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In regards to deductivism and the work of Karl Popper, it's possible to deduce statements which are consistent with science's current understanding of something. These statements are hypotheses and some are testable, and hence scientific, and others are not testable, and hence they are unscientific. It seems to me in economics the profession is fond of deducing many statements from their models which are untestable. What is the purpose of this exercise? What can be the goal of deducing untestable statements other than to eventually arrive at something which is testable? Is there a word for these untestable statements besides "unscientific hypotheses?" Thank you.
Miriam Solomon
June 26, 2014
(changed June 26, 2014)
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Karl Popper thought that theories (hypotheses) could be tested by using them to deduce testable consequences. Many theories and hypotheses are quite abstract (physics and economics are good examples of abstract theories) and other assumptions are often needed in order to use them to deduce test... Read more
In regards to deductivism and the work of Karl Popper, it's possible to deduce statements which are consistent with science's current understanding of something. These statements are hypotheses and some are testable, and hence scientific, and others are not testable, and hence they are unscientific. It seems to me in economics the profession is fond of deducing many statements from their models which are untestable. What is the purpose of this exercise? What can be the goal of deducing untestable statements other than to eventually arrive at something which is testable? Is there a word for these untestable statements besides "unscientific hypotheses?" Thank you.
Miriam Solomon
June 26, 2014
(changed June 26, 2014)
Permalink
Karl Popper thought that theories (hypotheses) could be tested by using them to deduce testable consequences. Many theories and hypotheses are quite abstract (physics and economics are good examples of abstract theories) and other assumptions are often needed in order to use them to deduce test... Read more
Where can I find literature within philosophy on the "good judgment" that Miriam Solomon (june 5, 2014) describes as essential to philosophy? Is this "good judgment" something like the "tacit knowledge" explored by Michael Polanyi? If so, what is the current philosophical status of his work (as opposed to status within cog-sci)?
Miriam Solomon
June 21, 2014
(changed June 21, 2014)
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There is a vast literature on reasoning and rationality that tries to understand what "good judgment" consists in. It includes Michael Polanyi's work, which is still very much respected among some philosophers, especially those influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. But the literature starts (in t... Read more
If intelligent people incur a moral obligation to society, can the same argument be made for other forms of (for lack of a better word) power? For instance, being beautiful gives you social influence to wield: on this line of thought, would beautiful people have an obligation too?
Charles Taliaferro
June 20, 2014
(changed June 20, 2014)
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Interesting! I suggest that one needs more of a foundation or framework to infer from someone having intelligence or some other talent, ability or good (such as beauty) to the conclusion that one has certain obligations to one's society. There are foundations or frameworks to consider: in... Read more
Hello! I'm a nursing student that recently cared for a child in the ICU. This child has never had the ability to speak, smell, see, walk, swallow, or care for herself in any way. She comes to the hospital frequently because the only way to survive is with medical machinery and constant suctioning. Unfortunately, the parents have become burned out. I felt like I was prolonging misery. To "pull the plug" on anyone is never easy, but it seems less ethical to do so on a child than it does with the elderly. Should quality of life have greater influence than age?
Oliver Leaman
June 19, 2014
(changed June 19, 2014)
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The parents and you may indeed be miserable, but who is to say that the patient has so little quality of life that she would be better off dead than alive? As you say, we might be more inclined to pull the plug were she to be older and we could say that the patient has at least had a life and has... Read more
Hi Philosophers, I have a burning question that is troubling me relating the religion versus science debate. I hope I articulate it well enough. Here goes. Mathematically, physicists are close to proving that a multiverse exists. Assuming they do prove this, and that as part of this proof it is deemed that infinity universes exist with both every conceivable and inconceivable possibility and outcome occurring throughout, then is it not fair to say that God certainly exists in at least one of these infinite possibility universes? Adversely, it is also fair to assume that God certainly does not exist in at least one of these universes? Then consider that if God certainly exists in at least one universe, and he is the all-seeing, all-knowing God that religion states he is, then how can he certainly not exist in at least one of the infinite universes? To say that God definitely exists is to, by definition of God, say that he exists everywhere and created everything, yet this notion within the multiverse theory eliminates the possibility of infinite outcomes as there can be no single constant to infinite possibilities. By definition of infinite outcomes, there must be at least one multiverse outcome where God doesn't exist. Will the theory of the multiverse, if proven, both unequivocally prove and unequivocally disprove the existence of God at the same time?
Andrew Pessin
July 10, 2014
(changed July 10, 2014)
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Great question (and great response by Allen). Let me just add a tiny bit, by encouraging you to check out both Norman Malcolm's and Alvin Plantinga's work on the ontological argument. (The latter is a lot more technical and difficult, so start with the former.) From them you get something like th... Read more
This is a follow-up to Miriam Solomon's statement describing philosophy: "Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exercise of "good judgment" which in fact we do not understand very well." (june 5, 2014) Can someone tell me more about what this "good judgment" is, please? I studied philosophy in college and I can't recall any of my professors ever suggesting that there was some elusive guiding principle in philosophy beyond what could be articulated...Instead, I was taught that it was about starting with premises and then executing deductive reasoning. Are you now saying that there's something mystical in there that philosophers can't articulate but which guides their work? That seems counter the way I learned philosophy, where the professors seemed particularly intent on articulating things clearly.
Richard Heck
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
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I'll just add that, for similar reasons, "good judgement" is equally important in mathematics, and nothing is more deductive than mathematics.
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I have a question about "solved" games, and the significance of games to artificial intelligence. I take it games provide one way to assess artificial intelligence: if a computer is able to win at a certain game, such as chess, this provides evidence that the computer is intelligent. Suppose that in the future scientists manage to solve chess, and write an algorithm to play chess according to this solution. By hypothesis, then, a computer running this algorithm wins every game whenever possible. Would we conclude on this basis that the computer is intelligent? I have an intuition that intelligence cannot be reduced to any such algorithm, however complex. But that seems quite strange in a way, because it suggests that imperfect play might somehow demonstrate greater intelligence or creativity than perfect play. [If the notion of "solving" chess is problematic, another approach is to consider a computer which plays by exhaustively computing every possible sequence of moves. This is unfeasible with current technology, of course. But we can imagine a futuristic computer which has such great raw power that it's able to play effectively using this otherwise exceedingly "dumb" strategy.]
William Rapaport
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
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Update: An interesting article about one of my computer science colleagues on the subject of cheating in chess and touching on the nature of "intelligence" in chess just appeared in Chess Life magazine; the link is here
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I have a question about "solved" games, and the significance of games to artificial intelligence. I take it games provide one way to assess artificial intelligence: if a computer is able to win at a certain game, such as chess, this provides evidence that the computer is intelligent. Suppose that in the future scientists manage to solve chess, and write an algorithm to play chess according to this solution. By hypothesis, then, a computer running this algorithm wins every game whenever possible. Would we conclude on this basis that the computer is intelligent? I have an intuition that intelligence cannot be reduced to any such algorithm, however complex. But that seems quite strange in a way, because it suggests that imperfect play might somehow demonstrate greater intelligence or creativity than perfect play. [If the notion of "solving" chess is problematic, another approach is to consider a computer which plays by exhaustively computing every possible sequence of moves. This is unfeasible with current technology, of course. But we can imagine a futuristic computer which has such great raw power that it's able to play effectively using this otherwise exceedingly "dumb" strategy.]
William Rapaport
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
Permalink
Update: An interesting article about one of my computer science colleagues on the subject of cheating in chess and touching on the nature of "intelligence" in chess just appeared in Chess Life magazine; the link is here
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When I was a teenager, I started to think about sex all the time, but nobody ever talked to me about it. I may have been talking with someone of the opposite sex, for instance, whose dress deliberately accentuated their sexual features, and yet both of us would go on idiotically talking about something else, which neither of us was probably really thinking about. Why is there such a prohibition about pointing out the elephant in the room? Why is it considered morally suspect to make one's sexual reaction to someone an explicit feature of a conversation?
Charles Taliaferro
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
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Probably one of the main reasons we shy away from talking with others about sexual attraction unless we are doing so with a partner in a sexually intimate relationship or conversing with a therapist or discussing medical issues (from STDs to pregnancy to birth control) or advising a friend w... Read more