Recent Responses
Someone asked here recently whether "philosophy is mostly specious rationalized intellectual imagination and raw speculation dressed in the guise of logical argument". My problem with philosophy is something like the opposite of this. I think philosophical questions, or at least most of those I've heard of, are in fact real and important questions. What I can't understand is why aren't many of them solved! Please don't say it's because philosophical questions are "very difficult": this sounds rather pretentious and seems to forget that many very difficult questions were solved in mathematics and in science. Take, for instance, the question whether morality is objective (or whether there are moral facts). I'm sure one needs to define carefully what "objective" or "facts" means, and even what one means by "morality", but when that is done, why on Earth can't you get to some consensus about this?!
Charles Taliaferro
June 8, 2012
(changed June 8, 2012)
Permalink
I really appreciate your recognition of the significance of philosophical questions! As I was the panelist that responded to the earlier posting, I thought I might take a shot at replying to your question and observations.There are a few issues in play: there is first the question of what it... Read more
I would like to know if the right to decide what is 'normal' and 'abnormal' belongs to any particular authority or type of expert. Whose job is it to define what is 'normal' and 'abnormal'? Is it the job of philosophers, or sociologists or another authority? Or a combination of these disciplines? Or is it not up to any type of authority and is instead up to everyday people with no particular expertise? Example: French historian and philosopher of history, Amaury de Riencourt claimed in one of his books that "Far from being an incomplete form of maleness...femaleness is the norm, the fundamental form of life." This statement implies that to be male is to be abnormal. Is he right because of his credentials? Are there counterarguments to this statement? If I disagreed with this statement, would I be wrong becuase I have no credentials to my name?
Miriam Solomon
June 8, 2012
(changed June 8, 2012)
Permalink
We are all fallible. Even experts. Especially about matters as value-laden as questions of "normality" of types of human beings. If you disagree with Amaury de Riencourt, and give reasons for your disagreement, then the fact that you have no credentials would not matter. Your reasons should be... Read more
Is it psychologically possible to believe a proposition in the absence of understanding the proposition? If not, do many of us continue to harbor beliefs "as tho" they are understood. While admitting that total understanding is, probably, not attainable, it appears to me that our mutually formed groups that purport to make and implement serious decisions stands as a possible threat to concerted action. I have classified these thoughts as somewhat metaphysical since, if totally psychological, the answer might be in the domain of science. Thank you for this site. Jerry D. H.
William Rapaport
June 11, 2012
(changed June 11, 2012)
Permalink
A valuable paper on this topic, written by a psychologist, but with many discussions of Descartes's and Spinoza's views on these issues, is:Gilbert, Daniel T. (1991), "How Mental Systems Believe", American Psychologist 46(2) (February): 107-119(online at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dtg/Gillber... Read more
how do i get out of the depression i am in???
Gabriel Segal
June 19, 2012
(changed June 19, 2012)
Permalink
Certainly consulting a physician is a good idea. There is a smattering of knowledge of some of the brain chemistry underlying some forms of depression and anti-depressants do work for some people. A physician might be able to offer some advice about different forms of therapy, such as CBT which... Read more
how do i get out of the depression i am in???
Gabriel Segal
June 19, 2012
(changed June 19, 2012)
Permalink
Certainly consulting a physician is a good idea. There is a smattering of knowledge of some of the brain chemistry underlying some forms of depression and anti-depressants do work for some people. A physician might be able to offer some advice about different forms of therapy, such as CBT which... Read more
Suppose it's morning, and I tell my wife that I am going to be home at 6 PM this evening. On my way home, however, I am involved in a minor traffic accident that delays my return, such that I am not able to arrive home around 6 PM as I had originally claim. Was my original claim a lie?
Oliver Leaman
June 7, 2012
(changed June 7, 2012)
Permalink
No, a lie is when you tell someone that something is true knowing that it is not. In this case you merely produced a false statement.
Log in to post comments
Can aesthetic claims be falsified?
Jonathan Westphal
June 7, 2012
(changed June 7, 2012)
Permalink
Suppose I say that Rembrandt's "Night Watch" is insipid, because it is too big (about 350 × 450 cms.) and its particular blocklike use of chiaroscuro makes it naive and primitive. I have made three interlocking aesthetic claims, together with an explanation of each. Now you go to have a look at... Read more
It seems that certain ethical theories are often criticized for contradiction ordinary ethical thinking, or common moral intuitions. Why should this matter, though? Is there a good reason to believe that ordinary common moral intuitions are infallible, and that more refined ethical systems ought not contradict such intuitions?
Allen Stairs
June 7, 2012
(changed June 7, 2012)
Permalink
You're quite right: ordinary moral intuitions aren't infallible. However, the sort of criticisms you have in mind doesn't really suppose that they are.
Start with an extreme case. Suppose someone came up with a moral theory with the consequence that most of our common moral beliefs were wrong. Now... Read more
I have a question about the entities in scientific theories and models. The status of some of these objects seems intuitive. Frictionless planes, for example, though they don't exist, seem helpful enough as an abstraction for understanding how actual planes function. My question is about entities which we (non-scientists) know only through the prism of scientific theory--say, photons or electrons. I know what light and electricity are, on some immediate level, through my everyday experience of these phenomena. But I don't know what to make of the entities that physics tells me compose them. My inclination is to take them as "real", not just convenient notions of the purpose of theorizing and mathematical models. I can't help pictures these tiny, planet-like spheres whizzing around. I know there's something importantly wrong about that image, but I'm not sure what. Furthermore, scientists still talk about particles "spinning" and so forth, I am unable to see in what sense this is an analogy in the way a frictionless plane is to an actual one. The point of my question is that science has a kind of authority to inform our understanding of the natural world even though it is too difficult for the non specialist to evaluate its claims. So as a non-scientist, how should I regard the claim that light is composed of "photons" and also "waves" given that these very concepts seem to rest on a great deal of theory that might potentially change such that the entities we now regard, naively or not, as "real" turn out not to "exist" for the purposes of future theories. From the educated lay-person's perspective, aside from considerations of parsimony, and given the way scientists speak to the public, how can we distinguish between theoretical entities which simply turn out to be convenient (for the moment) fictions, like say, Ptolemy's epicycles or "aether", and entities that exist in some more substantial way? This seems kind of important given the authority science has as the arbiter of how to understand the natural world. Thanks!
Marc Lange
June 7, 2012
(changed June 7, 2012)
Permalink
The question that you are raising is a venerable and perennial one. In the trade, it is called the dispute between "scientific realism" and "scientific anti-realism." Scientific realism is the view that in science, when a theory is accepted, the unobservable entities that the theory posits are believe... Read more
If a person is not afraid of non-existance then if he is afaid of death he is actually afraid of the possible pain involved ; does this seem reasonable?
Gabriel Segal
June 19, 2012
(changed June 19, 2012)
Permalink
Ie he is convinced that death would bring no pain he might still be afraid. Then it would be something else he feared. I don't know what he might rationally fear in such a case.
Log in to post comments