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Can reading Schopenhauer cure sex/lust addiction? If it can, do philosophers think that normative ethics ought to be therapeutic?
Gabriel Segal
August 18, 2013
(changed August 18, 2013)
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there is some potentially relevant empirical material here:
http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/
in the section:
The Relationship Between Moral Reflection and Moral Behavior:
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Is it ethical for game theory to be applied to conflicts which may involve mass human deaths for non-defensive wars?
Allen Stairs
August 15, 2013
(changed August 15, 2013)
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Perhaps it depends on what sort of application you have in mind.Suppose we want to understand the sorts of conflicts you've singled out. Surely the attempt to understand isn't immoral—quite the opposite given what's at stake. And suppose that the branch of mathematics known as game theory help... Read more
Classical logic says that from a contradiction you can derive anything. I think that depends on how you define a contradiction. If you have two opposing truth values with respect to A, A is true and A is false what can we infer about the truth status of A? Well in one way to look at it you could say that to assert a contradiction means we hold that both statements about A are true regardless of whether they contradict each other. A is true regardless of the contrary position that A is false. Likewise A is false regardless of the contrary position that A is true. If we define a contradiction in this manner then we can separately infer both truth values of A. Given A is true and A is false we can conclude A is true and given A is true and A is false we can conclude that A is false. If you infer A is true from the contradiction then A or B is true. If A or B is true then if A is false then B is true. A is true regardless of whether A is false therefor we can not conclude an explosion occurs. It seems that for Classical logic to make sense of a contradiction in such a way that it leads to explosion that it must define what it means to hold a contradiction in a particular way. I don't know which way it defines a contradiction but wouldn't it be defined in some arbitrary way that forces us into the "explosion" scenario?
Stephen Maitzen
August 15, 2013
(changed August 15, 2013)
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You wrote: (i) "It seems that for classical logic to make sense of a contradiction in such a way that it leads to explosion...it must define what it means to hold a contradiction in a particular way" and (ii) "[W]ouldn't it be defined in some arbitrary way that forces us into the 'explosion... Read more
For the given premises P and Not P, is P a valid derivation? Shouldn't the derivation be true for all the premises for it to be valid or is it not sound and yet valid? But aren't we determining its unsoundness by virtue of something other than the content of those premises?
Stephen Maitzen
August 15, 2013
(changed August 15, 2013)
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Given premises P and not P, it is indeed valid to derive P. I don't know of any logical systems, including non-classical systems, that would deny the validity of that derivation. (A valid derivation needn't use all of its premises: "P; Q; therefore, P" is valid.)The derivation you gave isn'... Read more
Why are personal religious beliefs more respected and legally protected than personal philosophical beliefs? Could this be because religious metaphysics are more irrefutable than secular metaphysics?
Allen Stairs
August 11, 2013
(changed August 11, 2013)
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I'm guessing that by "personal philosophical beliefs" you mean not just philosophical beliefs that someone might happen to hold (such as the belief that numbers exist as Platonic objects, for example) but beliefs and commitments about matters that someone takes to be of great personal signific... Read more
Why is it important to have more women students and professors in philosophy? So long as there is equality in opportunity why does equality of outcome matter? Asians are even less represented in philosophy departments and Eastern Philosophy is given much less attention than the Feminist School of Resentment yet that isn't being challenged.
Oliver Leaman
August 10, 2013
(changed August 10, 2013)
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It is a matter of fairness. If women are put off philosophy, and do not on the whole flourish in the profession, then it is unfair if they are able and interested and unsuccessful. The same goes for education as a whole. There is no reason why we should expect the various disciplines to be eq... Read more
As a professional philosopher; which philosophical idea brings you the greatest joy whenever you think about it?
Douglas Burnham
August 9, 2013
(changed August 9, 2013)
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What a lovely question! Thank you!
I'm going to punt for Kant's account of the beautiful as that which brings harmony among the cognitive faculties and 'enlivens' their mutual functioning. Now, why does this bring me joy? First of all, because I have found the idea enormously philosophically... Read more
What are some books for a beginner to learn about Kant's critique of judgement?
Douglas Burnham
August 9, 2013
(changed August 9, 2013)
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Well, I'm sure you can do BETTER than my book (with Edinburgh, 2000), but that's not going to stop me recommending it. More recent is a fine introductory commentary by Fiona Hughes (Continuum 2009).
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Do you think that more philosophy departments in the future will either continue to have their budgets cut or be completely eliminated at both public and private institutions? If so, is this more because of administrative politics or because philosophers are unpersuasive in their arguments? Isn't this pressure a good thing, since forcing philosophers to justify the existence of their field is something philosophers ought already to be able to do ever since Socrates (who seemed to be a bad pro se lawyer)?
Allen Stairs
August 8, 2013
(changed August 8, 2013)
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When it comes to what will happen, I'll have to plead lack of a crystal ball. I can't even say what might happen. I'm not sure what sort of administrative politics you have in mind, but at least at my institution, I haven't noticed that administrators have any special animus against philosophy.... Read more
Why are personal religious beliefs more respected and legally protected than personal philosophical beliefs? Could this be because religious metaphysics are more irrefutable than secular metaphysics?
Allen Stairs
August 11, 2013
(changed August 11, 2013)
Permalink
I'm guessing that by "personal philosophical beliefs" you mean not just philosophical beliefs that someone might happen to hold (such as the belief that numbers exist as Platonic objects, for example) but beliefs and commitments about matters that someone takes to be of great personal signific... Read more