Recent Responses
Should I expect a reward when doing a good deed? Like I pick up a wallet containing a big amount of money. Shoud I expect a reward from the owner when returning it to him.
Lisa Cassidy
October 11, 2012
(changed October 11, 2012)
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No, I don't think you can expect it. But you can take it if it is offered.
We can reasonably expect what we are owed. In this case, you literally aren't owed anything because you didn't do all that much. We can't be owed what we don't earn. (Even if the the owner of the wallet exclaims, "O... Read more
I've just listened to a BBC radio discussion of the ontological argument. I'm puzzled as to why the following objection was not even mentioned: - The concept of "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" necessarily includes the attributes of being all good and all powerful. Something all good and all powerful would not allow suffering. Suffering exists, therefore the concept cannot exist in reality. The counter-argument that suffering is part of God's plan for us to work out our own salvation only reinforces the original objection by admitting that God is not great enough to come up with a better plan. This argument is well known in philosophy in general, so why would it not be considered relevant to the validity of the ontological argument? God may still exist, but if He can't be all good and all powerful, the ontological argument for His existence is a non-starter. I had the impression from the radio programme that the ontological argument is still entertained by some philosophers. How do they get round this objection?
Jonathan Westphal
October 11, 2012
(changed October 11, 2012)
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True confessions: like Charles, I accept the Ontological Argument. But it must be said that a response to the Argument based on "the problem of evil" is something of a mistake. The reason is that the problem of evil is a problem for all arguments for theism, and offers nothing specific... Read more
Should we as humans actively try to maintain the existence of other species (like we do now due to their cuteness/rarity)?
Andrew Pessin
October 10, 2012
(changed October 10, 2012)
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Hm; who would think we shouldn't, all else being equal? Although I suppose some might question whether "all else is equal." After all, "maintaining" has various costs (devotion of time, money, resources etc) that might better be spent elsewhere (for example, helping suffering human beings).... Read more
Is it appropriate to email a philosopher in Academia about a journal article they may have published, whether it be with a possible criticism or query? This is assuming that the emailer is just a casual reader of said journal, not an academic, with no involvement in a university. Also assuming the email is polite, to the point, not of an exorbitant length, and the emailer is quite sure of his query or criticism.
Andrew Pessin
October 10, 2012
(changed October 10, 2012)
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Ditto. It's nice to know that something one has written has actually been read by someone who cared enough to respond, even if critically ... !
ap
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Many pro-choice advocates maintain that, though abortions should be permissible, they are regrettable nonetheless. For instance, Bill Clinton famously said that he wanted to keep abortions "safe, legal and rare." I don't understand this view. To my mind, whether abortion is immoral turns on the question of whether a fetus is a person with a right to life. But this seems a clear dichotomy--either fetuses have such a right, or they don't. If they do, then abortion is immoral. If they don't, then not only should abortion be permitted, but there is nothing objectionable about them at all. Indeed, it is every bit as innocuous as using condoms. Sometimes I think that what is happening is that people who advocate this position are still captive to some kind of residual pro-life sentiment. They believe that abortions should be permissible, but they can't shake the feeling that they are still, somehow, a bad thing. (And not just because of circumstantial considerations, such as that women who need abortions are often poor or otherwise disadvantaged, or that mothers who choose abortion may come to regret her decision; but because abortions are themselves are bad.) Assuming that abortions are indeed morally permissible, what is there that could make them regrettable?
Richard Heck
October 10, 2012
(changed October 10, 2012)
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Thanks to everyone for their contributions, and especially to Bette for reminding us of the importance of hearing women's voices on such topics. I'll add one more point, along the same lines.
The questioner says that, if a fetus has a right to life, then abortion is immoral and should not be... Read more
Many pro-choice advocates maintain that, though abortions should be permissible, they are regrettable nonetheless. For instance, Bill Clinton famously said that he wanted to keep abortions "safe, legal and rare." I don't understand this view. To my mind, whether abortion is immoral turns on the question of whether a fetus is a person with a right to life. But this seems a clear dichotomy--either fetuses have such a right, or they don't. If they do, then abortion is immoral. If they don't, then not only should abortion be permitted, but there is nothing objectionable about them at all. Indeed, it is every bit as innocuous as using condoms. Sometimes I think that what is happening is that people who advocate this position are still captive to some kind of residual pro-life sentiment. They believe that abortions should be permissible, but they can't shake the feeling that they are still, somehow, a bad thing. (And not just because of circumstantial considerations, such as that women who need abortions are often poor or otherwise disadvantaged, or that mothers who choose abortion may come to regret her decision; but because abortions are themselves are bad.) Assuming that abortions are indeed morally permissible, what is there that could make them regrettable?
Richard Heck
October 10, 2012
(changed October 10, 2012)
Permalink
Thanks to everyone for their contributions, and especially to Bette for reminding us of the importance of hearing women's voices on such topics. I'll add one more point, along the same lines.
The questioner says that, if a fetus has a right to life, then abortion is immoral and should not be... Read more
Is it possible for a mathematical equation to both be fundamentally unsolvable and also have a correct answer?
Richard Heck
October 7, 2012
(changed October 7, 2012)
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To answer this question properly, we would need to make some of the terms used in the question more precise. Math only works with precise definitions. But there is a natural way to do this, and it does bring us close to Gödel's work.
A diophantine equation is any equation of the form:
f(x,y,z.... Read more
Is it possible for a mathematical equation to both be fundamentally unsolvable and also have a correct answer?
Richard Heck
October 7, 2012
(changed October 7, 2012)
Permalink
To answer this question properly, we would need to make some of the terms used in the question more precise. Math only works with precise definitions. But there is a natural way to do this, and it does bring us close to Gödel's work.
A diophantine equation is any equation of the form:
f(x,y,z.... Read more
I've just listened to a BBC radio discussion of the ontological argument. I'm puzzled as to why the following objection was not even mentioned: - The concept of "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" necessarily includes the attributes of being all good and all powerful. Something all good and all powerful would not allow suffering. Suffering exists, therefore the concept cannot exist in reality. The counter-argument that suffering is part of God's plan for us to work out our own salvation only reinforces the original objection by admitting that God is not great enough to come up with a better plan. This argument is well known in philosophy in general, so why would it not be considered relevant to the validity of the ontological argument? God may still exist, but if He can't be all good and all powerful, the ontological argument for His existence is a non-starter. I had the impression from the radio programme that the ontological argument is still entertained by some philosophers. How do they get round this objection?
Jonathan Westphal
October 11, 2012
(changed October 11, 2012)
Permalink
True confessions: like Charles, I accept the Ontological Argument. But it must be said that a response to the Argument based on "the problem of evil" is something of a mistake. The reason is that the problem of evil is a problem for all arguments for theism, and offers nothing specific... Read more
Is one who spreads a contagious disease unconciously held responsible for the victimes? Or under what circumtances should he be held responsible?
Thomas Pogge
October 5, 2012
(changed October 5, 2012)
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If the choice is to impose the cost either on the infectors or on the infected, the former rule seems preferable because it gives suitable incentives to potential infectors to find out whether they have a contagious disease and, if so, to avoid infecting others. This reason might be overcome i... Read more