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Suppose that you had two bags each with an infinite number of blue marbles. Suppose you also had another bag of infinity red marbles. If you mixed those three bags what are your odds of getting a red marble? Obviously this isn't a realistic experiment but is it 1 in 3 or 50%?
Allen Stairs
May 18, 2012
(changed May 18, 2012)
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I'd suggest that there needn't be a determinate answer without adding more detail. In particular, the notion of "mixing" the three collections would need to be spelled out. Suppose the "mixing" works this way: take 10 marbles from the red bag and one from each of the blue bags. Put in an infinite v... Read more
Kant's contradiction of the will seems to suggest that it is inconsistent for us to allow abortion; that it is inconsistent to simultaneously will that we live and that allow that our mother could have had an abortion (meaning we wouldn't live...) However, I find this a little unconvincing but can't quite get it down. Is it not consistent to argue that the rights of me as a foetus are overridden by my mother's rights as an adult and that I will everybody to be treated according to the rights the can claim despite the consequences? Thanks a lot in advance!
Thomas Pogge
May 4, 2012
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Kant's contradiction in the will test suggests what you say it suggests only on the assumption that, as a rational agent, one necessarily wills one's own existence. Most human beings are happy to be alive, but it does not follow from this that any human (let alone any rational) being must will its own... Read more
Many people bring forth the argument that the chances of life, especially intelligent human life, occurring are so ridiculously improbable that the only way to explain it is to bring a creator into the picture. I've heard various figures thrown around and grains of sand in the universe brought in to explain how unlikely it is. But is the actual science behind the probability sound? And do you think that this is a good reason to believe in a creator? And what about a rational, logical argument explaining how this is not a very good reason? Thanks.
Nicholas D. Smith
May 3, 2012
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First of all, it is nonsense to try to assess the probability of intelligent human life occurring unless we first stipulate what the prior conditions are.
According to evolutionary theory, human beings and other living things are the result of genetic mutations that occur within prior life form... Read more
Why are the lives of plants not considered ethically relevant, when there are more than a few people who think the lives of all animals, including the simplest insects, are? Plants, too, can whither and die. What's the difference between the ethical value of an apple tree and that of a termite?
Eddy Nahmias
May 3, 2012
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You would probably appreciate this recent column in The New York Times on whether it is ethical to eat peas (and other plants): http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/28/if-peas-can-talk-should-we-eat-them/
I didn't. I thought it was pretty stupid. Why? Because the sort of "communication" th... Read more
I'm attending a lecture on the philosophy of science, and our professor told us yesterday that "we constantly rely on inductive reasoning all the time in our lives, such as when we assume that the floor won't suddenly collapse beneath our feet if we walk forwards." This struck me as odd. Is it accurate to say we "assume" such a thing? It seems to me that we don't even think about these things at all, much less try to justify any such assumptions - saying we're relying on some kind of argumentation seems like a stretch, but perhaps it isn't. Is everything we do, then, the result of certain processes of reasoning? Or are there things we just do without any reasoning to support them?
Andrew Pessin
May 2, 2012
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Hm, I wonder if you were in MY early modern class (where I use this example with Hume ....!) In any case I might only add to Stephen's reply that one small test that we are making an implicit assumption P is to imagine, for a moment, that we didn't believe the proposition P in question -- if we tell... Read more
One of the formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative is that we should never treat humanity as a mere means to an end. I wonder, then, whether this means that horror film directors are behaving unethically. After all, in a horror film, terrible things are made to happen to human beings, solely for the purpose of frightening/pleasing the audience. The human beings may be fictional, but it is nevertheless the fact that they are fictional *humans* that makes horror films effective (as opposed to a horror film where the victims are all robots). It seems to me that the humanity of the fictional characters is being used as a tool to manipulate the audience's emotions. Does this fall under the umbrella of the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative? If not, why not? It certainly seems that it is the humanity of the victims (including their emotions, their aspirations, their mortality, their ability to suffer) that is key to the function of horror films.
Andrew Pessin
May 2, 2012
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A very interesting question -- and while I know next to nothing about Kantian ethics, I might chip in here the observation that in a (clearly 'fictional' film) there is no particular, actual, individual human being who is being used as a 'means to an end' (unless of course the actors etc. are being e... Read more
What makes a philosophy program at a University better or worse than another program? I live in the Dallas area, where there are two philosophy programs in my area. One is at The University of North Texas, the other at Southern Methodist University. One's a public, state-funded school with a broad program in philosophy and religious studies, the other is a private school with about 15 different courses in their undergrad program. What would make one better than the other?
Nicholas D. Smith
April 27, 2012
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I think the practice of "rating" different departments is tricky at best, and at worst sheer fraud. So my answer will be very indirect.
Obviously, students want professors who are engaging and interesting to teach them. But from a distance, I think it can be very difficult to assess wheth... Read more
Dear Philosophers, We can differentiate between objects by two axii, their form, which is the shape they take, and their "thingness." Thingness refers to the reason for an object, its purpose that it is supposed to achieve. For example, the thingness of a guitar is to make music. We can differentiate it from a similar object like a banjo, because while they share similar purposes, they have different shapes. We hold in our minds this thingness in the form of a Concept. If you were to show me a picture of a guitar, I would match that image (its form and thingness) to my Concept of guitar, and so I could recognize that object. Now if we have a guitar, but remove the strings by this framework we could say that it is no longer a guitar, because while it has a shape of a guitar, it now lacks the "thingness" of a guitar, that is it can no longer be used to make music. So its new label becomes "an object that's almost a guitar." Another example. We have a Bic lighter. A lighter is used to light things. What if it runs out of fluid? since it can no longer fulfill its purpose to create fire, it shouldn't be considered a lighter, we should say "that used to be a lighter." Furthermore, a Bic lighter can also be used as a bottle opener. So when a lighter runs out of fluid, it is no longer a lighter but can still be used as a bottle opener. Therefore, the object is now only properly referred to as a bottle opener. I consider this simply a different way of looking at the things, so it's not something that I feel is provable. Is this a flawed perspective? If it isn't, is it possible to create a way of proving this works? -James
Nicholas D. Smith
April 27, 2012
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Your question calls to mind Aristotle's so-called "four causes," which I prefer to think of as four sorts of explanation.
"Material Cause": explaining a thing in terms of what it is made of (in the case of the Bic lighter, plastic, compressed gas, etc.)
"Formal Cause": explaining a thing in... Read more
Hey Philosophers, I was having a discussion with my girlfriend about what the "meaning of life" was. A tired, perhaps ultimately pointless, question... but suprisingly, we actually ended up both agreeing that the purpose of life is to "flourish." However, we sort of ran into a brick wall when we realized we couldn't even explain what that is. Like, what is "human flourishing?" We thought that was maybe to complex a question, so questioned what "plant flourishing" was; if a seed is planted with the capacity to flower, and it begins to grow, yet, some problem hinders it's growth and because of that it doesn't flower, it can be said that the plant didn't 'flourish' - the plant did not fulfill it's potential to flower. Would it be fair to say, then, that "human flourishing" comes down to humans fulfilling the potential they have in life? This is problematic, though, since humans are so complex, we simply can't put a finger on one thing and say "that's flourishing" like we can with the flower. The limits on human flourishing and capability, infact, seem somewhat 'limitless' which is unlike any other creature due to the level of intelligence/flexibility that we have evolved. So, our main question is "What is human flourishing?" How do modern philosophers handle this concept? A little background may be helpful: we are both studying biology in college, and we've read some philosophy; Aristotle's ethics and some Spinoza for example, but we don't really know much in regards to modern philosophy at all. Thanks :)
Nicholas D. Smith
April 27, 2012
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Maybe you should read a little more Aristotle. Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics deals directly with this issue. So does the end of Book IV of Plato's Republic, from a somewhat different perspective. Plato also has Socrates talk about what it means to value "the most important things" in... Read more
It is generally acknowledged, especially by feminists, that men in general have behaviors and traits that are not good. Could a feminist name any general behaviors and traits that women have that are not good and that are also not the fault of men?
Nicholas D. Smith
April 27, 2012
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First a disclaimer--I don't speak for feminists in this response.
But something in the question piqued me a bit, but then there is also something I wanted to pursue a bit. I think that talk about "men in general" and "women in general" is already likely to deal in the sorts of stereotypes... Read more