Recent Responses
Why don't humans think of all lives as equal, and instead that other creatures' lives hold more importance than others? For example a human kills an animal such as cows or pigs and no one (except animal rights activists and the like) has a problem with that, but if that same person killed another human they would be charged and sent to prison. In both cases a life is taken but (one human) and that person's life for some reason holds more importance than the animal's.
Richard Heck
March 3, 2006
(changed March 3, 2006)
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It is crucial, I think, to recognize that the relevant question here is not: Are the lives of humans more valuable than the lives of (other) animals? The objection to killing animals need not presuppose that animals' lives and humans' lives are of equal value. Most defenders of animal rights would... Read more
Is there philosophy of humor? I want to know if any professional philosophers have written on the necessary and sufficient conditions for quality comedic material.
Catherine Wearing
March 5, 2006
(changed March 5, 2006)
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Another great resource is Ted Cohen's recent book, Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters. He explores how jokes work -- what makes them funny, what makes them offensive (when they are) -- as well as what jokes can do beyond simply making us laugh. Full of good examples.... Read more
What is the philosophical notion of personhood? Sorry if this is a bad question. I'm new to philosophy.
Amy Kind
March 1, 2006
(changed March 1, 2006)
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One point that's implicit in Professor Pogge's answer above, but that it might be useful to make explicit, is that philosophers often use the notion of "person" in such a way that it contrasts with the genetic notion of "human". Whether or not you are human is a matter of your DNA. But whether or no... Read more
What is the philosophical notion of personhood? Sorry if this is a bad question. I'm new to philosophy.
Amy Kind
March 1, 2006
(changed March 1, 2006)
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One point that's implicit in Professor Pogge's answer above, but that it might be useful to make explicit, is that philosophers often use the notion of "person" in such a way that it contrasts with the genetic notion of "human". Whether or not you are human is a matter of your DNA. But whether or no... Read more
It is legitimate to say that tomatoes instantiate the property red. But is it also legitimate to say that tomatoes "cause" the instantiation of the property red? Thank you.
Thomas Pogge
February 27, 2006
(changed February 27, 2006)
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One might say that a person causes the property kind to be instantiated when she decides to perform a kind act: She causes there to be a kind act.
But we cannot really say anything like this about static objects. The stone does not cause heaviness to be instantiated, the relationship betwe... Read more
David Hume said of Berkeley that his arguments are irrefutable but his conclusions unacceptable --- or so I am told. Is this true, and if so, where can I find it? If it is true, isn't it a remarkably succinct statement of bigotry?
Douglas Burnham
February 27, 2006
(changed February 27, 2006)
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See the note to page 122 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. He writes '...the arguments admit of no answer and produce no conviction.' The point is not quite what you take it to be. Hume is considering the nature of scepticism (here he considers Berkeley to be a sceptic), and... Read more
One of Nietzsche's most cited statements is, to paraphrase, "That which doesn't kill me, makes me stronger". Seems to me that, despite common acceptance, this is flat out inaccurate. As one example, many people survive traumatic events and are hardly stronger, instead living sometimes nearly incapacitated lives with Post-Traumatic stress disorder. Or, those with diseases such as AIDS, diabetes, or any number of diseases that can be treated. Do Nietzschian philosophers still accept this quote? Is there some other interpretation of his statement that makes it useful?
Douglas Burnham
February 27, 2006
(changed February 27, 2006)
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The quote is from Twilight of the Idols, first section, and not quite accurate but close enough. To be sure, Nietzsche was not afraid to exaggerate, when he could get some rhetorical mileage out of it. Here, his point is not unrelated to the Darwinian idea that competition among species... Read more
I have been studying axiomatic set theory as a foundation of mathematics and am stuck on the definition of a relation as a subset of a Cartesian product. I have two problems. The first is that a large number of relations seem to be presupposed prior to this definition: the truth-functional relations of logic, for example, or the relations of set-membership and subset. Doesn't this make the definition circular? Second, in specifying which subset of the Cartesian product is intended, a polyadic predicate is usually invoked; but isn't a polyadic predicate a relation, thus giving a second circularity? Furthermore, these are vicious circles, not harmless ones.
Daniel J. Velleman
February 25, 2006
(changed February 25, 2006)
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All theorems about relations in axiomatic set theory are proven just from the axioms, using the rules of first-order logic. Thus, no facts about relations are presupposed in these proofs--at least, not if by "presupposed" you mean "used to justify a step in a proof."But perhaps this... Read more
Hello philosophers. I was just wondering about Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. What exactly is it and does it limit what we are capable of knowing? I have no training in mathematics or formal logic so if you could reply in lay terms, I would appreciate that. Thanks, Tim.
Richard Heck
February 25, 2006
(changed February 25, 2006)
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Regarding your second question, whether the incompleteness theorem limits what we are capable of knowing, people disagree about this question. But the short answer is: There is no decent, short argument from the incompleteness theorem to that conclusion. If it does limit what we are capabl... Read more
Is this bad logic? As all religions claim they are right and all others wrong, then only one can be right (though they can all be wrong). And is Pascal's Wager now statistically a complete waste of time with so many religions to choose from? And why should the comparative age of a religion serve to lend it credence and respectability?
Richard Heck
February 25, 2006
(changed February 25, 2006)
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There are a lot of questions here.
First, I think your assumption that "all religions claim they are right and all others wrong" is false. I am a Christian, and neither I nor, I think, anyone else at my church would make any such claim. I believe there is profound truth in Christianity, an... Read more