Fascinating question! Perhaps you are right that if we were paid for our responses, there would probably be more responses, but this might not mean that the responses would be better in quality. I have not seen a response yet keeping in mind I have not read all the responses that seemed to me to be done in a cursory manner, or in a way that would be less in quality if the question - response format was conducted professionally. I suggest that there may be no greater value as a rule for the superiority of value when persons act voluntarily or for free or for a promised reward money. Someone might volunteer to help the poor and do so because they have inherited great wealth, whereas another person who does not have such wealth and wants to help the poor may need to be paid if she is going to afford to do the work. Both persons might be equally compassionate and courageous Still, there are cases when it seems that a voluntary act may have greater merit: if someone refuses to be nice unless...

Great question! Some preliminary thoughts: Racism seems to involve treating a group of persons who share an ethnic identity with derision, disrespect, and partial disadvantage. Accounts of racism today are controversial, but I propose that a comprehensive account of racism should involve both action as well as attitudes. What you write suggests that one reason why racism is inappropriate / unjust / wrong, is that persons cannot help being a certain ethnicity. I suggest, however, that racism would be wrong whether or not one could voluntarily adopt or abandon a race or ethnicity. If I converted to Judaism and, in the eyes of the world I became Jewish, anti-semitism would still be wrong even though I could have remained a Christian. In a related way, I suggest it would still be wrong to discriminate against homosexuals whether or not a person can choose whether to be homosexual or not. It should be added as a side point that the very category of "race" is vexing. Some think of race as a...

From an entirely secular point of view, plus some simple ethical assumptions that seem quite convincing (suffering illness, incarceration...are bad), plus a strong principle of respecting persons' choices (imagine the persons suffering would take their own lives if they could or they are actually asking others to assist them in committing suicide) it seems one can recognize cases when life has ceased to be of value to those suffering and one may well be sympathetic with providing (for example) a way that the prisoner could, if he chose, take his own life (imagine being able to get the prisoner a pill that would bring about an instantaneous, painless death, hence putting an end to the torture). BUT, even in such cases it may be that simply BEING ALIVE is a good, whether or not this is welcomed or valued by the person who is alive. It is hard to think of a compelling argument that life itself is and should be valued, quite apart from suffering and so on. Speaking personally, whether or not I am...

Thank you for this inquiry. Actually, philosophers have returned to the question of the meaning of life after a sort of sabbatical in the 1980s and 1990s. The latest is The Purpose of Life by Stewart Goetz published by Continuum. He thinks that most philosophers have agreed about the meaning of life, at least as far as human beings are concerned. The meaning (or true, desirable end) of life is happiness. Philosophers, according to Goetz, have disagreed about what does or should make one happy or the ultimate end of living a life of happiness, but agree in the abstract on the importance of happiness. I think there is some truth to this. Interestingly, Goetz is a Christian theist, so he ultimately weaves together his view of life's meaning with a whole philosophy of the cosmos, which he understands in teleological (purposive) terms as opposed to a matter of blind mechanism. Other recent contributors on the meaning of life include Thomas Nagel, who has written eloquently on the mystery of the cosmos...

A great question, and not easily answered! The English Romantic poet and philosopher Samuel Coleridge drew a sharp distinction between fantasy and imagination in which the first is relatively feckless and futile (and your examples would fit under what Coleridge would classify as fantasy), whereas imagination is more constructive and is employed to think about the meaning of life, God, the good, and our relationships and responsibilities to one another, and the life. I believe the Cambridge University philosopher Douglas Hedley defends position like that. I tend to take a somewhat more relaxed view. While clearly fantasies can be horribly self-absorbed, even cruel, surely (I suggest) our lives would be poorer without some fantasies --a child fantasizing about becoming an astronaut or an adult fantasizing about being a great diplomat who both gets Hamas to recognize that the state of Israel to exist and insures that the Korean peninsular is nuclear free. Sometimes the entertaining of outright...

Thank you for this inquiry! You raise a complex matter. Some philosophers have gone through changes, sometimes quite radical: we sometimes refer to the pre-critical Kant and then to Kant after the Critique of Pure Reason, Wittgenstein changed his mind in such a significant way that we refer to the early and the later Wittgenstein, same with Heidegger. I am not sure that we can say (in the abstract) that change is itself a good or value: there is a famous philosopher of mind, Frank Jackson, who first introduced a brilliant argument against materialism, but then changed him mind and concluded the argument failed. Personally, I think the first argument works, and the "latter Frank Jackson" is mistaken. As I noted, it is very hard to claim that either constancy or change (in the abstract) is good or bad, but perhaps it may be concluded that the tradition of philosophy and the current philosophical community is enriched by both philosophers who change their mind with great frequency (Bertrand Russell...

That's a great question! I suppose the idea is that without death, there would be urgency or boundary to our lives. Perhaps people think that part of what makes relationships important is that they will end. Maybe, too, there is a general, biological point, it would be hard for anything to live without death even a vegetarian needs to live on plants that are no longer alive. But the question might be adjusted somewhat: granted there is (perhaps inevitably there has to be death, but is it inevitable or necessary that that there can be no afterlife (at least for persons)? Is an afterlife possible (as is believed by billions of people historically and today, certainly in some of the great world religions) and what impact would an afterlife have on our values in this life? There is a fascinating literature on this. Bernard Williams has a famous essay to the effect that an afterlife would be (ultimately boring and so it would be irrelevant to the values of this life. I have a less famous essay "Why we...

As a theist, I would love to welcome you back, but in all honesty I suggest that atheistic philosophers have worked quite hard to argue that life without God can be deep and satisfying and while pleasurable not hedonistic. In fact, one member of this panel, Louise Antony has edited a book called Philosophers without God which you might find hopeful and uplifting. You might also look for Robert Solomon's Spirituality for the Skeptic or The Really Hard Problem:: Meaning in a Material World by Owen Flanagan. Some atheists do place a premium on caring for other persons, but some also care about other things --for example, caring for nonhuman animals or wildlife areas, artwork, science, and so on. If you want to compare atheistic and theistic views of values, you might check out a recent book I co-authored with the American artist Jil Evans' The Image in Mind; Theism, Naturalism, and the Imagination (Continuum, 2011). Sorry to hear that you're feeling down! I hope things turn around for you asap.

Thank you for this extraordinary question. The matter is quite profound and I feel quite unworthy to respond, but I will make a few observations that I hope are helpful (or not unhelpful)! First, one might question whether it is best to see your response to those who have died prematurely as carrying out what is a duty to them. I know you qualify this by writing "amost" and putting the word "duty" in quotes, but perhaps what has taken place is that the deaths of such good persons has awoken in you an intense realization of the preciousness of life itself. Having just lost a friend who died in his early 50s, I am keenly aware of how Rick would have loved even very simple pleasures (walking the dog) that I can do know. I am made aware of how precious it is that I can spend time with my wife, realizing at the same time how deeply sad (tragic) it is that Rick and Angela are not together. Perhaps this leads to a second observation. Except in some religious systems in which there is re-incarnation or...

A great many philosophers today think that, yes, philosophy or a philosophical approach to life need not involve any religious beliefs or practices and yet it can be deeply satisfying in what may be called a spiritual manner. Among the panelists on this site, Louse Antony is in that position or that is what seems to emerge in the book Professor Antony edited: Philosophers Without God. Owen Flanagen and the late Robert Solomon have published books arguing for an explicitly spiritual approach to life on atheistic or non-theistic grounds (there is also the UK philosopher Grayling who has published in this area). For these thinkers "spirituality" does not suggest the transcendent, but it has more to do with living life with reverence, respect, love / compassion, and more. You might check out Solomon's book Spirituality for the Skeptic or Flanagen's The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. There is also Wesley Wildman's Science and Religious Anthropology: A Spiritually evocative naturalist...