Is it possible to perceive something unconsciously?

The question of whether there are unconscious perceptions, and if so, their nature, has received considerable attention from philosophers and psychologists from the seventeenth century onwards. One's answer to this question will reveal a lot about one's conception of perception in particular and of the nature of the mind in general. Some care is needed in approaching the question. 'Perceive' is sometimes taken to mean 'be aware of', and if it is so taken, of course one cannot perceive anything unconciously, by definition. Such a definition doesn't, however, dispose of the question, for one can either stipulate that by 'perceive', one means to 'have a mental representation' (for now, let me just stipulate that a mental representation is an internal representation that enables one to have a sense-based perception: the nature and status of mental representations is a topic that deserves considerable attention in its own right): if one takes 'perceive' in this sense, then one can have both conscious...

Doesn't the "problem of evil" objection to God's existence presuppose that people ought to be happy? Isn't the idea that people ought or deserve to be happy questionable?

While I think that Andy is quite right to note that the problem of evil is normally framed in terms of suffering instead of happiness, I nevertheless want to add a couple of remarks concerning the possibility that happiness is the ultimate end of the human being, and how this might relate to the problem of evil, and then to take up the issue of whether human beings deserve happiness, a deep and interesting question in its own right. Philosophers from Aristotle through Kant have taken happiness to be an end, if not the ultimate end, of human beings, although they have cashed out the respect in which happiness might play this role in very different ways. Indeed, Christian philosophers have traditionally believed that the blessed in Heaven will be rewarded with a vision of God that constitutes bliss. Now such philosophers recognize that in this life, at least, human beings may not experience happiness at all, but nevertheless this constitutes no block to their thinking that ultimately the worthy will...

Studying philosophy is always done from a certain perspective, with certain assumptions in mind. (Every century teaches philosophy in a different way). So, if I am interested in philosophy, but do not wish to adhere to a specific set of beliefs - what do I do?

Just an addition to Nicholas Smith's suggestion that in order to avoid adhering to a specific philosophical viewpoint, one adopt a standpoint of 'epistemic humility', which I don't think is that easily achieved. (I, for what it's worth, don't think that one can up and decide to epistemically humble.) Historical, contextual, study of the history of philosophy can help to lead one to take such a position. As one sees the extent to which philosophical questions and answers are deeply bound up with contingent historical circumstances, circumstances which vary greatly from our own, we can come to see not only that philosophical positions developed by 'the mighty dead' were deeply contingent, but also that our own cherished positions themselves are deeply contingent, and may well be bound up with contingent historical circumstances. Reflection on the extent to which philosophy is contextual in this way may well lead one to begin to question the assumptions that we take for granted and that underwrite the...

Let's say that I have a perfect duplicate who is psychologically continuous with me. If I get bad news from my doctor that my days are numbered, can I anticipate surviving my death?

A thought experiment akin to the one that you propose has been deployed by Derek Parfit, in his classic book, Reasons and Persons , which I highly recommend if you're interested in this topic, in order to argue that personal identity is "not what matters." According to Parfit--I'm simplifying somewhat--if some agent has a perfect duplicate who is psychologically continuous with the agent, then, according to Parfit, even if the agent dies, and therefore the agent's consciousness does not continue, and so s/he does not continue to exist (Parfit is therefore answering question to the negative, and admitting that you won't survive) what's important, namely one's plans, projects, etc., will be continued by the agent's duplicate, and that, again according to Parfit, is more important than the survival of one's consciousness--indeed, in such a case, one shouldn't be worried about dying, because what one values will be carried on (albeit only by a psychologically continuous duplicate of oneself). Now Parfit...

A common objection to determinism is the notion that if our thoughts and actions are causally determined by preceding states and events, then the notion of responsibility vanishes in a puff of logic, and there are no longer any valid grounds for enforcing laws. This seems absurd on so many levels I can't begin to even understand how someone might seriously support this opinion. Causality would also determine whether we punish or not, and why should this realization alone be enough to causally force us to stop punishing people? Do we really only punish people because we think they as they were, confronted with the same situations, could have done otherwise? Why should causal determination eliminate responsibility if the person "responsible" is still the most salient source of the events in question? If our choices are not determined by a combination of our own nature, logical considerations and exterior circumstance, than we must be behaving randomly, and how does that justify punishment or law...

You raise an excellent issue here! It's true that it is often claimed that if determinism is true, and every event--including choices or decisions--is determined by preceding events, then choices will not be free, and hence agents will not be responsible for their choices or decisions, and so the agent cannot be responsible for the actions that follow upon choices or decisions, and consequently, there is no basis for sanctioning the agent for those actions that break the law. It seems to me that the reason that this belief is as common as it is is because philosophers with incompatibilist intuitions think that agents are not free, and, hence, not responsible for their choices/decisions unless either the agent is able to do otherwise or the agent is the ultimate source of her choices. (It seems to me that these conditions are distinct: one might hold that it is a condition on freedom that agents be able to do or choose otherwise than they did without also holding that the agent is the ultimate...

Opponents to gay marriage often argue that marriage is "by definition" a union between one man and one women. I support gay marriage myself, but this kind of argument is interesting to me--I'm not sure what to make of it. What does it mean to say that marriage is, by definition, thus and so? (Is this just a statement about the way people tend to use the word "marriage"?) More importantly, should we ever be persuaded by such arguments?

This is a great, and, in light of the fact that same-sex marriage will be legal in New York state in three days, on Sunday, July 24th, a very timely question!! Although some opponents of same-sex marriage maintain that marriage is 'by definition' between a man and a woman, and buttress this claim with an appeal to the Bible, and although both positions have been argued for, perhaps by now even almost ad nauseam , I myself think that what's really at issue here is not the meaning of the word 'marriage', but rather the concept of marriage. What's at stake is whether marriage is a civil contract, in which case it is up to the state to determine what parties may legally contract in this way, or a religious sacrament, in which case it is up to the church--whatever denomination that church may be--to determine who can be joined in this way. I myself am inclined to think that marriage may be seen both as a civil contract and as a religious sacrament, but also think that in a truly secular...

I want to major in philosophy because I love everything about it,, I am not interested in the physical matter of things. Rather , I am intrested in the morals of it, why is it created, how does it affect us, what is the value of it, is it right or wrong. I am so into these things, however, what am I gonna dowith this major in the future ? what is my future with it ?. When I tell my parents that I want to major in philosophy, they will go like what there is no future being a philosopher and so on. I need to know what is my future as a philosopher ? what can I work at, how am I going to use philosophy to gain money and support my family ? I need to know to convince myself about it , and to make my family appreciate philosophy and allow me to major in it. Please help me.

Although philosophy, like most of the 'liberal arts', does not directly prepare one for any career, majoring in philosophy does equip one with 'portable' skills--the ability to read carefully and to think and write clearly--that are useful in many careers. Surveys have shown that philosophy majors are among the top scorers on LSAT exams; I have heard that Wall Street firms like philosophy majors, because they have good analytic skills. I myself think that a Philosophy major is good preparation for almost any career that does not require specialized knowledge, so you should not worry about your future!! (Information on this topic is also available from the American Philosophical Association website, which I urge you to check out.)

What is the best way to approach questions like "What is the meaning of the word x?"? Is there some kind of advisable generalised approach to such questions, based on the remarkable developments in philosophy of language? What would Wittgenstein probably say? I'm thinking for example of the debate in aesthetics concerning the meaning of the word beautiful.

The best way to approach questions about the meanings of words is to look in a good dictionary. (This isn't meant to be a smart-alecky response: J. L. Austin, perhaps the foremost practitioner of 'ordinary language philosophy' recommended the dictionary as a starting point for ordinary language investigations.) Insofar as most, if not all, words are to be found in a good dictionary, this is a generalized approach. The reason it may be a useful starting points for the kinds of question in which you seem to be interested is that dictionaries, as Austin noted, reflect the range of meanings, and hence of concepts, that speakers of the language have found useful. The reason that I think that the kind of question you're interested in is more related to ordinary language philosophy than more recent philosophy of language is because I would think that you would find the most illumination in attending to the kind of variation of which terms admit--as manifest in the question concerning different meanings of ...

Does synesthesia have any significant implication for philosophies of perception?

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which the activation of one sensory modality leads to experiences in a second sensory modality: one common form of synesthesia is the perception of letters or numbers as inherently colored. This phenomenon has, I think, received relatively little attention from philosophers--although there are related remarks scattered throughout Wittgenstein's 'later' writings--in part because after years of neglect by psychologists, it has only relatively recently begun to receive sustained attention from them. Consideration of the phenomenon may well offer insights into a range of questions in the philosophy of mind, including the philosophy of perception, such as: the relation between different sensory modalities; whether different sensory modalities represent the world differently; and even the nature of consciousness, insofar as one problem for accounts of consciousness is explaining the experience of sensible qualities--sometimes called 'qualia', for qualitative experiences, a topic...

It is often said that people have the right to hold whatever beliefs they want, even if they fly in the face of fact. To what extent is this true? There is surely no serious problem with a person believing that tulips are hallucinogenic (the worst case scenario is that they will be disappointed), but there is surely something wrong with a parent believing that large doses of arsenic is an integral part of a healthy child's diet. Is harm really the only factor that matters? Do people have a duty to hold true opinions if they are able to do so? Do people have the right to try and correct the false beliefs of others?

"Private," Hobbes writes in Leviathan , regarding the nature of beliefs, "is in secret free." These words are, I think, absolutely correct, and pertinent in the context of your excellent question, regarding whether agents have a right to hold whatever beliefs they wish, and whether other agents--and maybe even the state--have a right to correct those false beliefs. Hobbes's point is that the state need not concern itself with agents' beliefs, provided that those beliefs are not made publicly manifest; similarly, insofar as agents' beliefs do not interfere with the lives of others, then the state, and indeed, most other agents, have no right to try to change those beliefs. I am inclined to think that this point is broadly correct, since I'm inclined to favor minimal state interference with individuals. There is a question, however, whether agents have an epistemic duty to try to achieve true beliefs. This topic was the subject of an exchange between William James and W. K. Clifford, in which...

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