Recent Responses
Recently a 19 year old woman killed herself after she was taunted by her high school classmates for doing a porn. The while situation makes me angry and upset. (though looking at the reported online comments they don't seem as bad or as I voluminous as you might imagine, and they were not all directed her. So there may be some other issues) Maybe it makes me angry partly because I often watch porn with women of that age but part of me feels uncomfortable about it because I don't know how it affects their lives or if they are doing it with a sufficiently developed sense of ownership about the consequences that decision may bring. But really should I feel bad for watching porn with younger women or should I direct my feelings toward a society that is unfairly judgmental and hypocritical about sex?
Allen Stairs
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
Permalink
I don't know how much older you are than the women you watch with, and I don't know anything about the larger situation. I don't know why you aren't picking companions closer to your own age, and I don't know anything about the young women and your relationship with them. What I'd think in detail wo... Read more
I am trying to understand the idea behind the question of the meaning of knowledge. I'm confused by why the usual meaning of something we remember having encountered before requires further definition. I guess I'm asking if philosophy has no acceptance of the usual common meanings? How does such a definition as "true verifiable belief" (if I remember that right) satisfy more than our commonly shared meaning? After all, I have knowledge of a lifetime of experiences and feelings and impressions and ideas that cannot possibly satisfy those criteria. Does that mean that philosophers claim that my memories are not knowledge? I have the same problem understanding the need for "defining" existence as {I think therefore I am." It seems more sensible to me to reword it as "I am therefore I think." Can you explain the most basic conception of philosophical inquiry? Is it simply a game?
Stephen Maitzen
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
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To answer your last question first: I don't regard philosophical inquiry as a game. On the contrary, it may well be the most intellectually serious form of inquiry there is. What philosophical inquiry amounts to is itself a matter of philosophical controversy, but I'm inclined to say that philoso... Read more
In paradoxes such as the Epimenides 'liar' example, is it not sufficient to say that all such sentences are inherently contradictory and therefore without meaning? Like Chomsky's 'the green river sleeps furiously', it's a sentence, to be sure, but that's all it is. Thanks in advance :)
Stephen Maitzen
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
Permalink
Thank you for the argument for that claim, but your reasons for it do not particularly interest me.
Wow. How very philosophical. We philosophers aren't interested in each other's reasons, after all. Now, am I supposed to be interested in the reasons you're giving for your claims?
I've given a num... Read more
In paradoxes such as the Epimenides 'liar' example, is it not sufficient to say that all such sentences are inherently contradictory and therefore without meaning? Like Chomsky's 'the green river sleeps furiously', it's a sentence, to be sure, but that's all it is. Thanks in advance :)
Stephen Maitzen
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
Permalink
Thank you for the argument for that claim, but your reasons for it do not particularly interest me.
Wow. How very philosophical. We philosophers aren't interested in each other's reasons, after all. Now, am I supposed to be interested in the reasons you're giving for your claims?
I've given a num... Read more
In paradoxes such as the Epimenides 'liar' example, is it not sufficient to say that all such sentences are inherently contradictory and therefore without meaning? Like Chomsky's 'the green river sleeps furiously', it's a sentence, to be sure, but that's all it is. Thanks in advance :)
Stephen Maitzen
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
Permalink
Thank you for the argument for that claim, but your reasons for it do not particularly interest me.
Wow. How very philosophical. We philosophers aren't interested in each other's reasons, after all. Now, am I supposed to be interested in the reasons you're giving for your claims?
I've given a num... Read more
In writing mathematical proofs, I've been struck that direct proofs often seem to offer a kind of explanation for the theorem in question; an answer the question, "Why is this true?", as it were. By contrast, proofs by contradiction or indirect proofs often seem to lack this explanatory element, even if they they work just as well to prove the theorem. The thing is, I'm not sure it really makes sense to talk of mathematical "explanations." In science, explanations usually seem to involve finding some kind of mechanism behind a particular phenomenon or observation. But it isn't clear that anything similar happens in math. To take the opposing view, it seems plausible to suppose that all we can really talk about in math is logical entailment. And so, if both a direct and an indirect proof entail the theorem in question, it's a mistake to think that the former is giving us something that the latter is not. Do the panelists have any insight into this?
Richard Heck
June 3, 2014
(changed June 3, 2014)
Permalink
I probably should have noted before that, in the case of the different proofs of the first incompleteness theorem in Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, the first proof they give is indirect or, as it is sometimes put, non-constructive: The proof shows us that, in any given consistent theory of sufficient... Read more
In writing mathematical proofs, I've been struck that direct proofs often seem to offer a kind of explanation for the theorem in question; an answer the question, "Why is this true?", as it were. By contrast, proofs by contradiction or indirect proofs often seem to lack this explanatory element, even if they they work just as well to prove the theorem. The thing is, I'm not sure it really makes sense to talk of mathematical "explanations." In science, explanations usually seem to involve finding some kind of mechanism behind a particular phenomenon or observation. But it isn't clear that anything similar happens in math. To take the opposing view, it seems plausible to suppose that all we can really talk about in math is logical entailment. And so, if both a direct and an indirect proof entail the theorem in question, it's a mistake to think that the former is giving us something that the latter is not. Do the panelists have any insight into this?
Richard Heck
June 3, 2014
(changed June 3, 2014)
Permalink
I probably should have noted before that, in the case of the different proofs of the first incompleteness theorem in Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, the first proof they give is indirect or, as it is sometimes put, non-constructive: The proof shows us that, in any given consistent theory of sufficient... Read more
In writing mathematical proofs, I've been struck that direct proofs often seem to offer a kind of explanation for the theorem in question; an answer the question, "Why is this true?", as it were. By contrast, proofs by contradiction or indirect proofs often seem to lack this explanatory element, even if they they work just as well to prove the theorem. The thing is, I'm not sure it really makes sense to talk of mathematical "explanations." In science, explanations usually seem to involve finding some kind of mechanism behind a particular phenomenon or observation. But it isn't clear that anything similar happens in math. To take the opposing view, it seems plausible to suppose that all we can really talk about in math is logical entailment. And so, if both a direct and an indirect proof entail the theorem in question, it's a mistake to think that the former is giving us something that the latter is not. Do the panelists have any insight into this?
Richard Heck
June 3, 2014
(changed June 3, 2014)
Permalink
I probably should have noted before that, in the case of the different proofs of the first incompleteness theorem in Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, the first proof they give is indirect or, as it is sometimes put, non-constructive: The proof shows us that, in any given consistent theory of sufficient... Read more
How would a legal philosopher deal with the trolley problem compared to a moral philosopher? Would he come to a conclusion that is neither switch nor not switch? That is, either choice is equally legal?
Stephen Maitzen
May 31, 2014
(changed May 31, 2014)
Permalink
You seem to be asking about the legality of switching or declining to switch, in which case your question is best answered by a lawyer rather than a philosopher of law. I'm not sure, but the answer may depend on the jurisdiction. It may also matter whether the person in a position to switch the t... Read more
In paradoxes such as the Epimenides 'liar' example, is it not sufficient to say that all such sentences are inherently contradictory and therefore without meaning? Like Chomsky's 'the green river sleeps furiously', it's a sentence, to be sure, but that's all it is. Thanks in advance :)
Stephen Maitzen
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
Permalink
Thank you for the argument for that claim, but your reasons for it do not particularly interest me.
Wow. How very philosophical. We philosophers aren't interested in each other's reasons, after all. Now, am I supposed to be interested in the reasons you're giving for your claims?
I've given a num... Read more