Recent Responses
I became a vegan two years ago, mainly motivated by emotional distress at the thought of the pain and suffering that animals go through to be killed/farmed. Now I justify this decision to others for health/social reasons, because I don't know how to justify it morally. I instinctively feel that to eat an egg, whether or not the hen was free-range, or even if I just found it outside, would be inherently wrong, but I can't quite articulate why logically. I suppose if pressed I'd say that all sentient beings possess rights, or at the right not to be treated as property, and farming violates this right. Does this stand up to scrutiny?
Jean Kazez
September 10, 2010
(changed September 10, 2010)
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I think less is more when it comes to explaining why it's wrong to use animals for food. Animals taste good, but that's too trivial a reason for imposing serious harm on them--suffering and death. (As I'm sure you know, in intensive farming laying hens suffer in many ways, and for each l... Read more
If it's generally accepted that we are able to punish and criticize on behalf of others, are we also able to forgive on behalf of others?
Sean Greenberg
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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I think that only one person is in a position to grant forgiveness--the person from whom one is seeking forgiveness. When one seeks forgiveness, one is asking someone against whom one has trespassed in some way to absolve one of the trepass, and, thus to restore your relationship, and o... Read more
I was hoping that you could resolve a dilemma that I have recently discovered. It has to do with the art of philosophy and not with the subsequent ideas generated by philosophizing. Before I state the dilemma, I want to ask: Does determination of nature precede determination of action? In other words, can we practice philosophy without necessarily defining the terms and the nature of the act we which to practice? It seems that we ought to first ask: What is philosophy and how ought we practice philosophy? The problem arises when we attempt to answer the two questions specified above. How exactly do we answer these questions without philosophizing? The very act of contemplating the nature of philosophy requires philosophy; this is logically inconsistent. We cannot study the existence of X by presupposing that X is true to begin with. This is the dilemma; it is a dilemma of definition and how an approach to philosophy must first be preceded by a method of thought detached from philosophy. What is this alternative thought? Because it seems to me that philosophy can never be practiced until we resolve this dilemma.
Allen Stairs
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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One thing is clear: people actually do practice philosophy. (Some of my best friends...) And so whatever the reasoning you've offered shows, it can't show that no one can do philosophy because people clearly do do it. But then, most of us can't say what most of our activities amount to in... Read more
Can something really be divided into an infinite number of parts? It seems like it's theoretically possible to infinitely continue dividing something, but that is in no way the same thing as saying that something can be infinitely divided at any point in temporality, since an infinite period of time must be reached before something has been infinitely divided (which is not even a theoretical possibility). It seems like vast claims and supposed paradoxes in physics and mathematics are founded on this dubious assumption that an object or shape can be theoretically divided into an infinite number of parts.
Miriam Solomon
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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It may help to say that we only need "infinite divisibility"--we don't need the division to have actually taken place, only to be possible in principle.
Also, what is your model of "dividing" here? Do you imagine scissors and paper and a lot of cutting? Perhaps there are other ways of... Read more
My question deals with fair play and the relative value that we ascribe to victories in sports that are either earned through no apparent cheating or that are earned through a clear (though at the time undetected by officials) cheating (for example, the "hand of god" moment by the Argentine soccer player, Maradona). Have philosophers opined on this issue? As an aside, I note that it has been famously said by certain athletes in sports that "if you're not cheating, you're not trying." So perhaps there is a related though tangential question regarding the perceived amount of effort employed by players themselves in a sporting event -- that if you are not trying to bend the rules to some extent then you are not trying hard enough, and consequently you are not placing a sufficient amount of value on the purported end of the game or match, i.e., victory. I am not inclined to favor the "cheating is just really trying" angle, but it is offered as a frequent enough justification.
Douglas Burnham
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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The issue, it seems to me, is that there are more than one set of criteria for what is a good game of football, or even what is fair. So, from the player, fan, coach and owner's point of view, whatever it takes to win might be considered both good and fair and 'part of the game' (thus... Read more
Is it possible to have a thought that has never been thought by anyone else before? A thought or notion that is so unique and individual to oneself that it surely could never have been thought by anyone else previously?
Sean Greenberg
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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I think that the answer to this question depends on what one take a thought to be. If by 'thought', one means an actual, occurrent mental state, then surely it is possible to have a thought that no one else has ever had: if sensory perceptions are thoughts, then every distinct event tha... Read more
I became a vegan two years ago, mainly motivated by emotional distress at the thought of the pain and suffering that animals go through to be killed/farmed. Now I justify this decision to others for health/social reasons, because I don't know how to justify it morally. I instinctively feel that to eat an egg, whether or not the hen was free-range, or even if I just found it outside, would be inherently wrong, but I can't quite articulate why logically. I suppose if pressed I'd say that all sentient beings possess rights, or at the right not to be treated as property, and farming violates this right. Does this stand up to scrutiny?
Jean Kazez
September 10, 2010
(changed September 10, 2010)
Permalink
I think less is more when it comes to explaining why it's wrong to use animals for food. Animals taste good, but that's too trivial a reason for imposing serious harm on them--suffering and death. (As I'm sure you know, in intensive farming laying hens suffer in many ways, and for each l... Read more
Should we teach philosophy to younger children? Would it help them in anyway, or would it be harmful in later life?
Gordon Marino
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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Children are natural philosophers in that they are naturally filled with wonder. And very early on in life, they have all kinds of pressing issues about justice. In that sense, I don't think it could hurt to talk with them about philosophy. It depends on where the child is calling from, w... Read more
What is required to truly be "sorry" for something? I've always heard that if your truly sorry for an action, you will never repeat that action. A repeat offence, therefore, means that you were never truly sorry in the first place. So how can one express sorrow?/what is required for a true "sorry"?
Sean Greenberg
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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If by 'feeling sorry' for an action, it is meant that the action is regretted, then it seems to me that one may sincerely regret an action and nevertheless for some reason commit a similar action. (That an agent repeats an action that s/he sincerely regretted may reveal something deep a... Read more
If the Nazi government can be called evil for committing the Holocaust then shouldn't the American government during the time of slavery be regarded as evil also?
Sean Greenberg
September 9, 2010
(changed September 9, 2010)
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The notion of evil is somewhat problematic in this context, since it is a very loaded term. Indeed, Hannah Arendt's influential Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, argued that Adolf Eichmann's actions aren't straightforwardly seen as evil (hence the subtitle of her... Read more