Response from Lorraine Besser-Jones on September 9, 2008

There are certainly deep connections between justice and revenge. J.S. Mill , in his Utilitarianism, suggests that the sentiment of justice is really just an extended desire for revenge. He argues that we all have a basic impulse for self-defense that directs us to seek revenge on those who harm us. Through a combination of our intellect and sympathy, we extend this desire for revenge to anyone who harms our community, and a sentiment of justice arises. Mill would probably agree with your analysis that justice is distinguished from revenge largely in that the sentiment of justice has an objective nature, while a desire for revenge has an inherently subjective character to it.

Notice, though, that Mill is talking about the sentiment of justice, and not justice itself. We can separate the sentiment of justice from justice itself, which covers a sphere of actions, of which acts of retribution comprise just one part. With revenge, on the other hand, it is harder to separate the sentiment of revenge from revenge itself. An act of revenge always involves a desire to cause harm or suffering, to “get even”. But not all acts of justice invoke this sort of desire, even an objectified one.

Consider the just acts most of us perform on a daily basis: we treat others equally, we don’t steal from one another, we pay taxes, and so on. We do all of this without ever thinking about anything remotely related to harm and suffering. And even when someone around us violates a duty of justice, we don’t necessarily want her to suffer for so doing. Most often what we really want is simply for the person to start acting justly.

If not all acts of justice involve feeling a sentiment of revenge, then we can make sense of how it is possible to both be just and be merciful. Justice need not involve causing harm and suffering, and certainly doesn’t require desiring the harm and suffering of others.