Recent Responses

Although there is obviously a distinction between playing a game with simulated violence and actually committing acts of violence, is it immoral to enjoy violent games? Is enjoyment of simulated violence evil, and, if so, where do we draw the line? Is chess immoral since the victor would normally enjoy 'killing' the opponents army? How does the accuracy of simulation effect morality?

Thomas Pogge July 5, 2007 (changed July 5, 2007) Permalink "I don’t see why a person who would never, ever consider raping a woman might not still enjoy fantasizing about raping a woman." I agree that this is possible. But this does not really answer the question whether there would be anything wrong with such fantasizing and such enjoyment. Leaving aside c... Read more

If we assume that there is no afterlife, what reason do we have to comply with a person's wishes as regards treatment of their corpse? In particular, it is striking to me that we should respect a person's wish not to extract their organs after death; what reason could we possibly have to heed the wishes of someone who no longer exists, especially when the donation of their organs could literally save the lives of several people?

Roger Crisp July 26, 2007 (changed July 26, 2007) Permalink A further consideration is that, given that many people have strong wishes -- whether rationally grounded or not -- that their corpses and probably those of their loved ones be treated in certain ways, it would be highly upsetting to many if they were to become aware that such treatment quite poss... Read more

Is it ethical for a depressed person to limit social interaction with friends, based on the idea that the friends might find such interaction unpleasant? Part of the problem is that friends often don't openly admit to not enjoying the depressed presence, but, if the depressed person finds it difficult to live with him-/herself, would it not follow that other people also find his/her company difficult? Increased isolation would undoubtedly have adverse effects on the depressed person. Would it be possible for a philosopher to explain the ethical position of the depressed person as regards to social interaction, please?

Gloria Origgi July 7, 2007 (changed July 7, 2007) Permalink When you are going through a depression your social identity is severely undermined. The mirroring effect that others have on your own perception of yourself- the way you "see yourself seen"- is so modified by your emotional states that one can argue that it would be probably safer to avoid too muc... Read more

Hello panel, My question focuses on a space in time where everyone ever associated with a person including themselves has died, where everything of that person's experience down to the most miniscule details of their existence is no longer in the minds of the living. This is assuming the non-existence of an afterlife. At this point in time, does this render that person's existence utterly meaningless? There are many people who survive in history but there are also many faceless, nameless people who lived through the ages and had experiences common to all the living now, but in this present day, those experiences no longer exist except in the distant past, and are thus inaccessible. (I apologise if this is making little sense, I am absolutely struggling to grasp my own problem.) Essentially what I mean to say is, while our experiences on this earth have meaning to us and the people sharing them with us in the present, on a grander timescale, is there any argument to allay a feeling I sometimes experience of utterly hopeless insignificance?

Thomas Pogge July 3, 2007 (changed July 3, 2007) Permalink How you live will have effects long after your death (see also question 1689). But if these effects carry no message of your character and personality, of your thoughts and emotions, loves and successes, they may not mitigate the feeling of looming utter insignificance. The dreadful feeling is that... Read more

Hello panel, My question focuses on a space in time where everyone ever associated with a person including themselves has died, where everything of that person's experience down to the most miniscule details of their existence is no longer in the minds of the living. This is assuming the non-existence of an afterlife. At this point in time, does this render that person's existence utterly meaningless? There are many people who survive in history but there are also many faceless, nameless people who lived through the ages and had experiences common to all the living now, but in this present day, those experiences no longer exist except in the distant past, and are thus inaccessible. (I apologise if this is making little sense, I am absolutely struggling to grasp my own problem.) Essentially what I mean to say is, while our experiences on this earth have meaning to us and the people sharing them with us in the present, on a grander timescale, is there any argument to allay a feeling I sometimes experience of utterly hopeless insignificance?

Thomas Pogge July 3, 2007 (changed July 3, 2007) Permalink How you live will have effects long after your death (see also question 1689). But if these effects carry no message of your character and personality, of your thoughts and emotions, loves and successes, they may not mitigate the feeling of looming utter insignificance. The dreadful feeling is that... Read more

What makes god, GOD? or in other words: what gives "him" authority? Is it the fact that he "knows all", or the fact that he can "create", or the lack thereof?

Douglas Burnham July 1, 2007 (changed July 1, 2007) Permalink Two points of clarification. In my response above, I am certainlynot endorsing Kant's solution, and I apologise if my wording gave that impression. Rather, I was giving his argument as an example of how some philosophers reply to the very fine question 'What makes God, GOD?'. That is, I am claim... Read more

Is an event which has zero probability of occurring but which is nonetheless conceivably possible rightly termed "impossible"? For instance, is it "impossible" that I could be the EXACT same height as another person? I take it that the chance of this is zero in that there are infinitely many heights I could be (6 ft, 6.01 ft, 6.001 ft, 6.0001 ft, etc.) but only one which could match that of a given other person exactly; at the same time, I have no problem at all imagining a world in which I really am exactly as tall as this other.

Daniel J. Velleman June 29, 2007 (changed June 29, 2007) Permalink I agree that there's nothing paradoxical here; surprising, perhaps, but not paradoxical. The only kind of additivity that is usually assumed in probability theory is countable additivity, and there's no violation of that here. But you do have uncountably many non-overlapping outcomes, each... Read more

Although there is obviously a distinction between playing a game with simulated violence and actually committing acts of violence, is it immoral to enjoy violent games? Is enjoyment of simulated violence evil, and, if so, where do we draw the line? Is chess immoral since the victor would normally enjoy 'killing' the opponents army? How does the accuracy of simulation effect morality?

Thomas Pogge July 5, 2007 (changed July 5, 2007) Permalink "I don’t see why a person who would never, ever consider raping a woman might not still enjoy fantasizing about raping a woman." I agree that this is possible. But this does not really answer the question whether there would be anything wrong with such fantasizing and such enjoyment. Leaving aside c... Read more

What makes god, GOD? or in other words: what gives "him" authority? Is it the fact that he "knows all", or the fact that he can "create", or the lack thereof?

Douglas Burnham July 1, 2007 (changed July 1, 2007) Permalink Two points of clarification. In my response above, I am certainlynot endorsing Kant's solution, and I apologise if my wording gave that impression. Rather, I was giving his argument as an example of how some philosophers reply to the very fine question 'What makes God, GOD?'. That is, I am claim... Read more

Is an event which has zero probability of occurring but which is nonetheless conceivably possible rightly termed "impossible"? For instance, is it "impossible" that I could be the EXACT same height as another person? I take it that the chance of this is zero in that there are infinitely many heights I could be (6 ft, 6.01 ft, 6.001 ft, 6.0001 ft, etc.) but only one which could match that of a given other person exactly; at the same time, I have no problem at all imagining a world in which I really am exactly as tall as this other.

Daniel J. Velleman June 29, 2007 (changed June 29, 2007) Permalink I agree that there's nothing paradoxical here; surprising, perhaps, but not paradoxical. The only kind of additivity that is usually assumed in probability theory is countable additivity, and there's no violation of that here. But you do have uncountably many non-overlapping outcomes, each... Read more

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