Recent Responses
I recently asked a question about the sorites paradox, and I received the following response, which seems to me to have a logical fallacy in it. In other words, the answer below does not seem to "explain" the paradox as much as it "contains" the paradox.... Here is the reply: "Because the paradox itself results from commitments of common sense: (a) some number of grains is clearly too few to make a heap (maybe 15, as you say); (b) some number of grains is clearly enough to make a heap (maybe 15,000); and yet (c) one grain never makes the difference between any two different statuses (heap vs. non-heap, definitely a heap vs. not definitely a heap, etc.). Given commonsense logic, (a)-(c) can't all be true, but which one should we reject? Most philosophers who try to solve the paradox attack (c), but I certainly haven't seen a refutation of (c) that I'd call 'commonsense.'" It seems that point (c) above presupposes that either we have 100% heap or 0% heap; however if we can have a number of grains such that we have 85% heap / 15% not heap at the same time, or 50% heap / 50% not heap at the same time, then there is no paradox. Maybe it is "merely" a question of semantics? We know that "100% either / 100% or" is a convention that does not necessarily fit the "commonsense" world; often times we "know" from "common sense" that something can be part either / part or at the same time. Yet the "logic" that causes the sorites problem to be a paradox is "logic" that insists that only 100% either or 100% or can exist, which seems to violate the "common sense" test. In other words, I do not see a paradox, I see a problem with underlying assumptions and definitions, the lack of clarity in which produces an apparent paradox which is resolved when we examine those underlying assumptions and definitions. Am I missing something? or am I being "too" concrete in a world in which everyone else insists on abstraction?
Stephen Maitzen
February 10, 2012
(changed February 10, 2012)
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I supplied the response you found unsatisfying, so thanks for not pretending you were satisfied by it!
You're right that my response did assume that there's only a "yes" or "no" answer to such questions as "Can N grains (for some particular N) make a heap?", "Can N grains definitely mak... Read more
If language limits the things we can think about, and we can only think about things that our language is capable of discussing, how then do we create new terms that describe things previously not incorporated into the language?
Oliver Leaman
February 9, 2012
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Just because we use language to express our thoughts, it does not follow that the limits of language are the limits of our thought. For one thing, we can and do change and extend language to incorporate new ideas that cannot fit into the existing language. It is rather like the ways in whic... Read more
In a democratic society, we are often called to vote. However, I don't believe there is a clear understanding of how one should vote. Are voters supposed to vote according to what they believe to be the best policy for everybody? Does democracy intend that everyone express some normative opinion about how society ought to function, and that the dominant opinion triumphs? Are voters supposed to vote according to what policy would be most beneficial to themselves? Does democracy intend that everyone express their personal interests, and that government builds a consensus or favors the dominant interests? Are voters supposed to vote strategically, in an attempt to maximize the likelihood of their desired policies being enacted? Does democracy intend for us to vote for options that don't necessarily represent something we believe in, if we believe that such a vote would best guarantee the success of the policies least abhorrent to us?
Oliver Leaman
February 9, 2012
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The point of voting in a democracy is that one votes in accordance with whatever principles one likes, or none. It is perfectly valid to vote for the best looking candidate, the candidate who has an attractive spouse or partner, the candidate who won when a coin was tossed, and so on. It is... Read more
In a class on Aristotle we have been discussing the difference between the Greek's idea of Eudaimonia and what we today call happiness. Many of my classmates seem skeptical of more objective accounts like Aristotle's, instead defending subjective theories of happiness. Do you think this perhaps misguided view of happiness could be problematic? It seems to me that this view is embraced by a great number of my peers who, like me, come from comfortable middle class backgrounds. This "Do what you like as long as it makes you happy" attitude seems to result in both a sense of entitlement to whatever they happen to desire at the moment as well as a slavish need to act on any impulse. At the same time many of these people seem awfully depressed and unhappy for people with such privileged, comfortable lives. Do you think that this unique type of depression and a certain view of happiness are linked?
Nicholas D. Smith
February 9, 2012
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First, a clarification: as many scholars have noted, "happiness" is a misleading translation of the Greeek "eudaimonia," and partly for the very reason that is at the heart of your question. The Greeks certainly had disputes over how precisely we should understand eudaimonia, but all w... Read more
Why do we have some fundamental rights (such as freedom of conscience or the right to life) but not others (such as the right to sexuality, or the right to happiness)? Who decides? Who prioritizes?
Charles Taliaferro
February 6, 2012
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When you write about "who decides? who prioritizes?" it sounds as though you are referring to legal rights. While some ethical theories of rights do appeal to contracts and social agreements, much of the philosophy of rights appeals to nature, human nature specifically, or to duties,... Read more
Are there any philosophers who have taken Foucault's approach of looking at the history and changes of a concept, but who have applied it to ideas NOT investigated by Foucault (punishment, sexuality, mental insanity)?
Charles Taliaferro
February 6, 2012
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Yes, many philosophers have conducted investigations into different concepts or themes other than those investigated by Foucault. Lad Sessions, for example, has done a good book on the concept of faith, outlining philosophically significant different notions of faith and, more recentl... Read more
Is the purpose of ethics to seek out a universal code of right and wrong? or is it's purpose merely to justify or criticize actions based on subjective beliefs about right and wrong? or perhaps some third purpose?
Gordon Marino
February 6, 2012
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Ethics is concerned with relations, our relations to others, ourselves, and the enviornment. I don't believe there is any purpose to ethics per se. Those who study ethics do it with different ends in mind. For Aristotle, the study of ethics was intended to improve your moral life -- make y... Read more
Is Kant's Categorical imperative overly dependent on empirical considerations? I think it is since judging the morality of an action by asking what would happen if everybody did the same thing means that the morality of an action is dependent on the contingent features of the world that produce that effect. If everyone did a certain thing then there would be chaos so that is not good Kant seems to say. Well that chaos of course depends less on the nature of the action and it underlying intentions than on the world that action took place in. If everyone stole then society would fall apart but that seems to have more to do with principles of sociology than something that pertains to ethics.
Thomas Pogge
February 3, 2012
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You suggest that Kant's criterion of wrong conduct turns on this question: "If everyone acted the way I am proposing to act, would this have undesirable consequences?"
I think Kant's actual question differs in two respects. Kant is not asking whether the agent would like some fictional world... Read more
Is 20°C twice as hot as 10°C? Now, I know that the phenomenon (heat) described by 20°C is by no means twice as intense as is that described by 10°C. Yet 20 is also undoubtedly twice the size of 10, no more and no less. So we have two seemingly opposing ways of looking at the situation. Which one is correct, and what standards do we use to judge that correctness? Or is there no correct answer?
Miriam Solomon
February 3, 2012
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The Celsius scale of temperature places the zero at the freezing point of water, not at "absolute zero" which is conceptualized as the time when molecular motion ceases. So 20 degrees C is not twice the temperature of 10 degrees C. The zero for temperature is minus 273C.... Read more
Is the claim that education is a universal right a morally defensible claim? I have heard many people claim that education is a priviledge or a commodity, and they have quite convincing arguments. They say that because teachers need to be paid, and books, computers, etc. need to be purchased, that only those people who can afford it (or who can borrow the money for it) should have access to education. Although this conclusion is unsettling, I cannot seem to think of any reason to deny its validity, nor can I find a solid argument defending education as a right.
Nicholas D. Smith
February 2, 2012
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There is a saying among philosophers: "ought" implies "can." The application of this maxim to your question is as follows: It seems that anything that deserves to be called a "universal right" would be something that ought to be provided to everyone--no exceptions. But this could not... Read more