for it; he may beg for it. But it is your decision entirely.

I can see how loving the other woman might have added to the offense (though I don't see how the addition would convert a "forgivable" offense into one that is unforgivable--because even had he loved her, you might reasonably determine that it was best to forgive him--after all, it would still be entirely your decision whether to forgive him or not). But I think the main issues here are two:

(1) He already violated your love (whether or not he loved the other woman), and the isssue that needs to be resolved is what you (and he) are going to do about that. So I think his trying to make the issue whether or not he loved her to be a case of misdirection--he's changing the focus from what is most important to something much less important.

(2) He seems to think he is in a position to command--or at least make a justified argument for--it being the right thing for you to do to forgive him. He is in no position to make such a command or argument, because it seems to me that you, as the wronged party, are entirely in charge of that issue. On this point, too, it sounds to me like he is trying to put one over on you. Were I in your shoes, I would regard his argument as making him less worthy of your forgiveness, on the ground that he doesn't seem to "get" the fact that he is the one wholly in the wrong here.

If you do decide to forgive him, then he should be humble and grateful. If you don't, then he should make his retreat knowing that once he did what he did, he lost any ground for telling you what you owed him. He owes you!!!