Let's say when we measure the brainwaves of someone who is actually deluded and the brainwaves of someone who is fervently religious, they match up to an extraordinary degree. Are we justified to say that the religious person is deluded base on this observation of matching brainwaves alone? Can we judge the propositional content of a belief as to its truth value by brain activity? Can scientific neurological experiments determine the truth and falsity of propositional content or are arguments the only way to determine the truth and falsity of propositional content? Can we appeal to brainwave activity to invalidate theism? Galen O.

Interesting question(s)! I'm afraid that it will be very difficult to replace arguments and the different "tools" philosophers use with neurological data. First, I assume that in identifying a subject as "deluded" we would have to know the falsehood of her belief and perhaps identify which fallacies she has committed. We would also need to think through ideas of mental causation and the degree to which a person's beliefs may be linked to neurological events (are we going to assume a reductive account of the mental? or are we going to allow that propositions, mental acts such as 'believing' are irreducible to the physical, in particular, brain states and processes?. We also need more than neurology to identify and define what is a 'religion.' You seem particularly interested in theism, but some important religions are non-theistic (most forms of Buddhism), and some theists are not religious (Richard Taylor may have been a good case of this). Still, there are some common sense ways in which...

When arguing about the existence of God, the vast majority of arguments I have ever run into always go to the point of asking for evidence. With that word in use they are implying the physical manifestation of evidence to prove God true and, as a theist, that is not how God works in relation to what we are taught. Must evidence, in a physical form or with science backing its existence, be truly necessary to believe in the idea of the supernatural?

Thank you for this inquiry! The idea that all our beliefs, religious or not, must have sufficient evidence is sometimes called "evidentialism." It is much debated today: some philosophers think there is no uncontroversial domain of what may or may not count as evidence nor, if we did agree on what counts as evidence, how much evidence one needs in order for a belief to be justified. I am inclined to think that all or most of our beliefs are in fact backed up by some evidence (reasons for thinking our beliefs are true), however modest and elusive. And I also suggest that the belief in God is rarely without some evidence, even if it only amounts to 'it appears to me that God exists.' But four things might be noted in reply to your question(s). First, not all evidence for a belief need involve "physical manifestations," a "physical form," or the natural and social sciences. Part of the problem with these claims is that we do not have a clear, universal concept of what counts as physical. Second...

It seems all philosophical arguments for the existence of God all result in having nothing to say about the conception of God, God's attributes or religion. If someone accepts that God exists, how does that belief entail in accepting a particular religion over another, if at all? And if that entailment is accepted does that mean all of the articles of faith of that religion (i.e. ethics, rituals, afterlife) MUST be accepted given that God exists, by coherentism?

Actually, all the classical and most contemporary arguments for the existence of God are each based on (or involve) a conception of God and divine attributes. So, every version of the cosmological argument I know of as used to support theism relies on the idea that, if there is a God, God exists necessarily or is not causally dependent on other beings, God is without beginning or self-explaing, and so on. Most versions of the ontological argument begin with the idea that God is maximally excellent (or God is such that no greater reality can be conceived) and that thesis is used to argue that a maximally excellent being would be necessarily existing, essentially good, omnipotent, omniscient, and so on. For a fuller picture of how arguments rely on divine attributes see the Philosophy of Religion entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy or see the book published by Continuum: Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide. In terms of the philosophical concept and conviction that there is a God, it may be...

An atheist friend and I (I am a theist) had a long series of discussions about the existence of god, and his comments made quite an impression on me. I found what he said so stimulating, in fact, that I beagn to read more philosophy of religion to help me better understand the nature of the issues raised. One question, however, is a bit puzzling, and I have not read much about it, though I have seen it raised in atheist/theist debates about the existence of god. The issue is simply falsifiabilty: how can we know if some occurrence of anything is an act of god and therefore, say, the result of prayer, or the result or effect of natural processes? For example, if I pray for a sick relative and she recovers, I can say god healed her; but I can also rightly argue that medical science healed her; or, even more precisely, physicians using medical knowledge stabilized her body so that it could heal itself. I know many theists regularly thank god for certain acts (many of which they pray for) that could easily be...

Much appreciate! I believe that the assessment of whether any particular event is the result of God's provident will rest on one's background beliefs. If, for example, one has plausible reasons for thinking theism is true (based on any of the classical or contemporary arguments, for examples of these see the entry, Philosophy of Religion in the free and online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), then there will more openness to accepting a theistic account of, say, a healing than if one has independent reason for thinking theism is false and naturalism is true. However, I suggest that it would be best to see any argument for (or against) God based on ostensible miracles as a component in a comprehensive case for theism based on religious experience. There are a host of defenders of such an argument: Kai Man Kwan, William Wainwright, Caroine Davis, William Alston, Keith Yandell, Richard Swinburne, and others. Of course, as in all interesting matters, there are serious critics, but my point is to...

Can you call an atheist a spiritual person in any kind of context?

Yes! While I am not myself an atheist, the idea of "spirituality" or "being spiritual" can describe someone who approaches life with reverence and reflective care regardless of whether they recognize the reality of God. While the idea of "spirituality" emerged with the idea of "spirit" and thus conjures up a background of the supernatural (as in the idea of there being a "Holy Spirit" as part of the Trinity in Christian theology), someone may engage in many of the better or ideal practices we associate with religious tradition (meditation, compassion...) without belonging to any religion. On philosophers who are what I would call spiritual and atheists, you might look at the volume Louise Antony edited: Philosophers without God. Also, see work by Owen Flannagen and Robert Solomon. Keep in mind, too, that most forms of Buddhism are readily recognized as "spiritual" and yet are non-theistic. If you are open to the theistic side of the fence, you might check out Stewart Goetz's latest book with...

One of the biggest problems I have found in my struggles understanding common religions is the idea that we as humans always give God praise for his feats of glory, humanity, and miracles, however, it is dispicable or even pure heracy to suggest that he is at fault in something not having your desired outcome. I know this is a broad topic with many ways to go but i'm completely stuck. For instance, If a mass murder were attempted and all were spared due to someone performing a heroic act. The press, the public, our Govt. would immediately flood our country with "praise God", "our prayers were answered", "I told you he performs miracles" etc. On the other hand, if the complete opposite happened and many were murdered, first of all, most people would quietly try not to mention him, but the more bold person would respond like "God has everything happen for a reason", "only God knows" or "pray for the victims". Aren't these completely opposite outcomes to this tragic situation that result in...

Good question and set of concerns. I gather you are dismayed by how some persons' faith may seem irresistible to counter-evidence. I suppose an analogy would be a case when I continue to trust my husband is a good man on the grounds that he sometimes demonstrably cares for me and I explain the times that he neglects or seems to injure me on the grounds that he must be so very wise that his action or inaction is actually good for me. That's a problem. When it comes to reflecting on God in response to your concerns, perhaps three points are worth considering. First, according to the major theistic traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, God is a reality that is omnipresent and immanent to creation, but also the transcendent creator and sustainer of the cosmos. So the concept of God seems vastly to outstrip any ordinary, finite agent. So, when reflecting on God we should think not of the ethical ways of finite creatures but, as it were, the values that would be in play if there is a Creator...

I've just listened to a BBC radio discussion of the ontological argument. I'm puzzled as to why the following objection was not even mentioned: - The concept of "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" necessarily includes the attributes of being all good and all powerful. Something all good and all powerful would not allow suffering. Suffering exists, therefore the concept cannot exist in reality. The counter-argument that suffering is part of God's plan for us to work out our own salvation only reinforces the original objection by admitting that God is not great enough to come up with a better plan. This argument is well known in philosophy in general, so why would it not be considered relevant to the validity of the ontological argument? God may still exist, but if He can't be all good and all powerful, the ontological argument for His existence is a non-starter. I had the impression from the radio programme that the ontological argument is still entertained by some philosophers. How...

I am probably the only one on the panel who does defend the ontological argument, so I suppose I better reply! There are various versions of the ontological argument, in fact one version (that one can find in the work of Spinoza) does not at all rule out suffering as part of reality and, indeed, Spinoza's God is not theistic and so not purposive. But that aside, I accept a version of the ontological argument that is theistic (God is essentially good, omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily existing, and the like) and so I do need to face up to the problem of evil. Two things to consider: first, the ontological argument (at least the one I accept you can find a version in my book Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide and on the free online Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy entry "Philosophy of Religion works from the possibility that God exists, to the conclusion that God necessarily exists. Now, if you think the evils in this world show that it is impossible that there is the God of theism, then...

How can a theist respond to the problem of evil in the specific case of mental illness? If God is omniscient and omnipotent, he knows that mental illness causes suffering, and is able to prevent it, but chooses not to. For an omniscient, omnipotent, morally-perfect god to exist, there must be a morally justifying-reason to permit this suffering. The usual theistic responses to the problem of evil do not seem to apply in the specific case of mental illness. The free will defence fails because mental illness actually suppresses free will; therefore, if God really valued free will, he would prevent mental illness. The soul-making theodicy fails because mental illness actually deprives sufferers of their ability to comprehend their existence in relation to God and His creation; therefore, if God really valued spiritual growth, He would prevent mental illness. It also won't do to say that the suffering of the mentally ill gives others the chance to be morally good, because the pharmaceutical companies...

Great question, and I feel sure that what I will suggest in response will not strike you as adequate, but let me offer seven things to bear in mind in assessing the force of the challenge you are raising for traditional theists who believe God to be all good, omniscient, and omnipotent:: First, a very minor point, not all of what we call "mental illness" involves the subject suffering. Someone with an illness involving severe cognitive impairment might even have less suffering that most mentally healthy persons. Second, when we consider cases of illness that do involve undeserved suffering it is not clear to me why this stands out as a special case from other instances of undeserved suffering. Is it worse to be born or develop bi-polar disorder through no fault of one's own than for a healthy, mentally fit child to be killed in an auto accident, etc...? Or consider the suffering of non-human animals whose suffering is not out of their sin or mis-use of freedom, and the like. Third, on the...

I am wondering if there is a flaw in the following reasoning: If an event occurs, then that event now becomes possible and able to reoccur. If the event can reoccur, then the event is not "super natural" nor is the event a "miracle". Therefore, there is no possibly way for the "supernatural" or "miracles" to exist. If there are no "supernatural" things or "miracles" that exist, then there is no God. I find that the argument is weird because the criteria eliminates the possibility of what is in question in the first place: the "supernatural" or the "miracle". Basically if something does not fit into the science mold the arguer won't allow the conversation to continue. I can ask "What would God have to do to convince you he exists?" The honest answer I received was "He can't do anything to prove himself!" The reason is because as soon as God acts in a physical way, there is a scientific explanation. So if God were to levitate the entire state of Texas in the sky 15,000 feet for 7 days this is not...

Your argument and questions are excellent. Some things to consider: I do not think any religions that acknowledge that God acts miraculously (that is, God brings about events of religious significance that would not have occurred if God had not acted) entails that miraculous events could not be repeated. There is nothing conceptually odd given the concept of a miracle if God were to miraculously lift the state of Texas 15,000 feet every Monday in December, though perhaps the event would seem to fall short in terms of other factors: such a feet would seem pointless and scary and perhaps make people think God is more like Zeus or a clown or a Texan than a God of justice, love, and goodness. Still, there is an interesting issue in play if God were to repeatedly and comprehensively act to bring about something that would not occur by "nature" alone or without God's will. Some Christians believe that the emergence of consciousness in each person is partly due to God's willing that when biological organisms...

I'm aware of many arguments attempting to prove or disprove or make probable or improbable the existance of a God. However, I don't know of any attempts by recent academic philosophers to explain why religion is such a ubiquitous phenomenon historically and at present among humans. It seems remarkable to me me that no early human civilization developed without some kind of supernatural deity/agency. There's some overlap here with psychology/sociology/anthropology, but Im more interested in philosophical analysis that is informed by the social sciences. Im uncertain of the probably of the existance of a God based on the traditional arguments, and I find the moral implications of the Judeo/Christian God troubling (how could hell be just?), but why do so many humans seem to need religion? As a nonreligious person I feel that even my own life is lacking something without belief in something sublime/transcendent. I'd appreciate book recommendations also.

Thank you for this inquiry! I believe an excellent book to check out is The Believing Primate published by Oxford University Press and edited by Jeff Schloss and Michael Murray. There is a great deal of material there on the projects of accounting for the emergence and continuation of religion and the philosophical presuppositions of these projects and their philosophical implications. You also might enjoy The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion which considers the study of religion from different scientific (including the social sciences) points of view and it includes a chapter on the philosophical investigation of religion (a second edition is in the works), edited by Robert Segal. Three is also a fascinating book just published called The Routledge Companion to Theism which is a massive, impressive work that includes reflections on the sciences and cross-cultural philosophical work on theism and its alternatives. You may (like a number of others) find the moral implications of the Judeo...

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