Response from David Brink on June 24, 2010

It does seem plausible that all else being equal it is more important or at least more valuable to save the life of a younger person than that of an older person, because when all else is equal doing so should produce more value. But, of course, all else being equal abstracts from a great many variables; there are many ways in which things might not in fact be equal. Assume A is the younger person and B is the older person. Consider some potential forward-looking differences. Even though A is younger, B might still live longer than A. Or B might lead a much more valuable life than A, either prudentially or morally. Or consider potential backward-looking differences. B might be more deserving of aid than A. Perhaps A is more responsible for her plight than B. Or B might be worse-off overall, and some people think that priority should go to the worse-off. So even if we agree that all else being equal it's better to benefit A than B, there may nonetheless be a great many situations in which all else is not equal and in which it would be better to benefit B than A.