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How can phrases mean things their words don't appear to mean? For example, if I'm eating a salad, my friend asks how it is, and I say "not bad," the words "not bad" seem to be extremely open - the salad could be amazing, it could be okay, it could be great or it could be totally neutral; it might even be horrible, so long as it isn't "bad." However, I would normally be understood as saying the salad was okay, rather than any of the other logically plausible alternatives. How does that work?
Richard Heck
June 25, 2012
(changed June 25, 2012)
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I think there's rather more that can be said here (and, for what it's worth, I don't actually agree that "words mean what we use them to mean").
We probably need to distinguish a couple different things here. One kind of case is that of idiom. These are linguistic expressions, like "kicked the buc... Read more
We use logic to structure the system of mathematics. Lord Russell was described as bewildered upon learning that original premises must be accepted on some human's "say so". Since human knowledge is so fragile (it cannot have all conclusions backed up by premises), is the final justification "It works, based on axioms accepted on faith"? In short, where do you recommend that "evidence for evidence" might be found, if such exists in the anterior phases of syllogistic construction. Somewhere I have read (if I can rely upon what little recall I still have) Lord Russell, even to the end, did not desire to rely on inductive reasoning to advance knowledge, preferring to rely on deductive reasoning. Thanks. Your individual and panel contributions make our world better.
Allen Stairs
June 23, 2012
(changed June 23, 2012)
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I was intrigued that you take human knowledge to be very fragile. The reason you gave was that there's no way for all conclusions to be backed by premises, which I take to be a way of saying that not all of the things we take ourselves to be know can be based on reasoning from other things we take... Read more
Can Behaviourism be considered a philosophy of education?
Nicholas D. Smith
June 21, 2012
(changed June 21, 2012)
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Why not? It provides a way to mold behaviors (which, in an extreme form of behaviorism, is all there is to mental states anyway), and so the acquisition of new behaviors would be (all there is to) education.
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Is it conceivable that there are truths about science, nature or the universe that we are better off not knowing? What might some such truths be?
Nicholas D. Smith
June 21, 2012
(changed June 21, 2012)
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There have recently been psychological studies showing that people tend to have somewhat inflated views about themselves in terms of their own attractiveness. Those whose self-images most closely mathced other people's actual assessments of them tended to be depressed. So that is one exampl... Read more
So Oedipus comes along, gets into a fight with a stranger (his father, unknown to him), and kills his father. Depending on the telling, either the killing was intentional, or it was in self-defense; let's assume the former. If Oedipus intended to kill Laius, and Laius is Oedipus' father, but Oedipus didn't know that Laius was his father, did Oedipus intend to kill his father?
Nicholas D. Smith
June 21, 2012
(changed June 21, 2012)
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Your question raises what is known as the "de dicto/de re" distinction. Rather than give a formal explanation of that (for which, have a look at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), I'll try to put an answer without using the distinction explicitly.
One way we can think about intentions... Read more
Suppose I behave altruistically, because I believe that doing so will help create a better community for all - and because I want to live in such a community. Am I acting according to altruism or egoism? Or are the two actually compatible?
Gordon Marino
July 1, 2012
(changed July 1, 2012)
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I agree with Professor Smith that in this context concepts like altruistic and egoist are a recipe for confusion. Clearly, if your only intention were to improve the community for your own benefit -- like working on your house or something --- then it would be egoistic but it would be hard to imagi... Read more
Is our society's assumed negative view of pre-marital sex only because of what is said about it in the Bible? Or does this also account the fact that sex is used for procreation? But at the same time, why is it more shocking to hear that a high school student hasn't had sex rather than has?
Nicholas D. Smith
June 21, 2012
(changed June 21, 2012)
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I suspect that you put it well when you state that it is our society's "presumed negative view," since I suspect that it is a minority of people who actually do marry as virgins these days. So if our actual cultural values are reflected in our practices, then I think what we find is that onl... Read more
Red seems exciting but blue seems calming. That is not the only thing that could be said about those colors. But is the reason those colors have the effects that they have because of something about the color themselves or because of the culture we are in?
William Rapaport
July 18, 2012
(changed July 18, 2012)
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As with many other questions about color, you might find the discussion of emotional responses to colors in Hardin's classic book to be of interest:Hardin, C.L. (1993), Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, expanded edition (Indianapolis: Hackett)
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Cartesian dualism relies upon two substances, body and mind, which are totally distinguished by their properties. While the characteristic nature of body is Extendedness, the mind is known with its capability of thinking. So, Cartesian Dualism is founded on these two basic propositions: 1. All bodies are extended. And 2. All minds are thinkable. Abandoning the latter, the former (1) seems acceptable to all physicalists. But if so, then its contraposition might be true equally. In other words, physicalists should be agreed with this proposition too: 3. All non-extended are non-body The question is how physicalists justify this proposition? In other hand, the unavoidable consequence of this proposition (and its truth) is existence of a non-extended (entity) which isn't body, which isn't justifiable in reductive physicalism approach. So, considering this proposition that in reductive physicalism approach: 4. everything has identify with physics. But, isn’t paradoxical acceptance of (3) and (4) together? how physicalists justify the existence of non-extended entities which aren't bodies? Thanks! Borhan S., a student of philosophy of science.
Miriam Solomon
June 21, 2012
(changed June 21, 2012)
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Dear Borhan,The answer to your question requires some deductive logic. Let's start with (1) all bodies are extended, which is Descartes' premise. It follows logically that if something is not extended, then it is not a body. Thus (3) follows logically from (1). You are worried because you th... Read more
How can phrases mean things their words don't appear to mean? For example, if I'm eating a salad, my friend asks how it is, and I say "not bad," the words "not bad" seem to be extremely open - the salad could be amazing, it could be okay, it could be great or it could be totally neutral; it might even be horrible, so long as it isn't "bad." However, I would normally be understood as saying the salad was okay, rather than any of the other logically plausible alternatives. How does that work?
Richard Heck
June 25, 2012
(changed June 25, 2012)
Permalink
I think there's rather more that can be said here (and, for what it's worth, I don't actually agree that "words mean what we use them to mean").
We probably need to distinguish a couple different things here. One kind of case is that of idiom. These are linguistic expressions, like "kicked the buc... Read more