Recent Responses
I've been thinking about the concept of revenge lately, and I was wondering what purpose it served. For example, if someone were to hurt or kill one of my loved ones, I would feel the need to seek revenge, despite the fact that revenge itself does not accomplish anything (if I were to hurt the person who killed my loved one, they wouldn't be brought back). Is this a psychological coping mechanism, or some other sort of phenomenon?
Oliver Leaman
December 9, 2012
(changed December 9, 2012)
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Some philosophers would say that the need for retribution goes deeper than just being revenge, in that a balance is achieved when someone suffers for the suffering caused to others. Clearly this is not just revenge since some perpetrators of crime might feel that the state was justified in... Read more
What are some questions a philospher might ask about death or dying
Charles Taliaferro
December 8, 2012
(changed December 8, 2012)
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Almost from the very beginning, philosophers have reflected on death and dying. Here are some questions that have exercised philosophers (and I am sure the list is incomplete):Is the death of a person physically a matter of the person ceasing to be or is it possible (or even likely) t... Read more
Throughout life, we all have fantasies, from childhood fantasies of being rock star/doctors/astronauts, to "adult" fantasies of wealth, fame and power. These "adult fantasies", including, but not limited to, images of wealth, power, lust, power, status, and/or self-actualization, are seemingly very common. Do you think these fantasies are more beneficial, allowing us to aspire for greater goals in life and being driven to attain them, or dangerous, filling us with envious glowers of lust with little determination to fulfill them?
Charles Taliaferro
December 8, 2012
(changed December 8, 2012)
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A great question, and not easily answered! The English Romantic poet and philosopher Samuel Coleridge drew a sharp distinction between fantasy and imagination in which the first is relatively feckless and futile (and your examples would fit under what Coleridge would classify as fanta... Read more
Is mercy on an offender a lack of justice? That is, if an offender is treated mercifully, as in, given less punishment than is warranted, doesn't that mean the offender is given less justice than is warranted?
Thomas Pogge
December 6, 2012
(changed December 6, 2012)
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One straightforward way to see that this is not so starts from the realization that the criminal law cannot perfectly anticipate all realistically possible cases. This is so for at least three reasons. First, human powers of anticipation are limited. Second, a criminal law doing justice to a... Read more
Greetings. In regards to the situation of Jean Baptiste Clamence in La Chute (The Fall) of Camus, can we say that "doing nothing means also doing something"? Being more specific, for instance if one has witnessed something "bad/evil" which s/he could have done something about and chose to do nothing for avoiding a row of enormous, maybe even deadly consequences like a chain reaction for other people's lives if he chose the opposite; should we consider him as "acting in bad faith or guilty"? Of course in the second option things would get worse also for him too. But by doing nothing, this time he will have to carry the burden alone like Clamence. The content of bad/evil can be understood as subjective, but i meant a valid moral perspective in general by using that term. (E.g., killing a random person in the street)
Thomas Pogge
December 6, 2012
(changed December 6, 2012)
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We often do nothing in such situations without recognizing this failure to act as a choice, and perhaps even really without making a choice not to act (see Hilary Bok: Acting without Choosing). Bad faith is manifested not in doing nothing, but in the failure to acknowledge our responsibility... Read more
Is existence a property? The way I became confounded was an example like this: a phoenix is a bird, it has feathers, and it is born from ashes, but it does not exist, whereas a penguin is a bird, has feathers, exists, and is born in snow. As in, existence and being born in snow are properties of penguins, but not of phoenixes. I feel there might be some mistake, but I certainly lack the expertise to puzzle through this on my own.
Stephen Maitzen
December 6, 2012
(changed December 6, 2012)
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Why not think of it this way? The concept phoenix is the concept of a bird, with feathers, that arises from ashes, etc. The concept penguin is the concept of a bird, with feathers, that's (typically) born in a cold climate, etc. As it happens, the first of those concepts isn't fulfilled:... Read more
In sports (especially boxing) fans love to rank the best boxers, players or teams. So when ranking the Greatest Boxers of All-Time -- is it ethical to include boxers you or anyone else (alive) have never seen before (for no footage exists of them - e.g., Harry Greb)? (Provided that you put in as much research as possible - e.g., books, news archives, boxing historians writings.)
Gordon Marino
February 7, 2015
(changed February 7, 2015)
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I am a professional boxing writer who has to vote on who gets into the Boxing Hall of Fame so this question certainly resonates with me. With your mention of Harry Greb it is clear that you know your boxing because based on his record and opposition there are many of us who believe he is on... Read more
Look at what I just read in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "2. You could not have been born of different parents. (Someone born of different parents wouldn't be you.) (...) Each of these claims appears to have a true reading." Do you all think this way? A son of my paternal twin-uncle and my maternal twin-aunt could easily (so to say) have exactly the same DNA as I have. He could have been born on the same day. He could have been told that his parents were my actual parents. He could have been given my name. My actual parents could have had no biological child. Things in the whole world could have been exactly as they actually were and are since then. So, in what reasonable sense wouldn't this person be me?
Stephen Maitzen
December 6, 2012
(changed December 6, 2012)
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Interesting question. Can't we interpret the story you told as one in which you never exist but someone quite similar to you does instead? Why would such an interpretation be unreasonable?
You list six conditions that you seem to regard as jointly sufficient for someone's being you: (1)... Read more
Why would any one think this question is meaningful? (below) Surely morality is only objective when your current language community agree on its precepts; I don't know any atheists that would claim an "objective morality" is a viable claim beyond this, and most lean towards accepting that moral systems are contingent upon cultural norms, as such they are relative. "In conversations with Christians (and members of other religious groups), more often than not I'm asked on what grounds atheism can claim to have an objective morality. This isn't a new question, but it is one I don't feel properly equipped to answer well. I think reason and our intuitions can aid us in finding objective moral truths, but I often find myself at a loss articulating a good defense. I do not find the theist's claim that morality depends on God's existence a good one, but I want to advance a better argument for why secular morality works out, and not just knock down their view. What's the general consensus among philosophers? Is there a firm foundation for morality without God?"
Stephen Maitzen
December 6, 2012
(changed December 6, 2012)
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Your question concerns Question 4929, which you quoted. Have a look at the Morriston and Wielenberg articles that I linked to in my answer there. In the case of Wielenberg, you have an atheist who emphatically rejects the idea that "morality is only objective when your current language... Read more
What is the difference between justice and morality? Evidently, the concepts overlap each other, and in many cases they appertain to each other. I have made some observation, though I am not quite sure whether they are of any relevance, in terms of difference. Firstly, it appears to me that morality deals with the means of an action, in most of the cases, rather than the ends, where the motive of your action is of major, if not absolute, significance (whereof Kant suggested good will as the basis of morality, or something done out of reverence of law). In justice, however, the means are scarcely ever mentioned, and all we hear about is the ends. It appears to me that some ends are in themselves the measure of justice, independent of intention. Also, the word justice, apparently, from the word "jus", which means law, which certainly does make it easier to approach. However, it does not appear to be the case that law is equal to justice. Laws can, supposedly, also be unjust. It really bothers me that I cannot substantiate the difference between the two concepts, for it appears to me that I can apprehend them, though not separate from each other.
Charles Taliaferro
November 30, 2012
(changed November 30, 2012)
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Your frustration is understandable! In English, we used to have fine distinctions between the terms ethics and morality, duties and obligations, labor and work, recklessness and negligence..... but we English-speakers seem less keen about the finer distinctions at work. One might e... Read more