Recent Responses
When discussing kinds of terms, there are certain kinds that come up often. Singular entities such as Queen Elizabeth II are one kind, categories such as cats are another, and properties such as blue are a third. However, what about substances like "gold"? Is a gold watch an instance of the property of being gold, or being made of gold? Or does the watch simply contain trillions of elements in the category "gold (atoms)"? Or is "gold" a singular entity that exists scattered throughout the Universe? Or are substances an entire category to themselves?
Charles Taliaferro
August 24, 2012
(changed August 24, 2012)
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Very difficult and interesting question! Those of us who are Platonists and believe in abstract properties would acknowledge (maybe with some qualifications) properties like being a monarch, being feline, being blue, being a mineral, being gold, being a mineral with a certain atomic num... Read more
Is logic "universal"? For example, when we say that X is logically impossible, we mean to say that in no possible world is X actually possible. But doesn't this mean that we have to prove that in all possible worlds logic actually applies? In other words, don't we have to demonstrate that no world can exist in which the laws of logic don't apply or in which some other logic applies? If logic is not "universal" in this sense, that it applies in all possible words, and we've not shown that it absolutely does apply in all worlds, how can we justify saying that what is logically impossible means the not possible in any possible world, including our actual world?
Stephen Maitzen
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
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I don't understand the question, because I don't understand the phrase 'a world in which the laws of logic don't apply'. I don't think any sense can be attached to that phrase. Is a world in which the laws of logic don't apply also a world in which they do apply? If no, why not? If yes,... Read more
Is it possible for there to be a world that logic does not apply? That is, can't a "married bachelor" actually exist in some world that there is no logic or that there is a different logic that applies? And if so, then isn't it the case that we merely assume the first principles of logic (noncontradiction, identity, excluded middle, etc...) because we observe them in our actual world, which is 1 of many possible worlds? And if it is mere assumption, then can't we be wrong about them when we say they can/should apply to other possible worlds?
Stephen Maitzen
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
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I don't think this question can be answered. I think no one -- including the questioner -- understands the question being asked. In asking "Is it possible for there to be a world where logic doesn't apply?" is the questioner asking (a) "Is it possible for there to be a world where logic d... Read more
Is logic "universal"? For example, when we say that X is logically impossible, we mean to say that in no possible world is X actually possible. But doesn't this mean that we have to prove that in all possible worlds logic actually applies? In other words, don't we have to demonstrate that no world can exist in which the laws of logic don't apply or in which some other logic applies? If logic is not "universal" in this sense, that it applies in all possible words, and we've not shown that it absolutely does apply in all worlds, how can we justify saying that what is logically impossible means the not possible in any possible world, including our actual world?
Stephen Maitzen
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
Permalink
I don't understand the question, because I don't understand the phrase 'a world in which the laws of logic don't apply'. I don't think any sense can be attached to that phrase. Is a world in which the laws of logic don't apply also a world in which they do apply? If no, why not? If yes,... Read more
If under possible world semantics one was to assert 'it is possible that there be an orange elephant'. Is one to be understood as saying that there is an object which does not exist in this world but does in another that is an orange elephant. Or is one to be understood as saying that an object in this world (presumably an elephant) is orange in another?
Andrew Pessin
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
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Of course actuality entails possibility too, so another reading would be consistent with there existing an actual orange elephant (in 'this' world, the actual world), whether or not there exists one in any other possible world. The most direct response to your question (I think) might be to... Read more
Has the idea of responsibility for NOT having a certain thought been addressed in the free will literature? Certain forms of compatibilism seem to hinge on denying that we are 'bypassed', a term described very well by Professor Nahmias as referring to "the idea that our conscious deliberations, our desires, or our reasons play no role in what happens" (quoted from his response to question 3236 on 6/1/10). But what about thoughts and ideas that simply don't occur to us? There is no grand buffet of potential thoughts that I (whatever "I" means) get to choose from, I can't prevent myself from having something occur to me and I can't force something to occur to me. So how could I be responsible for the absence of a certain thought. Clearly there are uncountably many situations in which someone's failure to act or someone's decision to act lead to consequences that may not have happened had a different thought occurred to the person. But, in a certain sense, they were definitely bypassed in the "thought selection" process. They just weren't bypassed in the "I'm now aware that I'm thinking this thought" process. Thanks for your answers and thanks for this awesome website!
Eddy Nahmias
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
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Great question. Here's a question for you:
Suppose a friend asks you to pick her up at the airport (or water her plants while she's gone). Suppose you promise to do so. Suppose (scenario A) that you fail to put down your obligation in your calendar. Or suppose (scenario B) that you put i... Read more
I think killing in self-defence is perfectly acceptable yet I strongly oppose the death penalty. Is this consistent?
Allen Stairs
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
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Yes. To say it's okay to kill in self-defense usually means that it's okay to kill in response to an immediate threat to one's life or safety. We could add various qualifications, but on anything like this understanding, capital punishment isn't self-defense. The person executed almost never p... Read more
Is it possible for there to be a world that logic does not apply? That is, can't a "married bachelor" actually exist in some world that there is no logic or that there is a different logic that applies? And if so, then isn't it the case that we merely assume the first principles of logic (noncontradiction, identity, excluded middle, etc...) because we observe them in our actual world, which is 1 of many possible worlds? And if it is mere assumption, then can't we be wrong about them when we say they can/should apply to other possible worlds?
Stephen Maitzen
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
Permalink
I don't think this question can be answered. I think no one -- including the questioner -- understands the question being asked. In asking "Is it possible for there to be a world where logic doesn't apply?" is the questioner asking (a) "Is it possible for there to be a world where logic d... Read more
A friend of mine self identifies as a Christian but rejects the concept of a personal anthropomorphic god. It appears to me that a person who rejects that concept of god seems to have much more in common with an atheist than a Christian since it seems that many Christians subscribe to the view of god which my friend rejects. Does it make sense to identify with the Christian tradition when one is rejecting-it appears to me- a fundamental part of the religion?
Charles Taliaferro
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
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Good question. Today it seems that there are versions of Christianity which are very heterodox, treating the incarnation more as a saving metaphor rather than a real event and so on. On the traditional concept of God in Christianity, I think few Christians would describe God as "anthro... Read more
A friend of mine self identifies as a Christian but rejects the concept of a personal anthropomorphic god. It appears to me that a person who rejects that concept of god seems to have much more in common with an atheist than a Christian since it seems that many Christians subscribe to the view of god which my friend rejects. Does it make sense to identify with the Christian tradition when one is rejecting-it appears to me- a fundamental part of the religion?
Charles Taliaferro
August 23, 2012
(changed August 23, 2012)
Permalink
Good question. Today it seems that there are versions of Christianity which are very heterodox, treating the incarnation more as a saving metaphor rather than a real event and so on. On the traditional concept of God in Christianity, I think few Christians would describe God as "anthro... Read more