I have a question about the the usage of words. If a word has a particular meaning in a specific context that contradicts, ignores or stretches beyond the way that word is used in more general context, is that word being used wrong? For instance, consider the term "game." I've frequently come across arguments in different spheres about what constitutes a "game" and how such-and-such use of the term is mistaken. In some contexts a "game" can be all sorts of things (consider the bewildering variety of video games that have almost nothing in common with one another), in others it must be something competitive (there are people who express hesitation at calling solitaire a true "game"), in other contexts "games" need to have a structure of some kind or another (some say that children's imaginative games are not games, but merely "play" in a vague sense). My question is, if certain contexts use a term in a certain way, one that deviates from the understanding of that term in broader contexts, are those...

Great question(s). Your choice of examples is interesting, as the philosopher Wittgenstein used the term "game" to make his case that the meaning of some terms is not at all strict and relies more on what he called "family resemblance" than a strict appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions. His view is that we might meaningfully use terms without precision and he then went on to speak of different "language games," by which (I believe) he meant different contexts or domains in which different rules (or practices) apply. So, in the "language game" of the physical sciences, the term "cause" may have a different meaning than in the "language game" of religion. That aside, certain practices like philosophy may stipulate that terms have special meaning that may not match ordinary usage. Philosophers in the recent past have used terms like "manifest image" that is vaguely related to the way we ordinarily use the terms "manifest" and "image" but give it a special, specific meaning (the world as it...

Hello. This submission will include two questions. The panelist´s are of course free to answer only one of them, if the other turns out to be of no interest. I´m no student of philosophy in the conventional sense, but lately it does consume much of my time. I remember reading Frege´s "The thought: a logical inquiry" a while back, and his answer to "an unusual objection" he thought he heard, puzzled me; "what if it were all a dream?" It seems to me that questions of this kind are unanswerable, and that Frege´s answer to this question is unsatisfactory. The (short) reason for this is simply that the question is one of fact, and one would have no possible way of empirically proving that one is not. What is your take on my objection? (I am aware that it is not one of the sections in the article that did the most impact on future philosophy) The second question relates to the distinction between analytic and extra-logical statements. After reading "Two dogmas of empiricism" by Quine, I am left wondering...

Thank you for these interesting reflections! As for your first point, there are a number of philosophers who address radical skepticism (e.g. can any of us know with certainty that we are not, as we seem to be, wide awake and acting in the world rather than, say, dreaming?) in the way you suggest. Arguably, life may continue just as it appears until one's death and yet there would be no decisive reason to rule out the possibility one was merely a brain in a vat. And because of this, some philosophers think that such radical skeptical hypotheses are idle or nonsensical or of no interest. I am somewhat of the other mind: I think we can imagine radical hypothetical states of affairs in which we are indeed systematically mistaken in almost all our beliefs about ourselves in the world (in brief, I think it conceivable that we might be in the matrix). While this does not have awesome practical consequences, I think it should humble us in our knowledge claims. As for the second point, Quine set out to...

My experience with philosophy (including reading this site) has given me the impression that every utterance (or at least nearly every utterance) can be interpreted in such a way that gives it plausibility. This holds for ethically trivial utterances like "I don't believe that 2+2=4", which I can defend with an explanation like "well, 2+2=4 is not an absolute truth because a) there is skepticism in the spirit of (perhaps and among others) Descartes and b) no base was clarified in which this equation takes place" as well as ethically significant utterances like "I did not have sex with that woman" which I can defend with an explanation borrowing ideas I saw in some responses to the question about whether cybersex was sex, for instance, "Well, we used a condom which prevented literal contact which I believe is a necessary condition for something to count as sex". Now my questions are: a) is there some interpretation of every utterance such that it is plausible and b) if so, can I, in responding to...

Oh dear, oh dear, I hope not! You are right that many statements can be interpreted in ways that would make them plausable, but communication rests on agreed upon meanings and nuances. So, it became apparent during the Clinton years that his claim not to have had sex with Monica was outright deception, even though he might have had a definition of "sex" that did not include (what most people would describe as) the types of sexual acts they performed. The key lies in wrongful deception, whether or not you say something that is literally true. Imagine you are late for an appointment because you lingered too long over lunch. The person you were to meet says: "You're late." You respond: "The traffic today is horrible." Let's say it is true the traffic is horrible, so this is not (in some narrow sense a lie, but it is lying insofar as you are engaged in deception by implying that the reason you are late is due to traffic. You might like to read Thomas Carson's Lying and Deception; theory and practice ...

What way of communicating is better? Is it a verbal communication or text communication? Why? I believe there are no different between them. Yet all girls say that better way of communicating is verbal communication.

Great question! In the dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates offers reasons why the girls (if you are right that all girls prefer verbal communication) may be right. Among other things, Socrates proposed that verbal, in-person communication is superior to writing for it is less subject to misunderstanding. One can, on the spot, correct misleading communication, and one can also retain the ability to revise one's position in the here and now. Socrates thought that writing things down, in contast, is akin to abandoning your speech. Still, even if Socrates is right about this, we would not know his position unless his observations were written down (asssuming that a reliable oral tradition going back to 399 BCE would be a bit unlikely) and there is often (though not always) a clarity and endurance in written communication. In reply to your question, I suggest, instead, not that there is no difference between written and verabal communication; each has its virtues and vices. If you want a record, I would go...

It happens repeatedly to me that when I read a poem, I may come across a feeling that the poem has actually reflected some thoughts of mine that had been floating in my mind but hadn't actually been able to express it in terms of words. Does this phenomenon pave any grounds for the argument that we may not actually need words in order to think? Would be grateful for an answer. Thanks. óAli

Great question. Some philospohers have been quite firm that thought cannot exist without language, but this has always struck me as quite implausable. One problem is that it is hard to know how one might even begin to learn a language unless you had thoughts. But the case you raise is another reason to be suspicious of such a linguistic account of thought. There might be a middle position, however, in which one recognizes that in expressing thoughts in language we can achieve greater clarity; a poem may help crystalize in sharper terms what had, until you read the poem, only been vague hunches. Your language even suggests this, for the poem seems to be something more concrete than "thoughts ...that had been floating in" your mind. Good wishes! CT

In general, it seems that an action is considered morally wrong when it harms a person (or animal). Is there anything morally wrong with profanity? To clarify, I do not mean swearing at someone, but profanity in general. E.g.: I spent my whole &*@&#$ night writing that %*@&# paper! Sure, it may be "tasteless", but is there any basis on which to call it wrong?

Great question. In replying to a question on vulgarity earlier this week, I offered a minor defense of swearing, suggestiing that it might be essential in expressing the passionate nature of one's convictions (e.g. the classic case is the law case over whether wearing a shirt with the words "Fuck the draft" was protected under free speech) and using vulgarity might be more effective to get people's attention in an emergency (e.g. if you yelled out "Get out of the ^%$#@ building; it is on fire!" you might get a faster response than if you left out the swearing). But in trying to come up with a general account about why the use of profanity might be wrong in general, I think one would need to argue that it in some way debases language and offends human dignity. I write "offends" rather than some stronger word (like "violates"!) as if a wrong is involved, surely it is not a deep and profound wrong unless other factors are involved (you are using profanity to intimidate children). Degredation and offense...

I would like to take liberty on discussing an issue which is taxing my mind for the last many decades, which is "Vulgarism and Other Errors of Speech." I am proud to say that I have been brought up by my moralist father on universal ethics and moral grounds without any streak of religious thought or teaching. His education and moral guidance inculcated in me not to speak a single vulgar word ever in my life. I have never spoken a vulgar or indecent word from the day I learned to speak up till today. But it has been bothering me, why people use vulgar and indecent words in their speech when it has no pragmatic role. It is all over the world in every culture and in every society. Highly educated people have a vulgar explitive or a 'F' and 'S' word needlessly and habitually used in speech which they will spit out whether sitting in the drawing rooms or in the company of family members. I was almost stunned when the Vice President excitedly said to President Obama that this 'Fucking Bill of Health is finally...

Very interesting! Your specific interest seems to be vulgarity as opposed to blasphemy (e.g. using 'God' or 'Jesus' in cursing) or insults in general. I am not acquainted with much philosophical work on vulgarity per se, but there is some literature on politeness and respect that may be relevant. Some have argued that politeness is a virtue itself (what Hobbes called small morals) while others have contended that politeness is a reflection of greater virtues (the shadow of great virtues, to use G.K. Chesterton's expression). I suggest that vulgarity may be used for a host of reasons: to insure familiarity with someone, to use as an insult, to simply get attention, and so on. There was an important Supreme Court case in the USA --I believe it was Cohen versus California-- in which it was argued that a person had a right to wear a shirt that had the words "Fuck the Draft" on it because only using the explicative was the person able to fully express his convictions and thus it was protected under our...

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