Recent Responses
It seems generally accepted that the human race has a social responsibility to eradicate poverty; however, doesn't every economic system benefit in some way from the most impoverished element of society, or the people that are most exploited? What is the value of money if everyone has (approximately) the same amount? Is there any viable system where the economic playing field is more level? What might that system look like?
Thomas Pogge
March 2, 2012
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I don't know what it means for an economic system to benefit. But it seems plausible that some people benefit at the expense of those who are most exploited. I don't see how this benefit is supposed to defeat the proposition that the human race has a responsibility to eradicate poverty -- typicall... Read more
I am starting research for a term paper in a metaphysics class and have chosen the topic "Do Fictional Characters Exist?" I read Peter Van Inwagen's "Creatures of Fiction" as well as a couple journal articles that seem to be in disagreement with him on the question. Does anyone here have any other recommendations for good articles on the topic of fictional realism (either for or against)? Thanks for your help.
William Rapaport
March 1, 2012
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Here are a few of my favorites:
Scholes, Robert (1968), Elements of Fiction (New York: Oxford University Press). [a very short book, really just a long article]
Lewis, David (1978), "Truth in Fiction,'' American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 37-46.
Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1979), "Fiction and... Read more
Are definitions falsifiable? It seems that if I find something of category X that does not fit category X's definition, then it isn't actually of category X, and thus doesn't prove anything. But on the other hand, if that is the case, it seems no definition cannot be falsified or otherwise demonstrated to be inadequate (unless it is inherently contradictory or so).
Stephen Maitzen
March 1, 2012
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Let's focus on the phrase "something of category X that does not fit category X's definition." One on interpretation, we can't possibly find something of that description: if it doesn't fit category X's definition, then it's not something of category X, as you say. But that interpretation ass... Read more
Is similarity a fact of things in the world, or is it an observation made by sentient beings? Take two cats, for example. Is it an objective fact of the world that the two cats are similar (shape, size, biology, etc.)? Or are there, ontologically speaking, just two phenomena (or two portions of the phenomenal world) that we, as conscious beings, perceive as similar and categorize as cats?
Stephen Maitzen
March 1, 2012
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I think it depends on what's meant by 'similarity'. If similarity is just the sharing of properties -- having in common this or that attribute -- then it would seem that any two things are similar. Even Barack Obama and the Battle of Hastings have lots of properties in common: being known to... Read more
It has long seemed to me that philosophers do not seem concerned with illusion, i.e., the appearance of reasoning that SEEMS valid but is at least questionable if not illusory. The Greek philosophers that I read in school seemed particularly questionable. My impression was that much of their argumentation was illusory, i.e., based on claims that are unidentified assumptions. An example of illusion is the argument that since everything has a cause, there must be a FIRST cause. This SOUNDS sound but of course is not. Causality is not simple and is not a matter of logic. Causality has to do with nature and we know very little about nature. For all we know the universe has been going on forever, i.e., had no beginning. Moreover, if EVERYTHING has a cause, then there cannot be a FIRST cause which is exempt from having a cause. Are there philosophers who are concerned with this problem of illusory or unfounded philosophical reasoning? I would love to read their ideas. Please note that I'm not calling it "specious" reasoning. I'm questioning its basis, not criticizing it.
Stephen Maitzen
March 1, 2012
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You wrote, "It has long seemed to me that philosophers do not seem concerned with...reasoning that SEEMS valid but is at least questionable if not illusory." I must say I find that surprising, since philosophers devote a great deal of their time (and some of them virtually all of their time) t... Read more
Some of the answers that philosophers give on this site do not reference any particular philosopher or philosophical argument, and to my eye, would not be easily distinguishable from the answers that an interested, well-educated, thoughtful person might posit. What makes the philosopher's answer different?
Oliver Leaman
March 1, 2012
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Nothing really, all that past and present philosophers try to do is presentinterested, well-educated, thoughtful responses to theoretical issues. Except for showing how well-read one is, little is to be gained by citing chapter and verse of a particular authority.
Log in to... Read more
Stephen Hawking, in his recent book entitled The Grand Design, states that philosophy is dead. Without going into the reasons behind his thinking, I'd like to know the response of current philosophers to Hawking's statement. He has laid down a gauntlet of sorts, a challenge to philosophers to make their work relevant to the recent advances and discoveries made by cosmologists, astrophysicists, and others on the cutting edge of scientific discovery and investigation. Are present-day philosophers up to Hawking's challenge?
Stephen Maitzen
March 9, 2012
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Scientists who write obituaries for philosophy forget that science depends on philosophical assumptions. When some lab results or observations of the visible universe confirm or disconfirm a prediction in physics, Hawking and colleagues draw conclusions about the whole universe. But does any... Read more
I was reading some questions on this site regarding vagueness and the Sorites conundrum and I'm not sure I understand the fascination with figuring out what does or doesn't qualify as a heap. Isn't the word heap useful precisely BECAUSE it doesn't have a strict quantitative requirement? We choose to use the word "heap" and not a different word (like grams, or tons, or twenty-seven, etc.) because it offers us flexibility. I'm not sure exactly why this "puzzle" has received so much attention. The fact that there hasn't been an accepted solution makes perfect sense to me because there is nothing to solve. It seems like trying to apply precision to a word intentionally designed to be imprecise. It seems to me that if we figure out the exact point at which something becomes a heap then we will no longer be able to use the word as freely. Am I misunderstanding the problem? Thanks in advance!
Stephen Maitzen
March 1, 2012
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I think you understand at least one aspect of the problem quite well. As you say, words like 'heap' are useful only if they're vague. Indeed, their vagueness seems built into their meanings: they're essentially vague; they wouldn't be the words they are if they weren't vague. The problem is... Read more
For me the answer to the question of whether abortion is right or wrong depends on the ontological status of the fetus. Is a fetus the kind of being that has a right to live or is it not? I don't know. How on earth can I know that? If I knew then I wouldn't be an agnostic on this issue. Most people, if I am not mistaken, take it for granted that a new born baby has the kind of being that gives it the right to live. So what reason is there to think that a young baby has the kind of being that gives it the right to live? What about an older baby or an adult...if we can stretch this question to its limits.
Stephen Maitzen
March 2, 2012
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Your questions raise a host of difficult issues. What gives anything a right to life? In other words, what in general (if anything) about an individual makes it morally wrong for others to end its life? I've never seen a satisfying answer to that basic question. Does an individual's right t... Read more
Is it ever possible to do something we don't want to do? If I think/feel that I prefer not to do something but I do it anyway aren't I really just "wanting" not to face the consequences of not doing it more than wanting to do something different? A really simple example could just be preferring to watch the baseball game rather than driving to the airport to pick up my in-laws. If I suck it up and go to the airport and skip the game aren't I really "wanting" to not deal with the consequences of stranding them at the airport more than "wanting" to watch the game? Thanks!
Bette Manter
February 29, 2012
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It seems to me that there are many layers of meaning to your question: are we free to be moral? Is altruism possible? Can I shape my desires or am I just kidding myself?! In a sense you are in a pretty pickle here, because if I understand you correctly, you can neither prove nor disprov... Read more