Recent Responses
Why is there no "happiness"ology? It seems that throughout history philosophy has strived to legitimize and analyze most basic human questions except that of what happiness is and how it is achieved. Is this accurate or am I mistaken?
Alan Soble
October 18, 2005
(changed October 18, 2005)
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A few, but only a few, words on two 19th-century philosophers: Jeremy Bentham and his disciple, who went off in his own, individual direction, John Stuart Mill. Both were utilitarians, and believed in the moral principle: "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." But they understood "h... Read more
What's the best definition of Nature and its contrast to the supernatural?
Sean Greenberg
October 14, 2005
(changed October 14, 2005)
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In the early modern period, there was considerable debate about the metaphysical status of miracles. Philosophers as different as Hobbes and Malebranche seem to agree, however, that some event is a miracle if and only if it caused by God's willing that that event take place.On this accoun... Read more
It seems that most of my thoughts are expressed as reflections of familiar stimuli received through the agreed-upon 'five senses' (this includes spoken and written language). Is there any appropriate way to speculate on what form the thoughts of a hypothetical person born without access to sight, sound, smell, touch, or taste might take? I guess what I mean is: "please speculate!"
Amy Kind
October 13, 2005
(changed October 13, 2005)
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There was a real life case of a girl named Genie (a pseudonym) who was deprived of any real sensory stimuli for much of her young life because of the abuse of her father. Her story is told in a book called Genie by Russ Rymer. Her case suggests, in line with what Alex says above, that the abse... Read more
When something disastrous happens, like Katrina, "logic" says: so much the worse for a loving God. But for the believer, what comes out, instead, are things like "God never gives us more than we can handle" and "We have to praise the Lord, and thank him, that <i>we</i> are OK." Why? (Or is this just a psychological or sociological question? Or did I watch too much Fox news?)
Alan Soble
November 11, 2006
(changed November 11, 2006)
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Plantinga writes, in the quoted passage, "what God sees as better is, of course, better. " Oh? Of course? Having solved to his own satisfaction the problem of evil, can Alvin also solve the Euthyphro-style dilemma that arises here? (1) A world is better because God sees it as better vs. (2)... Read more
Is Russell's Paradox a problem for our confidence that 2+2=4 is true? I've never understood how big a problem it represents in math. Does it throw everything into doubt, or just some things? The <i>Stanford Encyclopedia</i> entry is a bit technical.
Daniel J. Velleman
October 12, 2005
(changed October 12, 2005)
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Russell's Paradox is a problem for set theory--or at least it was when Russell discovered it. The most popular modern approach to set theory is based on the axioms developed by Zermelo and Frankel, and the Zermelo-Frankel (ZF) axioms are formulated to avoid the paradox. So Russell's... Read more
How do we resolve the fact that our finite brains can conceive of mental spaces far more vast than the known physical universe and more numerous than all of the atoms? For example, the total possible state-space of a game of chess is well defined, finite, but much larger than the number of atoms in the universe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shannon_number). Obviously, all of these states "exist" in some nebulous sense insofar as the rules of chess describe the boundaries of the possible space, and any particular instance within that space we conceive of is instantly manifest as soon as we think of it. But what is the nature of this existence, since it is equally obvious that the entire state-space can never actually be manifest simultaneously in our universe, as even the idea of a board position requires more than one atom to manifest that mental event? Yet through abstraction, we can casually refer to many such hyper-huge spaces. We can talk of infinite number ranges like the integers, and "bigger" infinite ranges like rational numbers, and yet still "bigger" infinite ranges like the irrationals. In what sense can we say all of these potential huge spaces exist (and they must, since we can so easily instantiate well-formed members of them, at will) yet we don't have even the slightest fraction of sufficent space for them in our known universe?
Alexander George
October 13, 2005
(changed October 13, 2005)
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To add a word or two to Dan's great response: there is no questionthatmathematics deals with infinite collections, but what those are, whatwe mean when we make claims about them, which claims are correct —these have been hotly disputed issues for thousands of years. (Inthe history of mat... Read more
Concerning Berkeley's view that there are no such thing as external objects, just our perception of such ideas: What would he say about space?
Alexander George
October 12, 2005
(changed October 12, 2005)
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You can find a modernized "translation" of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge here.
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Are Walter Kaufmann's translations of Nietzsche still considered the best? They have been the standard since the 1950s but to me they seem stiff, clunky, and lacking in the humor or literary panache that the originals are said to possess. Sometimes the word use is so odd that it makes me wonder about Kaufmann's grasp of English. Unfortunately I do not read German, so I can't tell. Is Nietzsche really like this? And are there more recent worthy translations?
Sean Greenberg
October 12, 2005
(changed October 12, 2005)
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There are newer translations of many of Nietzsche's works in the series, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Hackett has also published fine translations of The Genealogy of Morals and Twilight of the Idols and may well be planning to publish further translations.... Read more
Concerning Berkeley's view that there are no such thing as external objects, just our perception of such ideas: What would he say about space?
Alexander George
October 12, 2005
(changed October 12, 2005)
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You can find a modernized "translation" of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge here.
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If science (i.e. evolutionary psychology) can explain why I have the morality I do, does that mean morality is subjective? If what I believe about morality is just a product of my evolution and my upbringing, can I still expect other people to live up to my principles even though they may have had a different upbringing? What about myself? Can I still hold myself to my own standards or am I being deceived by my evolution into thinking it would be wrong to do so?
Roger Crisp
October 12, 2005
(changed October 12, 2005)
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It might be helpful to follow a strand of British empiricism and to think about 'morality' as a social phenomenon, involving various 'sanctions' such as blame, guilt, shame, and so on. (So in that respect it is rather like law, though the sanctions there are somewhat different.) Your worry i... Read more