This is a big question, but I will just tell a story familiar to philosophers working in the area. A man is found guilty of a crime, and is allowed to give a brief speech before sentencing. He admits the crime, but claims not only to be a criminal but also a philosopher, and one who has convinced himself of the truth of determinism. Since everything he did was determined by causes before he was born, he could not have done otherwise but commit the crime. So surely he should not be punished. The judge, having listened carefully to all this, admits that she too has a sideline in philosophy, and that she too is a determinist. So she cannot help but punish him.

When we consider the relationship between determinism and responsibility, we have a tendency not to be entirely constent. Thus we may think that we should not punish criminals nor feel anger towards them. But what is the force of this 'should' if we too are determined?