I'm a little unclear on the question -- sounds like you think life in prison is better than death (for the convicted person, anyway), given your list of good things that life in prison allows (but death doesn't). So you already do think the death penalty is worse for the convict than life in prison?

Or are you (implicitly) arguing against the death penalty, by arguing that it's not worse than life imprisonment, and therefore there is no reason to apply it to the worst criminals?

In any case, one consideration that it's worse for the convict to receive death is simply that very many convicted persons simply don't want the death penalty; lots of people are terrified of being killed, and that terror alone makes the prospect of death seem far worse than life imprisonment. (Of course you might argue that this is an irrational fear, but that then takes you off into all sorts of other issues and directions ....)

And if the ultimate concern is whether our society should allow the death penalty, it's worth mentioning that there are many other things in play in addition to 'how bad is death v. life in prison for the convict' -- including issues of justice, of fairness, of the rights of the victims (and victims' families), etc....

Hope that's useful--

ap

I don't think there is a hard-and-fast rule to give here. Do you call the cops when you see your kid litter? Of course not! Just make them pick it up and give them a good lecture about why that is unacceptable behavior. But if you see them commit murder? Well, yes, then it seems appropriate. If I caught one of my children shoplifting, I would try to come up with a way to make them repay the store--but I don't think I would be supportive if people at the store gave me an indication that they aggressively prosecute every case of shoplifting.

I think our responsibilities change in different relationships. I would also try to "correct" minor misdemeanors (like littering) when done by friends or more distant family members. The worse the crime, the more it seems to me to call for a legal report. But I think we are, in a way, much more responsible for the behavior of our minor children than we are after they have reached the age of majority, and we are much less responsible for distant relatives, acquaintances, and the like. So my own culpability in failing to report some law-breaking is relative to the degree of my responsibility for the behavior of that other person.

Do I call in every case I see of someone speeding past me on the freeway? No. That's not my responsibility. But if I see evidence that they are seriously impaired in some way (weaving dangerously, etc.), well, yes, I would call that in.

I think the only good advice I have to give here, beyond such rules of thumb, is that you exercise the best judgment of your own level of responsibility (to the criminal, to his or her victims, and to your fellow citizens) and of what you can do that is most likely to provide the best available resolution to the situation.

Good questions. The answer to your first question is, basically, all of the things you list in your second question, plus some. The justifications for criminal punishment are typically divided (oversimplistically) into two theories: "backward-looking" retribution and "forward-looking" consequentialism. The forward-looking theories (often associated with utilitarian ethics) focus on the future benefits of punishing criminals: (1) deterring the criminal from further crime, (2) deterring others from carrying out crimes, and perhaps also (3) rehabilitating the criminal and (4) restitution of the victims.

The backward-looking theories (often associated with Kantian ethics) focus on what happened in the past--the crime committed, the harm done, the guilt of the criminal--and aim to punish the criminal as much as he or she deserves it, which may include making the criminal suffer an appropriate amount, but perhaps also forcing him or her to make up for the crime with restitution. This justification may be seen as "exacting revenge," but revenge is typically more personal and not necessarily based on a moral justification.

Now, I suspect--and there's evidence to support--that we are motivated to punish criminals and others whom we perceive as doing us (or our loved ones) harm by strong feelings of resentment and indignation, and we feel relieved when we see these transgressors punished, including in significant cases, seeing them suffer or die (consider how people felt about bin Laden's death). These feelings likely evolved in part (and somewhat ironically) to promote social cohesion: Cheaters had to be punished severely to promote cooperation. But this suggests that our retributive impulses, and our feelings of revenge, may largely serve forward-looking goals--promoting social cohesion and preventing future wrong-doing.

But motivation is not the same as justification. The evolution of our legal system includes depersonalizing revenge, preventing the "spiral of revenge" (e.g., family feuds), and tamping down some of our impulses to punish severely and well beyond what people deserve (e.g., to send a message)--the 8th Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment illustrates this goal.

Notice that desert (retributive) theories may sometimes suggest less punishment than deterrent (consequentialist) theories--it may deter better to cut the hands off robbers. On the other hand, consequentialist theories often suggest less severe punishments, since the best future consequences are often served by trying to rehabilitate the criminal (e.g., educating him or her). If the death penalty does not deter (and the evidence suggests it doesn't), then consequentialist theories require getting rid of it. Retributive theories can still allow it, assuming some criminals deserve to be killed (theories of what people deserve open up lots of cans of worms, including whether people have the sort of free will that allows them to deserve punishment).

So, what sort of punishment would lead to the most just society? My own view is that it will include a hybrid justification, recognizing that giving people what they deserve (paying close attention to what capacities for rational control they have), with state-sanctioned (democratically approved) punishment, can play an important role in satisfying our sense of justice (including our deep feelings of retribution), while also serving the purpose of deterrence. But rehabilitation and restitution might best be served by helping those criminals who can be helped and allowing them to pay back their victims and society, rather than locking them up in nasty prisons.

These goals can compete. The "war on drugs" illustrates a conflict between harsh penalties justified by both desert and deterrence and treatments for addiction that would likely have better long-term consequences.

I hope these beginnings of answers to your complicated question are helpful!

There are a variety of ways of justifying punishment, not all utilitarian, and some would argue that punishing a criminal respects him or her since we apply a sanction to them which to some degree matches the crime. It is only sadistic if we enjoy their suffering, and surely most members of the public do not, especially as it is very expensive to incarcerate criminals. On your measure, causing any suffering at all is to bring about evil, and this is implausible. Sometimes offenders have to be brought face to face with the nature of their actions by punishing them, and they may reform or they may not, but they are not punished to make them suffer per se. The way in which this topic was described suggests that all punishment is evil, and we can easily think of cases where this is implausible.

I hear two things in what you say. One is that, quite understandably, you want to deal with your sorrow. The other is that you want a "serious, fair and moral" way past your situation. But I'm not sure these amount to the same thing.

When it comes to curing heartache, philosophers have no special expertise. A philosopher could offer you some obvious platitudes, including the suggestion that if you are really having trouble coping, there's no shame in seeking professional help, but a philosopher is not a doctor of the soul

On the other part of your plea, there may be a bit that a philosopher could say. You've accepted — intellectually, at least — that your former fiancé has lost her regard for you and that this is something you brought on your self. She is entitled to get on with her life, and the right thing to do is to respect that. But you're also looking for some way to atone and make amends.

Making amends may not be possible, because making amends isn't the sort of thing that can just happen one-sidedly. Your former fiancé may well not want to take part in the process and may feel that she owes you no such thing. A serious response calls for respecting that; a serious response calls for respecting her right not to be a party to your own attempt to get past what you've done. It would be fine to write to her (writing is less intrusive; and by writing I mean a real honest-to-goodness letter) and make clear that you will not intrude anymore. You can reiterate your regret; your can wish her well. But you can also assure her that you will leave her in peace, and you then must do just that.

Perhaps some day she will want to see you again; perhaps she won't. That is up to her and not up to you. Making it clear that you accept this and acting accordingly is a serious and decent way to bring your situation to a kind of formal close.

That's the philosophical part of the advice. I hope it doesn't seem unbearably austere. Following it may be difficult, though it may bring its own sort of release. That said, I do hope you'll take seriously the possibility that if, even after doing the right thing, your misery gets in the way of living your life, you should seek out the help of someone skilled at dealing with emotional pain.

I don't see what is special about rape from the evidence point of view. There are many crimes which take the form of one party saying one thing, and the other something else. In the Anglo-American legal system a jury may well have the opportunity to decide on who is telling the truth, and sometimes it is difficult and sometimes it is not. Juries have to decide what was going on in the minds of the accused and the other people involved in a vast variety of cases, including fraud, deception, conspiracy, murder and so on, and prejudice is potentially present in a whole variety of cases.