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According to Hillary Clinton, "Women have always been the primary victims of war. Women lose their husbands, their fathers, their sons in combat." On what conceivable grounds could such a statement be made given that dying tends to be kind "victimizing"? Has feminist discourse gone so far that it egocentrically sees even male loss in terms of female victimization? Should feminist thinking be criticized for it tendency toward sexism toward men? Or if feminism is by definition something that isn't sexist because feminism is about opposing sexism how do we address the fact that so much that is called "feminism" doesn't live up to that definition?
Thomas Pogge
October 5, 2012
(changed October 5, 2012)
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One might try to argue that men are typically the proponents and organizers of war and, in this sense, not really victims (because, like boxers, they bring the harm to themselves). I don't think this is empirically accurate: many men are pacifists and many women have strongly supported wars. M... Read more
Is it appropriate to email a philosopher in Academia about a journal article they may have published, whether it be with a possible criticism or query? This is assuming that the emailer is just a casual reader of said journal, not an academic, with no involvement in a university. Also assuming the email is polite, to the point, not of an exorbitant length, and the emailer is quite sure of his query or criticism.
Andrew Pessin
October 10, 2012
(changed October 10, 2012)
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Ditto. It's nice to know that something one has written has actually been read by someone who cared enough to respond, even if critically ... !
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Would it be fair to say that philosophy is a manipulation of words, and that scientists deal with the relationship between language and extra-language observations? Thus "truth" would primarily be a language concept according to which consistency between words would exist. In the non-language (empirical) world truth would be infrequent because be empirical observations can rarely be one hundred percent verified.
Stephen Maitzen
October 4, 2012
(changed October 4, 2012)
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To be candid, your question seems to embody some confusions. I'll try to address them in this reply.
1. I think it's fair to regard philosophy as the analysis (if you like, the logical manipulation) of concepts, although that view of philosophy is rejected by some philosophers. In any ca... Read more
In philosophy terminology, what is the difference between the self and the soul? When philosophers argue against the existence of the self, are they really doing something much different than when they argue against the existence of the soul? Can you recommend any books that make this clear?
Edward Witherspoon
October 1, 2012
(changed October 1, 2012)
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Thephilosophical problem of personal identity is an attempt to determine what a self, or person, is. Asatisfactory definition will tell us what makes someone the same self (orperson) over time. And this inturn will enable us to know whether it is possible for a self (or per... Read more
What's the difference between post-modernism and critiques of modernity?
Douglas Burnham
October 1, 2012
(changed October 1, 2012)
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Not an easy question to answer since(i) both terms are used in a variety of different ways, and not veryoften by the various philosophers who are categorised in these ways;and (ii) these terms cross boundaries (and peryhaps even originate there) well beyond philosophy(literary studies, musi... Read more
Russell says, “The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual belief of his age or his nation, and from conviction which have grown up in his mind without the cooperation or consent of his deliberate reason.” What prejudices, habitual beliefs, and unreasoned convictions do you think Russell is referring to here? Do you see these things in people around you?
Andrew Pessin
September 29, 2012
(changed September 29, 2012)
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Yes -- I've just written a book on this theme, and wish I hd the Russell quote handy as an epigram: Uncommon Sense: the strangest ideas from the smartest phiosophers (available website: www.andrewpessin.com!) he has in mind, perhaps, religious beliefs, but also moral beliefs, and also c... Read more
Frequently, I see the statment: "logical truths are trivial". But, what is meant by the word *trivial*?
Andrew Pessin
September 29, 2012
(changed September 29, 2012)
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Perhaps this: true by definition, v. true by means of some correpondence between their meanings and the world. "Bachelors are unmarried" is logically true, ie true by meaning, because that is how we use the definitions involved; it's a matter of convention and meaning that that sentenc... Read more
Is it morally wrong to eat my pet dog? Why is it right to eat beef and pork, but our pets?
Allen Stairs
October 12, 2012
(changed October 12, 2012)
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I agree with Andrew: the dog/pig distinction won't get us anywhere. And I might even be persuaded that we shouldn't eat animals at all. But there's a sliver of a distinction that may be worth noting.If a stranger asks me to drive him to the grocery store, I don't have any obligation to say y... Read more
Many pro-choice advocates maintain that, though abortions should be permissible, they are regrettable nonetheless. For instance, Bill Clinton famously said that he wanted to keep abortions "safe, legal and rare." I don't understand this view. To my mind, whether abortion is immoral turns on the question of whether a fetus is a person with a right to life. But this seems a clear dichotomy--either fetuses have such a right, or they don't. If they do, then abortion is immoral. If they don't, then not only should abortion be permitted, but there is nothing objectionable about them at all. Indeed, it is every bit as innocuous as using condoms. Sometimes I think that what is happening is that people who advocate this position are still captive to some kind of residual pro-life sentiment. They believe that abortions should be permissible, but they can't shake the feeling that they are still, somehow, a bad thing. (And not just because of circumstantial considerations, such as that women who need abortions are often poor or otherwise disadvantaged, or that mothers who choose abortion may come to regret her decision; but because abortions are themselves are bad.) Assuming that abortions are indeed morally permissible, what is there that could make them regrettable?
Richard Heck
October 10, 2012
(changed October 10, 2012)
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Thanks to everyone for their contributions, and especially to Bette for reminding us of the importance of hearing women's voices on such topics. I'll add one more point, along the same lines.
The questioner says that, if a fetus has a right to life, then abortion is immoral and should not be... Read more
Do academics in particular have a moral responsibility to be outspokenly critical of social injustice?
Thomas Pogge
September 28, 2012
(changed September 28, 2012)
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The journal Ethics and International Affairs had a symposium on this question very recently, see
www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2012/summer-2012-issue-26-2/--
focused mostly of the topic of world poverty as addressed by the new organization Academics Stand Against Poverty (www.aca... Read more