Recent Responses
Is it ethical for the civilized nations of the world to research weapons of mass destruction [chemical and biological] for the purposes of warfare? Both Russia and America have stockpiles of small pox a deadly virus that could do considerable damage to humanity. Is it ethical to keep said stockpiles as a precaution, as a counter measure to terrorists and warlike nations? Is it ethical to keep up a chemical and biological arms race through research and weapons development? I find myself wondering how we can fight a war with weapons like Ebola and smallpox. Do you have to become your enemy to defeat them? How far should we go to preserve the West? Are some things not worth the loss of moral standing? Do those that serve and protect our nation states really have to go that far and is it worth it? My concern likely echoes the dilemmas faced by many during World War Two and the question as to whether using nuclear weapons was worth the loss of humanity; either the lives lost or the abstract ideal of humane behavior. Thank you for the consideration.
Lorraine Besser...
February 19, 2009
(changed February 19, 2009)
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From an ethical standpoint, the research and development of weapons of mass destruction is justifiable only by appeal to the deterrent effect possession of such weapons has. When a country has weapons of mass destruction, others are deterred from using force against that county. T... Read more
We often to defend an action by justifying the intentions, but isn’t that the straw man’s fallacy? The question was never ‘were his intentions good,’ or even ‘were the results of his actions good,’ but rather ‘was the action itself good.’ Does the greater good justify a smaller evil, and do good intentions make an evil action good? Can somebody do something that’s bad without being bad in doing it? Take for example, suffering. We generally accept that suffering is evil, but that doesn’t mean that I’m doing something wrong for suffering, does it? Even though suffering by its nature is accepted as bad we don’t consider it ‘sinful’ for me to do so. So, to summarize, my question is: Can an action be evil simply by the nature of its existence?
Lorraine Besser...
February 19, 2009
(changed February 19, 2009)
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Moral philosophers will disagree on this topic; there are many different theories of moral worth. Some place significant weight on intentions, some do not. I think one helpful way of approaching this issue is to sort out the different considerations at stake. First, consider the ac... Read more
To what extent should our actions be guided by our theories in ethics?
Lorraine Besser...
February 19, 2009
(changed February 19, 2009)
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Ethical theories are meant to cover all areas of one's life. If someone truly embraces a particular ethical theory, then all of her actions ought to be at least consistent with her ethical beliefs. Some decisions, and corresponding actions, have no ethical value: choosing which pair... Read more
Why is it necessary that 2+2=4? Because it is difficult to conceive how 2+2 could have been other than 4? But how do we know that this is not just due to our limitations? The fact that we, i.e. our brains, cannot imagine a different result does not per se mean that it is logically impossible for 2+2 not to be 4 (given the standard semantics of course).
Allen Stairs
February 19, 2009
(changed February 19, 2009)
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We need to keep two questions straight here: (i) why is it necessary that 2+2=4; (ii) why should we believe it's necessary that 2+2=4.
The first question assumes that this is, in fact, a necessary truth, and asks what grounds the necessity. The second asks how we know.
On the first: why i... Read more
Before I married I dated a few guys from my group of friends from university. This group included a great variety of people in terms of health, wealth, race, looks, etc. The only common point was that we were all similar age. As I was lucky enough to be popular, I was choosy. I never wanted to date a smoker, because I find this a filthy, disgusting habit: I never wanted to date a fat man because I felt physically repelled; and I never wanted to date a black man because I find them physically unattractive. I liked all of my friends as friends, but when it comes to physical attraction I just cannot bring myself to something more physical with a black guy. Nobody would call me "smokeist" for not wanting to date a smoker, or call me "weightist" for rejecting a fat man; so why should I be labelled "racist" for finding black people unattractive? Our views of what is esthetically pleasing are personal and we are entitled to them; we should no be forced to like or dislike certain characteristics. Furthermore we are entitled to openly express whether we like something or not. An example of something impersonal is in the field of art: some people pay lots of money for works by, say Tracey Emin, but I find her works absolute and utter rubbish. In the same way I find the paintings of Van Gogh totally appealing, but other people don't like them. We can express our opinions on these works of art openly and freely. Why can we not express our opinions when we are talking about human beauty, or lack of it, according to our own tastes?
Jean Kazez
February 19, 2009
(changed February 19, 2009)
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Your beliefs about smokers obviously do affect your reaction to them. Likewise, it's not impossible that your beliefs about black people affect your response to their appearance. Not impossible. But not inevitable either, so let's suppose your lack of attraction is innocent. The rest of yo... Read more
What is a good ethical decision making model for a professor who has been asked to teach a class outside his qualification? This has been mandated by his supervisor stating he is as qualfied as anybody else at the university and he has the open time.
Peter Smith
February 15, 2009
(changed February 15, 2009)
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The question doesn't specify what is to be taught. That matters. To take an extreme case, only a fully expert, well qualified, person should teach brain surgery. It would indeed be unethical to ask anyone else, or for the non-expert to comply with such a request. Too much hangs on getting t... Read more
How relevant is knowledge of moral theory to acting morally? Are philosophers "better" people than non-philosophers? Thanks for your time.
Douglas Burnham
February 14, 2009
(changed February 14, 2009)
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It would be great if the answer to your second question was 'yes'!
But, despite the authority of Plato, I doubt that it is.
Let us distinguish between knowing why, knowing that, andcharacter. 'Knowing why' is the moral theorist: he or she understandsthe relationship among principles, t... Read more
Is it still possible today to consider the notion of "obviousness" as a criterion of truth ?
Jennifer Church
February 14, 2009
(changed February 14, 2009)
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All arguments seek premises that most people can agree to without needing further support, and in this sense the appeal to what is "obvious" remains alive and well. What people can agree to without further support often depends on the context, however: in the context of a weekend strol... Read more
Do think there's any legitamacy to the principal of first dibs? Suppose Jones sits down on a bench in a public place, and later Smith comes and wants to sit down (there's only room for one). Does Jones have more right to the bench since she came there first?
Allen Stairs
February 12, 2009
(changed February 12, 2009)
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Perhaps it's not so much a principle as a widely agreed-upon norm for setting potential conflict aside. We could imagine a society where the rule that everyone internalized was quite different: the person on the bench should always give their seat up to the newcomer. That would be a perfec... Read more
Is racial profiling against Muslims morally permissible under any circumstances? If so, why?
Joseph Levine
February 12, 2009
(changed February 12, 2009)
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I wonder if you meant "impermissible" rather than "permissible", but either way I'll try to address the question. With respect to any ethical principle, at almost any level of abstraction, it's hard to say that it applies under literally any circumstance (maybe "do the right thing" is a... Read more