Recent Responses
Utilitarianistically speaking, is there any difference between forced population transfer and ethnic cleansing?
Andrew Pessin
January 16, 2014
(changed January 16, 2014)
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I think the question is far too ill-defined to answer meaningfully. in some ways the two activities might be identical (if, say, the population you're transferring is all the members of some undesired ethnic group). Or of course one can ethnic cleanse w/o transferring (for example by genoci... Read more
Do philosphers think answers to questions always should mandate a philosophical response or do they think there is no such hierarchy? For example, do philosophers think they should have any more say than a politician, a political scientist or a theologian to the answer to the question, "Should there be a United Ireland?"
Allen Stairs
January 16, 2014
(changed January 16, 2014)
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To say that all questions demand a philosophical response (whatever exactly that is) would be at best a very controversial philosophical view. And a philosopher who thought that philosophers should have more say on large practical questions than anyone else would be hard pressed to justify h... Read more
In a review for Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos, John Dupré, takes issue with Nagel's assertion that reductive materialism is regarded as the only serious philosophical possibility within mainstream philosophy. According to Dupré, reductionism has been almost entirely rejected by philosophers engaged in the biological sciences. I've been a regular reader of the Askphilosophers.org website and from what I've learned here, physicalism is the widely accepted position. Even the Stanford encyclopedia says that physicalism is the "default" attitude among philosophers. Is there something I am missing, or is John Dupré correct? http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35163-mind-and-cosmos-why-the-materialist-neo-darwinian-conception-of-nature-is-almost-certainly-false/
Allen Stairs
January 16, 2014
(changed January 16, 2014)
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Others can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the solution to the puzzle is straightforward: physicalism isn't the same as reductive materialism. Indeed, that's part of Dupré's complaint against Nagel: Nagel's view of materialism is narrow and outmoded. You might have a look at this secti... Read more
Hello, my question is connected to Buddhist philosophy. What interests me ir the Buddhist view on sexuality and reproduction. As attachment is considered a cause of suffering and a negative aspect which keeps us away from selfless love and compassion, does this make motherhood or fatherhood a cause for low awereness? I mean, I don't think attachement can be eliminated in the case of having children or marriage, any kind of a deep personal relationship. Wouldn't that make Buddhism a very negative doctrine towards life in general? Doesn't this suggest that non-existence and avoidance is the goal?
Oliver Leaman
January 9, 2014
(changed January 9, 2014)
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Not really, and first of all one has to say that there is no one Buddhist view but rather a variety of views.Many Buddhists would take the line that any action leading to an attachment should only be undertaken if it could be seen as playing a part in eventually lessening attachment. Having c... Read more
Do philosophers shy away from discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Jewish culture in general for fear of upsetting American Jews in academia?
Oliver Leaman
January 9, 2014
(changed January 9, 2014)
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Despite what you suggest, those topics are much discussed, and a wide range of views is presented. You imply that American Jews have a common line on these issues, but of course they do not and can be found on all sides.
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I want to say Hume was an idealist but this seems controversial. My reasoning goes like this. Hume thinks that all we can know comes from our personal experience (this is uncontroversial Hume was an empiricist). He also thinks that we have no justification for believing in an external world, because all we ever experience are our sense perceptions which, Hume thinks, are wholly mind dependent. So Hume thinks all we can know is mind dependent and we have no justification for believing that there is anything more than this. So for Hume all there is, is mind dependent stuff. This clearly makes Hume an idealist. So my qustion is am I right in saying that Hume was an idealist?
Donald Baxter
January 9, 2014
(changed January 9, 2014)
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Here is another take on this important and difficult question. The fact that Hume can find no justification for believing in the external world does not prevent him from believing in it. Nature causes us to believe many things we can find no justification for. "We may well ask, What causes in... Read more
Utilitarianistically speaking, is there any difference between forced population transfer and ethnic cleansing?
Andrew Pessin
January 16, 2014
(changed January 16, 2014)
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I think the question is far too ill-defined to answer meaningfully. in some ways the two activities might be identical (if, say, the population you're transferring is all the members of some undesired ethnic group). Or of course one can ethnic cleanse w/o transferring (for example by genoci... Read more
Is there such a thing as a philosophy of food, or a philosphy of culinary arts? If not, may I create it now?
William Rapaport
January 9, 2014
(changed January 9, 2014)
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There is. My colleague, Carolyn Korsmeyer, has written on the subject.
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My understanding is that we can use systems like Peano Arithmetic to prove the seemingly basic truth that 1+1=2. Do such proofs actually give us reasons to believe that 1+1=2 that we didn't have before? Are they more fundamental or compelling than whatever justification a mathematically-naive person would have to believe that 1+1=2?
Stephen Maitzen
January 4, 2014
(changed January 4, 2014)
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There are genuine philosophers of math on the Panel, but while we wait for them to respond I'll take a stab at your questions, which are epistemological as much as they're mathematical. I think we can answer yes to the first question without having to answer yes to the second question, but... Read more
How arrogant are philosophers? Are they more or less easily to have their minds changed as compared to scientists or theologians?
Charles Taliaferro
January 3, 2014
(changed January 3, 2014)
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Two very difficult questions! Your first question about 'how arrogant are philosophers' suggests you are not asking whether philosophers are arrogant, but asking about the magnitude of arrogance. Before replying to your question, please allow me to back-up a bit.First, when is anyone a... Read more