Response from Bernard Gert on March 30, 2006

If the concept of God that you are considering is simply an adult version of Santa Claus, then you are correct that just as a child must one accept that there is no Santa Claus, so an adult needs to come to terms with the truth that their is no adult version of Santa Clause, what you call "their imaginary friend in the sky." However, there are concepts of God which are not simply adult versions of Santa Claus, and so even if adults should give up their belief in a God that is an adult version of Santa Claus, it does not follow that they should give up their belief in a different concept of God.

Response from Bernard Gert on March 27, 2006

In the last paragraph of Chapter 28 of Leviathan, Hobbes explains why he chose "Leviathan" as the model for a commonwealth.

"Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government, together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of Job, where God, having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud, 'There is nothing,' saith he, 'on earth to be compared with him, He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him, and is king of all the children of pride.'" [Job 41:33-34].

What is interesting about Hobbes choosing the name "Leviathan" for the reasons he says, is that it shows that Hobbes held that the govenor or sovereign needs so much power, not because man is self-interested or egoistic, but because he is proud. It is because each citizen holds that his own views about justice and right and wrong are better than those of other men that the sovereign needs so much power. This interpretation allows for the importance of views about justice and morality, whereas the standard egoistic interpretation makes all of Hobbes's talk about justice and morality seem beside the point.

Response from Bernard Gert on March 17, 2006

You are right that saying that someone is 'playing God' is merely a rhetorical claim made by those who oppose the kind of actions that the person is doing are contemplating doing. Since, "given the impossibility of humans acting as gods," as you say, it is a way of saying that you should not do the action because it is inappropriate for a mere human to act in a way that is appropriate only for a god. Insofar as the claim has any force, and it does not have much, it is a warning about making fundamental changes without very carefully considering all of the consequences, long term as well as short term, of making these changes. Many actions have massive unintended consequences, especially those that involve changing how we deal with life and death matters.

Response from Bernard Gert on March 5, 2006

Democracy is a form of government in which the sovereign power is vested in the majority, rather than being vested in a smaller group, such as an aristocracy, or in one person, e.g., a monarchy. A democracy does not necessarily seek to benefit all, indeed Mill talks about the tyrrany of the majority. So a democracy must be limited in some way that prevents such tyranny. The United States seeks to limit democracy by means of the Constitution. I would prefer to say that a democracy must be limited by morality. Given that kind of limitation, a democracy decides among the morally acceptable alternatives by the votes of the majority, either directly or indirectly. One justification of this kind of democracy is that since all of the alternatives are morally acceptable, then it seems appropriate that the decision among these morally acceptable alternatives be made by a majority of the people, rather than by some smaller subclass.

Response from Bernard Gert on February 18, 2006

Although Hobbes, more than any other political philosopher, takes obedience to the government to be the overriding duty of citizens, he claims that citizens do not have a duty to obey a government that is ineffective, that is, does not provide protection to its citizens. If that is what you mean by ineffective, then it seems clear that the government should be replaced, at least if this can be done without causing even more harm to the citizens of that country. However, if you mean by ineffective, that it does not provide anywhere near the kind of the services that could be provided by a country with that level of resources, then Hobbes would claim that it would be wrong to replace the government. By "replacing" I mean what you mean by "strongly reorganized" or "overthrown." I do not mean by "replacing" voting against the party in power. Citizens should vote against the party in power if it is ineffective in the sense that it does not provide anywhere near the kind of the services that could be provided by a country with that level of resources.

Response from Bernard Gert on February 18, 2006

There seems to be no more reason to heed the retrospective ideas, advice, and wisdom of a dying person than of that same person when he is not dying. If he is the sort of person who gave good advice previously, then what he says should be heeded; if he is the sort of person who did not give give good advice previously, then his advice shoud not be heeded. There is no reason to believe that dying makes anyone wiser than they were before.

Response from Andrew N. Carpenter on February 19, 2006

To add to my colleague’s excellent comment, one might think that, for many of us at least, dying is such a stressful time--with respect to health, emotionality, family dynamics, etc.--that a dying person is in a relatively poor position to form and communicate considered wisdom about life.

To be sure, for some the perspective of one's imminent death might be useful and constructive (as, for example, Hegel asserts when he defends the ethical utility of warfare), but I suspect that popular culture tends to exaggerate this possibility.

Response from Bernard Gert on February 18, 2006

There are different forms of utilitarianism, and they have different names. The view that we should aim at the best balance of happiness over unhappiness is often called hedonistic utilitarianism. The view that we should aim at the best balance of desires or preferences being satisfied over desires or preferences being unsatisfied is often called preference utilitarianism. They are both considered forms of utilitarianism because they claim that achieving the best balance of something, either happiness over unhappiness, or desires being satisfied over desires being unsatisfied, is the ultimate criterion for judging the moral rightness or wrongness of an action.

Philosophers moved from hedonistic utilitarianism to preference utilitarianism because of the difficulty of coming up with an objective account of happiness, or even one that commanded anything close to universal assent. It was thought that desires or preferences being satisfied was a more objective criterion, and also one that was more tolerant. No one could impose their own concept of happiness on others, and correctly claim that they were doing the morally right action.

However you are right that "it's reasonable that we ought to try to make people happy, at least in most cases, but I don't think it as reasonable that we ought to try to give people what they want." Notice that the view you are putting forward is not hedonistic utilitarianism, for you say "at least in most cases" not "always." Also you do not say that this should be the only or ultimate aim of all of our actions. But on any ordinary view of happiness it does seem that it's reasonable that we ought to try to make people happy, at least in most cases.

The second part of what you say, "I don't think it as reasonable that we ought to try to give people what they want," is also correct. Failure to appreciate that point is why as a theory, preference utilitarianism has more rhetorical than philosophical force. Given that the preference utilitarian does not put any limits on the content of desires, (this tolerance is part of its appeal) it seems to hold that one ought to satisfy the desires of a mentally ill person for the most painful possible death, if this does not result in a worse balance of overall satisfaction of desires.

Response from Jyl Gentzler on February 23, 2006

All Utilitarians share the view that we ought to assess the morality of actions in terms of how they affect the well-being of those whom they affect. They often differ in their conception of well-being. Some regard well-being as a matter of pleasure and the absence of pain; others have different conceptions of well-being. I don’t know of any philosopher who has suggested that happiness is simply a matter of satisfying whatever desires we might happen to have. (Callicles appears to endorse this view in Plato’s Gorgias; but Plato makes clear that Callicles was not a philosopher.) Instead, the only desire-satisfaction accounts that have any serious defenders are accounts that put certain constraints on the desires the satisfaction of which would constitute well-being. In the end, I don’t think that any version of this sort of account is viable, but I also don’t believe that such accounts can be easily dismissed. For able defenses of informed desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being, see Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and Peter Railton, “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topics 14 (1986).

Response from Bernard Gert on February 9, 2006

It is clear that pain is not the only bad thing (harm) that can happen to people. For one thing, they can be killed. They can also be disabled or deprived of freedom or pleasure. Being deprived of pleasure is not the same as being caused pain. Obviously, one can be killed in one's sleep and so never know it happened or even that it was going to happen. Generally people know when they are disabled, but people can lose a leg without knowing it right away, if they have been in an accident. If it is a mental disability, that can happen to someone without his knowing, and it may be that he never knows. People can also be deprived of freedom or pleasure with knowing, although usually they will find out about it. With regard to suffering pain, it seems as if people can be in pain without being conscious of it, at least for some period of time.

If you mean by "to suffer," to "suffer a harm" and not merely to "suffer pain," then it is clearly possible to suffer without knowing it. And even if you mean by "to suffer" "to suffer pain or other unpleasant feelings," it seems that one can suffer for at least some period of time without being conscious of it.

Response from Bernard Gert on February 2, 2006

There seems to be a set of virtues that every culture recognizes and appreciates, but they may not rank these virtues in the same way. For example, given the appropriate account, it is hard to conceive of a functioning culture that does not regard prudence, temperance, and courage as personal virtues, that is, as virtues that every member of that society would like to have. However, different people in a society and different cultures might rank these three virtues differently, some ranking prudence higher than courage and some the reverse.

Similarly, there also seems to be a set of moral virtues that every culture recognizes and appreciates, but they may not rank these virtues in the same way. For example, given the appropriate account, it is hard to conceive of a functioning culture that does not regard truthfulness, dependability, fairness, and kindness as moral virtues, that is, as virtues that every member of that society would like the other members of the society to have. However, different people in a society and different cultures might rank these virtues differently, some ranking fairness higher than kindness and some the reverse.

Many philosophers have put forward these virtues as universal, but they have not all put forward the same accounts of these virtues. I have put them forward in my book, Morality: Its Nature and Justification. I do not think that there are virtues that are recognized only in a singly culture, but I do think that some cultures rank the virtues differently. Not only do they rank within the personal virtues and the moral virtues differently, they also rank the personal virtues as compared to the moral virtues differently. It may be that these different rankings may serve to distinguish one culture from another, although that is unlikely.

Once one realizes that the virtues can be ranked differently, it does not seem that there is any need to have completely idiosyncratic virtues for different societies.

Response from Jyl Gentzler on February 5, 2006

Response from Bernard Gert on January 26, 2006

I am not sure what you mean by "an absolute pacifist." If you mean that you would not even disarm a person who was attempting to kill you, then you may have a problem reconciling it with practising a martial art. However, there does not seem to be any good nonreligious reasons to be an absolute pacifist in this sense. One can be a pacifist in a fairly absolute sense by refusing to ever seriously harm another person, and though there might be situations in which even this view would be hard to defend, it is somewhat more plausible than absolute pacifism. Another even more plausible form of pacifism is refusing ever to kill another person.

If practising a martial art does not involve practising killing anyone then it is not incompatible with the most plausible form of pacifism that I mentioned above. If practising a martial art does not involve practising seriously harming anyone, then it is not incompatible with the somewhat plausible form of pacifism that I mentioned above. I assume that practising a martial art does involve practising disarming someone who is attempting to kill you. However, I see no problem with this, as I cannot see why anyone would hold absolute pacifism in the sense I gave it.

You refer to absolute pacifism and practising a martial art as two conflicting philosophies. That seems to me to be a misuse of the term "philosophies." Although pacifism may be the result of some philosopical view, it need not be, and although practising a martial art may be prompted by acceptance of some philosophical view, it need not be. One can practise a martial art simply for the exercise, mental as well as physical and yet be committed to never using it to kill or seriously harm another person. So there need not be any conflict at all.