What is the difference between analytical and continental philosophy? Is one better than the other? Is analytical philosophy more scientific than continental philosophy?

I think that it is time that these terms were retired from the language. At best they represent a difference in literary style. That's at best. Many people regarded as "analytic" by those who fancy this distinction actually live(d) on the continent in question. Many regarded as "continental" live(d) and work(ed) in Anglophone countries. There is no clear demarcation between philosophical problems and methods marked by this distinction, and at worst, it is used by parties on each side as an excuse to valorise or to denegrate the work of those they regard as lying in the opposite side. Just read philosophy and enjoy it!

I have always been curious how the typical, bright Western philosopher views Eastern philosophers and sages. Quite a few sages and philosophers of the East seem to feel as if they have attained 'truth' or 'enlightenment'. I wonder sometimes what a Western philosopher is hoping to reach or attain in life through philosophy. Is it the same 'truth' or 'enlightenment' that the sages of the East strive for? Is there a common goal between the two different philosophies? It seems to me as if the stress of Western philosophy is on sound logic and reason and clarity of thought. Many times, this is not the stress of Eastern thought. It stresses intuition, metaphors, meditation, and faith (at least in Vedanta). So I guess what I'm really interested in is, does the Western philosopher believe that a 'sage' or great philosopher of the East has truly attained truth or enlightenment (even though the emphasis and stresses in 'philosophy' are very different [often times])? Or, rather is the eastern sage or philosopher...

The West is a big place, with a lot of philosophers, some of whom use careful rigorous arguments; some of whom do not, but give voice to deep insights in other ways; some of whom have explicitly religious agendas; some of whom are anti-religious or secular. The East is a big place, with a lot of philosophers, ome of whom use careful rigorous arguments; some of whom do not, but give voice to deep insights in other ways; some of whom have explicitly religious agendas; some of whom are anti-religious or secular. I think that the intelligent philosopher, or reader of philosophy does not first ask "in which hemisphere was this text composed?" or even "in which philosophical tradition was this text composed?" (especially given how hard it is to individuate traditions, and how heterogeneous each turns out to be), any more than s/he asks, "on which day of the week was this published?" The intelligent philosopher, or reader of philosophy, opens his/her mind and library to good, useful, insightful...

The question I have arises from a number of phenomena I have noticed of late. One is that a number of reasonably respected philosophers have publicly made asses of themselves by demonstrating serious ignorance of the empirical data available in the recent evolution/ID 'controvercy'; a second is that there have been a lot of suggestions that unsupported pseudo-scientific hypotheses (such as 'irreducible complexity') should be assigned to the philosophy classroom (as a kind of dumping-ground for ill-thought-out ideas); and the third is that a lot of the most promising philiosophy seems to be coming from 'thinking scientists' (in neuroscience, physics, and so on) rather than from professional thinkers. So, is there a crisis in philosophy? Science - at least in principle - is grounded in the systematic study of verifiable phenomena; a scientist whose knowledge outside of science is weak and who has little philosophy may not be satisfying as a person but as a scientist can still produce work with real meaning...

Good question, and one that is hotly debated, both explicity, and implicitly in the form a variety of forms of philosphical praxis, within the profession. I am a firm believer that the best philosophy is interdisciplinary philosophy, and where philosophy works on the borders of the sciences, collaboration with scientists is valuable as well as actual empirical research. My own work in the philosophy of mind involves conducting experiments, as does that of Paul Churchland,Patricia Churchland, Dan Llyod and Shaun Nichols among many others. Huw Price is a physicist as well as a philosopher, as is David Albert. Etc... I think that this is future of that part of the field that is naturally in dialogue with science. We can't just make up how the mind works, or the nature of time, etc...

Can you give any instances of any philosophical problems that have been 'nailed' so to speak by philosophy - that is, solved?

Yes. The question of whether the argument from design can prove the existence of the Christian, or any other, deity. That problem was nailed by Hume, and has been re-nailed in any number of recent articles. It can't. That also shows that the fact that philosophers have nailed a problem does not convince everyone!

I realize that these terms are vague and inexhaustive, but nevertheless there seems to still exist quite a bit of discussion about the "continental/analytic" distinction in philosophy. While at times the issue seems to be little more than academic bickering, it points to a pressing question about philosophy's place in today's world. From what I understand, empirical-minded analytic philosophers tend to think that vague issues dealt with by continental philosophy can be better expressed through, say, art, while continental thinkers argue that analytics are better off just doing math or science. Who's to be believed, if anyone?

I really do think that it is time we got over this distinction. Since many people called "analytic" by those who are fond of the distinction were born, lived or wrote on the continent in questiion, and many of those dubbed "continental" live and work on other continents, it is at least misleading. Things get worse when you actually pay attention to the content of texts, the methods of anaysis, the kinds of arguments offered. There just is no clear way of drawing the distinction. The closest one can come, I think, is to talk about literary style, which is a pretty superficial way to carve up philosophy. Even then you fail to get a clear cut. What you find are clusters defined by mutual approval within and and a certain amount of disdain between. Let's get over it. Worrying about this supposed distinction not only discourages people from taking seriously the work of people they should take seriously, but it also implicates an exhaustiveness that excludes African and Asian philosophy.

How does the panel explain the fact that philosophy seems to have become less and less about "truth" and more and more about the constructs of "language" - such that the discipline now appears to have a closer relationship with lawyers rather than scientists. When did it all go wrong?

There's another way to think about it. For a long time (between the 17th and 19th centuries) Western philosophy was concerned with the nature of knowledge, and that interest was prosecuted by inquiry into the nature of the relation between the mind and the world. That relation was generally taken in European philosophy to be one of REPRESENTATION : the mind was taken to represent things in the world, and questions about knowledge were often framed as questions about how those represenatations arise, what their relation is to representeds, and how we could be justified, or whether we could be justified, in claiming knowledge of the world in virtue of awareness of our representations. At the dawn of the 20th century, a number of European philosophers (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Heidegger) noticed that language also represents the world, and that it mediates our interaction with objects of knowledge. This insight inspired a great deal of attention to language as a medium of representation. But...