Philosophy

Could the conclusion of a good philosophical work be only a metaphor?

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What an unusual and interesting question! Before replying directly, I wonder about your use of "only." Metaphors can be true or false, and are not necessarily less precise than literal or non-metaphorical terms. With that caveat, various promising philosophical conclusions do seem to involve metaphors. So, consider John Rawls' account of justice in terms of what rational, self-interested people would decide behind a veil of ignorance. I suppose one might claim this is a literal, non-metaphor, but Rawls is invoking a non-lieral usage of veil. Perhaps a more promising example (but not without controversy) would be philosophical arguments concerning God. Either pro-theisitic or atheistic arguments may well be seen as arguments which use the term "God" as a descriptive, metaphorical noun. There is a massive literature on the extent to which "God" should be seen as a literal or analogical or metaphorical term. Other examples of when metaphors seem very much to be in play: Hume's bundle theory of the self ('bundle' seems to be a metaphor), four dimensionalism describes enduring objects as space-time worms ('worm' is a horrible metaphor, but no less of a metaphor for all that), the B theory of time is sometimes considered the frozen view of time whereas the A theory might be put in terms of describing time like an ever flowing stream or river, and so on.

There is an interesting new book, Science and Spirituality, by Michael Ruse, that argues that many of our major worldviews (theism, naturalism, and so on) have functioned historically as competing metaphors or images of reality. With co-author Jil Evans, I have also tried to address such root metaphors. See our Image in Mind; Theism, Naturalism and Imagination (Continuum Press, 2011).

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