Recent Responses
Is this sentence true: "Miles Davis and narwhals both have horns." The word "horn" can mean a musical instrument (which only Miles Davis has) or a bony protrusion (which only narwhals have.) But is it possible to mean both things at once (which would make the sentence true). Or does the sentence only have two possible meanings, both of which are false?
Richard Heck
July 26, 2011
(changed July 26, 2011)
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This phenomenon is well-known. It's a form of zeugma that is known as "syllepsis".
I think most linguists would say that this sentence cannot mean that Miles has a trumpet and a narwhal a protrusion from the head. The reason is the obvious one: that "horn" has to be interpreted a single way. Note... Read more
Has a person been wronged if they are cloned without their consent? Presume that the cloning process is non-invasive; a scientist simply picks up stray hair you left behind, and then makes a clone of you. Does that violate your rights? Do we have a copyright on our DNA?
Thomas Pogge
July 24, 2011
(changed July 24, 2011)
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This question is at the extreme end of a cloud of questions. The person who picked up your stray hair might use your entire genetic information (cloning) or any subset thereof. I don't think there is a general moral answer here about where to draw the line. There are some clues to a moral answer a... Read more
Would the possibility of women competing on equal footing with men be thinkable without contraceptives, birth control, and access to abortion?
Oliver Leaman
July 24, 2011
(changed July 24, 2011)
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Certainly. The fact that women have children does not mean that they are obliged to be the main carers for those children once they are born, nor does it mean that while pregnant they are in any way incapacitated. If childcare were to be shared equally, or adequately organized by the state or com... Read more
Is a parent's right to their own children based on something more than just the fact they are a good force in their children's lives? I read about a court case in which a custody dispute was decided on the basis of "what was best for the child". Now of course the children's interests should be one consideration, but aren't there others as well? Suppose a baby is born to two very poor parents. A rich couple demands their baby saying "We can give your baby a better future. With us, the baby will get a better education, eat better food, live in a better neighborhood." Shouldn't the poor parent's still have a right to keep their child, even if this situation is not "what's best for the child".
Oliver Leaman
July 24, 2011
(changed July 24, 2011)
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Precisely, and we do not tend to insist that children are brought up by the best parents, only their parents, other things being equal. So it is clearly the case that some parents are pretty lousy as carers, they may even realize it themselves, and yet this is no blanket reason to take their chil... Read more
My question today is concerning authority. I ask: how is authority ever justified? Let me frame my question. Let us allow that "authority" in a governmental sense is to stop the subjects from being murdered, pillaged, to stop violence, to stop thiefs, to moderate economics, etc. Now let me ask you this. If, say, a murderer thinks about killing his victim, but is ultimately unable to do so due to the various laws/punishments involved, the government has been "successful." They have deterred the murderer from committing the crime because of the legislation in place. In this sense, we can say that a government replaces "freedom" with "security". Essentially, the more totalitarian a government becomes, the more "freedom" is traded for "security". However, is it not also true that in the saving of the life of the victim, we have "murdered" the free will of the murderer? Why can authority, in essense, save the existance of one individual, while condeming the existance of another, even if that existance involves violence or crime? My question comes down to the following. Why is it that the life of the victim of the murderer should be any more valuable than his freedom? Say the government were to be abolished, prisons done away with; the murderer would achieve freedom of action and murder his victim. Why is this a bad thing? The victim is essentially in this instance becoming a martyr for anarchy - if we give up government, sure many will die, be raped, pillaged, and have their possessions stolen, but is this not all beneficial for the cause of freedom? The victim should, in the end, feel privelaged that they could give up their life for the freedom of another human being. Now, it is important to note that I recognise governments provide needed services to their subjects; my question is focusing solely on crime and punishment. Jack.
Allen Stairs
July 23, 2011
(changed July 23, 2011)
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I'll admit to being a bit puzzled. Here's the bit where I start to feel things spin:
...is it not also true that in the saving of the life of the victim, we have "murdered" the free will of the murderer? Why can authority, in essence, save the existence of one individual, while condemning the exis... Read more
In a recent question / answer, it was asked "how can a person know that an action is immoral, yet do it anyway?" and the response was "a person can 'know' things on different levels and so can engage in self-deception." I have a question about the response, which then leads to a deeper more qeneral question. Suppose a person knows that an action is immoral, yet does it anyway. Might that not indicate that the person [at least in this instance] does not care whether s/he behaves in a moral manner? and where does the concept of 'evil' stand in philosophy, and how might the concept of 'evil' explain this apparent disparity?
Thomas Pogge
July 22, 2011
(changed July 22, 2011)
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I agree that a person can, without self-deception, do what she knows to be immoral. This happens quite frequently. People lie to their parents and spouses about matters that legitimately concern them; people lie to colleagues and supervisors in order to get out of unwanted chores; people ignore th... Read more
Opponents to gay marriage often argue that marriage is "by definition" a union between one man and one women. I support gay marriage myself, but this kind of argument is interesting to me--I'm not sure what to make of it. What does it mean to say that marriage is, by definition, thus and so? (Is this just a statement about the way people tend to use the word "marriage"?) More importantly, should we ever be persuaded by such arguments?
Richard Heck
July 28, 2011
(changed July 28, 2011)
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Let me add a few words to Sean's excellent response.
I think one thing worth keeping in mind here, which I may have said already in response to a similar question, is that the institution of marriage in the United States, and in some other places in the developed world, has changed a great deal ov... Read more
In a recent question / answer, it was asked "how can a person know that an action is immoral, yet do it anyway?" and the response was "a person can 'know' things on different levels and so can engage in self-deception." I have a question about the response, which then leads to a deeper more qeneral question. Suppose a person knows that an action is immoral, yet does it anyway. Might that not indicate that the person [at least in this instance] does not care whether s/he behaves in a moral manner? and where does the concept of 'evil' stand in philosophy, and how might the concept of 'evil' explain this apparent disparity?
Thomas Pogge
July 22, 2011
(changed July 22, 2011)
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I agree that a person can, without self-deception, do what she knows to be immoral. This happens quite frequently. People lie to their parents and spouses about matters that legitimately concern them; people lie to colleagues and supervisors in order to get out of unwanted chores; people ignore th... Read more
Why would someone want to be loved other than selfish reasons or to boost their ego?
Allen Stairs
July 21, 2011
(changed July 21, 2011)
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We could dream up some strange scenario in which I want to be loved by someone - Robin, say - but only because if Robin loves me, this will (somehow!) produce some good result that doesn't benefit me personally. I leave it as an imaginative exercise to construct such a story. But that's presumabl... Read more
The "naturalistic fallacy" states that it is false to appeal to nature or naturalness in order to judge the goodness of something. Yet despite this being a fallacy, we see it crop up all the time in all spheres of life. Saying something isn't "natural" usually carries a negative connotation, and from foodstuffs to building materials to sexual practices, people use appeals to nature in order to condemn things. Since it seems appeals to nature are very popular, I wonder, is there a stream of thought that considers the naturalistic fallacy not to be a fallacy, but to be a proper form of argumentation? Are there philosophers or movements in philosophy which consider goodness to be clearly derivable from naturalness?
Allen Stairs
July 21, 2011
(changed July 21, 2011)
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First, just a terminological point. The phrase "naturalistic fallacy" is usually used to mean the supposed fallacy of defining a moral term such as "good" in terms of non-moral properties. For example, if someone said that "good" means "produces happiness," they would be accused of committing the... Read more