What's the philosophical response to Nietzsche's contention that all morality is merely a trick that the weak play upon the strong to get the strong to rein in their strength?

I think it would be tough to identify "the" philosophical response --as there have been many. Probably the most effective reply (in my view) is Max Scheler's (1874-1928) book Ressentiment in which he argues for the positive content of an ethic of compassion for the vulnerable and exposes some of the troubling consequences of Nietzsche's more aristocratic valorization of strength. When I began this reply by questioning whether there is "the" (singular) response to Nietzsche I may have been a little hasty. What I mean is that there are many alternative ethical systems (ranging from utilitarianism and Kantianism to the Christian ethic Nietzsche attacks in Beyond Good and Evil and elsewhere), but there is a general philosophical tendency not to discount a theory because of its origin. Imagine Nietzsche published his will to power philosophy, not because he believed it, but to win a bet with Wagner or Mary Wollstoncraft was actually into patriarchal governance --even so, we would have to assess N's work on...

Many of those who favor online piracy (or who oppose restrictive laws meant to combat piracy, at least), argue that piracy does not actually hurt movie and music producers. They claim that most pirates would be unlikely to buy the products in question even if they were unable to download them for free. In restricting piracy, we aren't actually restoring revenue to the producers or anything of the sort. Those producers would be just as successful or unsuccessful whether piracy were allowed or not. Is this sensible? Let's say that I download a movie. If it is really true that I would not buy the movie in any case, does that make downloading it okay?

We would add just a tad to the earlier respondent: Downloading without consent or payment would still involve disrespect of the filmmaker, artist, and so on. Also, the question itself suggests you really do want the object you have downloaded --otherwise downloading wouldn't come up as a question. You also say would "not buy the movie in any case," but if there was no other way of viewing the movie, would you still come to the same conclusion that you have. CT and his friend and consultant TJ Hagen

Is it ethical to force people to do the right thing?

This question is particularly troubling when it comes to Good Samaratan Laws, laws that would penalize persons who do not aid those in trouble. Some have argued that aiding others should be a matter of freely exercised virtues like courage (or exercising the good of compassion) rather than coercion. But in many cases, especially in life and death situations, we do in fact think it proper to force people to do the right thing. We expect persons to drive carefully, to not murder other people, to not steal from others, to pay taxes, and so on, and it seems difficult to conceive of a community in which there are no enforceable rules. I do not think any philosopher from Plato and Aristotle onward have thought it was possible for there to be a human society without enforceable laws of some kind. Philosophers have differed, however, as to the underlying foundation and extent of such laws. Hobbes, famously, located the justification for law in terms of social contracts, while philosophers like Aquinas saw...

Is killing considered wrong because people have a right to be alive, or because the act of killing someone is immoral?

Good question. Some ethical systems have grounded the ethics against homicide on grounds that do not appeal to the right to life. For example, some divine command theories hold that you should not kill innocent persons because this is prohibited by God. And some utilitarians (Bentham) repudiate the appeal to rights. However, there are other philosophical systems in which rights are given foremost attention, and would claim that the reason why you should not kill the innocent is because they have a right to life. This way of putting the matter puts the focus on the person who has a right not to be violated and also leads us to think that if someone does attempt to kill an innocent person (and fails) that person is owed some restitution (the criminal act is not just a crime against the state or God, though it might be agains both; it is also a crime against the intended victim).

If a person who is being harassed could easily and effectively extricate themselves from the situation, does that mean the harassment is any less "serious"?

Great question. I suppose that if the person does not know she can easily and effectively extricate, then her not removing herself has no bearing on the gravity of the harassment (she may feel trapped and has no means of breaking a contract). Also, if the person can easily and effectively extricate herself and knows she can do so, but imagine that once she does she would be unemployed and perhaps face great hardship, then there would also be no bearing on the seriousness of the harassment. It also might be that if the person knows she can do the extraction and an alternative job exists, she suffers from a profoundly low self-image or she thinks (falsely) that she deserves the harassment. For all these reasons, I think the best way to assess the harassment would be to describe the case itself (e.g. does she have to put up with crude, relentless sexist jokes, uninvited sexual passes, has she been given unfair humiliating tasks when male colleagues are not, does her boss spill hot coffee on her "by...

If a person performs good deeds according to a logic that is reprehensible, yet consistently leads to good deeds, is the person doing good, or is the good incidental? For instance, suppose an adult takes care of their elderly parents because they fear the public shame involved in letting their parents languish in a home, despite not actually caring about their parents at all. Is the person still doing the right thing, despite the less than admirable logic they use to get there?

Great question. According to most virtue theorists (in the tradition of Aristotle) and Kantians, the action is (at a minimum) tarnished, reflecting a serious impairment. It might be added, too, that in the tradition of some religious ethics, the act would not be praise-worthy if the motives are not praise-worthy. There is even a technical term in Christian ethics for this: good acts that are done for ill motives like the desire to avoid punishment are called acts of attrition as opposed to acts of contrition in which a person might reform or do some act or repentance for good reasons. Having said all that, I might add that if I was the elderly parent and there was no other way for me to receive care except from the likes of Goneril and Regan (two daughters who profess to love their father in Shakespeare's King Lear, when they only want his power) I might be tempted to accept the care gratefully. Perhaps the case is no different from imagining one is drowning and the only person who can and will rescue...

It seems that when a person commits a heinous act, that act is in no way "compensated for" by any amount of good they may have done prior or since. A firefighter who has saved dozens of lives, lives frugally and volunteers all his spare time for those in need is nonetheless damned if he commits one murder. It is clear that the crime itself is a terrible thing and cannot be excused, and should definitely be sanctioned, but it seems we go further and label the firefighter *himself* a terrible person, regardless of anything else he might have done. Is that really the case?

Very interesting! In the case you describe, the conclusion seems quite plausible. We might even think the firefighter worse than an "average person" or a gang member because we (perhaps rightly) think the firefighter should know and act better, especially given that he has in the past shown so much respect for human life. Still, there are cases in which we do sometimes overlook minor wrongs in the case of persons who have otherwise lived exemplary lives of virtue. I believe that Martin Luther King, Jr. was not always faithful to his wife and plagarized parts of his doctoral dissertation, but it would seem very small minded to hold these against the man who led such a radical movement on behalf of Black Americans and for the cause of fairness and integration. Gandhi, apparently, was not a good father (he was not abusive, per se, but not commendable), but this again seems very minor and of only minimal significance, given the greatness of Gandhi's achievement. If we imagine King and Gandhi did...

Can someone help me with this basic argument.I just want it to make sense and than I will look at the major tweaks later. I believe I need to fix the conclusion because when I get around to writing the paper about it I will be proving P2 and have nothing to say by P3 because it is the same thing.I'd appreciate some help thank you very much. (P1) If animals can critically interpret similarly to humans, it makes sense to assume they understand the feeling of pain as well. (P2) Most people agree it is morally unjustifiable to intentionally afflict pain on those who can feel it, especially in cases that are not of self defense. (P3) Animal cruelty is not a case of self defense, therefore animal cruelty is morally unjustifiable.

Looks very promising! You might want to adjust the first premise. First, you might want to refer to "some nonhuman animals." The notion of "critically interpret" seems a little awkward. Are you here asserting that some nonhuman exercise reason or that they involve higher order evaluations of some sort (e.g. they not only interpret situations but they critically do so)? I am on your side in this matter with respect to some nonhuman animals; great apes and dolphins seem to have higher order thoughts (they can recognize themselves in mirrors for example and have some powers of communication that is very close to language). If you are trying to reach P3, perhaps all you need in P1 is that some nonhuman animals suffer, and that thesis would seem to be supported on the grounds of analogy with humans --their brain and nervous system and ostensible pain-avoidance behavior is similar to our own. In P2 you might need to claim that it is not just morally unjustified to inflict pain (or suffering? some...

Why do we have some fundamental rights (such as freedom of conscience or the right to life) but not others (such as the right to sexuality, or the right to happiness)? Who decides? Who prioritizes?

When you write about "who decides? who prioritizes?" it sounds as though you are referring to legal rights. While some ethical theories of rights do appeal to contracts and social agreements, much of the philosophy of rights appeals to nature, human nature specifically, or to duties, which are not a matter of convention. So, assuming that we human beings do have a right to life and this is foundational (it entails that others have a duty not to murder me, for example), this is not something normally thought of in terms of a person or group of people deciding we have such a right. In any case, whether legal or ethical, some rights are considered more fundamental because they explain more particular rights. So, it is natural to think that the right of self-expression is more fundamental than my right to write a letter about my beliefs, because the first right explains the latter. Your having a right to liberty (within constraints) is more foundational than your right to start walking toward the setting...

Hi; I'm not sure this is a philosphical question, but nonetheless I would love to know, why is it that people do bad things even when they know they are bad things? Is there a philosopher or a philosophy that answers this question? Cheers Pasquale

Dear Pasquale, Yes, this is a question that exercised the earliest philosophers in Ancient Greece (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle). It is sometimes referred to as the problem of akrasia, which is the Greek term for weakness of will. Some of these early philosophers thought that ignorance is the key. People often do bad things because (basically) they don't know any better (or what counts as the good). A somewhat related view (taken up later by Augustine and Aquinas) is that when a person does something bad, he is actually (at least at the time of the act) pursuing something he believes (or he has deceived himself into believing) is actually justified or not wrong. So, on this view, a person might tell himself (and even tell the world) that he is only seeking justice, when in actuality he is a tyrant seeking revenge. Or, someone who in general thinks that adultery and stealing are wrong, gets himself to think that in these particular circumstances, the act is ok. Others, such as St. Paul in the New...

Pages