Recent Responses
Is the doctrine of the trinity illogical?
Charles Taliaferro
August 26, 2011
(changed August 26, 2011)
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I thought I would add just a tad more. Here is one argument against the Trinity and a reply:It has been argued that the Trinity involves Tri-theism or the supposition that there are three Gods (Father, Son, Holy Spirit). There cannot be three Gods for this reason: If there is a God, Go... Read more
As an argument against bestiality, it is often said that animals are not able to consent to sex. If this is the case, though, wouldn't that mean that every instance of two animals mating is an instance of rape, since presumably neither of them are able to consent?
Peter S. Fosl
August 26, 2011
(changed August 26, 2011)
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Well, if someone is struck by lightning is it murder? A necessary condition for the commission of a crime is that the candidate criminal be an agent. Arguably, non-human animals are not. So, just as they can't consent to sex, they are incapable of rape or murder. Concepts of moral or crimina... Read more
I read that Gödel's incompleteness theorems don't effect Peano Arithmetic that doesn't include multiplication sign. This confuses me, since multiplication can be defined through addition. So, even if "PA without multiplication" doesn't have multiplication sign in itself, it provides everything that's needed for defining mul. sign. So what's the difference? That is, why is "PA without multiplication" (but that contains everything needed for defining mul.) different from PA (that already has multiplication defined)? From "Gödel without tears": "The formalized interpreted language L contains the language of basic arithmetic if L has at least the standard rst-order logical apparatus (including identity), has a term '0' which denotes zero and function symbols for the successor, addition and multiplication functions de fined over numbers - either built-in as primitives or introduced by defi nition - and has a predicate whose extension is the natural numbers." Is there any difference between having those symbols defined as primitives (through axioms) and introducing them by definitions? I guess there is a difference, since PA is incomplete and PA without X isn't (and mul. definition is the only difference). If definitions (even if innocent-looking and seemengly talk only about what's already in system) are so powerful, then shouldn't people be more careful, because of it, when defining stuff? I noticed Gödel makes some other (primitive recursive) definitions in his proof (for example, function that returns n-th prime number). Could it be, in theory, that some of these definitions added certain functionality to system P that wasn't there before in P, and that without this new functionality P would be too weak for Gödel's theorems to affect it?
Richard Heck
August 25, 2011
(changed August 25, 2011)
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It's true that multiplication can be defined in terms of addition, but the crucial question is: What logical resources are needed for that definition? The usual definition would be in terms of repeated addition, which means that the definition is (primitive) recursive. And now the point is tha... Read more
Is the doctrine of the trinity illogical?
Charles Taliaferro
August 26, 2011
(changed August 26, 2011)
Permalink
I thought I would add just a tad more. Here is one argument against the Trinity and a reply:It has been argued that the Trinity involves Tri-theism or the supposition that there are three Gods (Father, Son, Holy Spirit). There cannot be three Gods for this reason: If there is a God, Go... Read more
Is it unethical to look at a woman's breasts? What if she has cleavage?
Allen Stairs
August 25, 2011
(changed August 25, 2011)
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Here's a plausible principle: in general, we shouldn't do things that are likely to make people uncomfortable. This is particularly true if our only reason for doing whatever we're doing is that we get some sort of enjoyment out of it. And if we're in doubt about whether we're likely to make t... Read more
Can ethics be a sufficient condition for becoming a lifelong "law-abiding" citizen? What ethical standards could be there to ensure life under legal boundaries? Or if one needs some very basic legal knowledge to achieve that being, what combination of ethics and law is most sensible for someone not pursuing a career in law? Or perhaps the question should be posed as, "How much law do we need to know in our lives, and how much do we use ethics to fill the rest of our moral consciousness?" Thank you!
Sean Greenberg
August 25, 2011
(changed August 25, 2011)
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This is a very interesting nest of questions!! The relation between law and morality has received considerable discussion from philosophers and is a fascinating topic. I treat the first question that you raise, and then turn to the very different question with which you conclude.I myself a... Read more
I hope this is not too general of a question, but the more I thought about it the more I realised it was a very difficult question to answer. It does not necessarily pertain to anything religious, but I believe in a God who is eternally good, just so you know the angle that I'm coming from. Anyway, here is my question: Would the idea of something or someone being truly 'good' have ever come about if it never had the contrast of something 'bad' or 'evil' to compare it to? Hypothetically speaking, if someone were to never experience anything bad, would they ever have the understanding of something being good?
Jonathan Westphal
August 25, 2011
(changed August 25, 2011)
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What you describe is one response (one that has occasionally been used by theists) to the problem of evil. It is sometimes called the "contrast" argument. It is found for example in Leibniz's Theodicy of 1810, in various forms, along with other arguments defending theism. The version that... Read more
Do people who are blind, deaf and mute since birth dream? If so how?
Jasper Reid
August 21, 2011
(changed August 21, 2011)
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I don't know the answer to this question -- I mean the how question rather than the whether, for everyone dreams -- and it sounds (from the fact that he is resorting to words like 'presumably') like Andrew Pessin doesn't know either. For it's really a question for empirical psychologists, not p... Read more
"Scepticism arises because 'for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows, they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the things which are perceived, are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?' The nub of the problem is that if we are acquainted only with our own perceptions, and never with the things which are supposed to lie beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of those things, or even be justified in asserting their existence?"--A.C. Grayling quoting Berkeley My question is: Isn't one answer to this problem re representationalism that concerns Berkeley that if we were seriously out of sync with the real (mind-independent) world, then how could we have survived as well as we have? If I reach for an object,it's always there (unless I hallucinate).---If it's ALL a "Matrix" world then I can see the point. But if we are realist, believing the world to be there even if we were not, then it seems assured we are in a pretty good fit with it since we get along so well. Hope I'm putting this clearly. Also (if I may add a second question)...In Berkeley we still have a form of realism as Grayling points out elsewhere in his essay. The world exists mind-independently (re-ally) relative to us,just not to God's mind. So what would be the true opposite of realism? That is, what would we call the view that would say there is NO mind-independent world at all? E.g. In Schopenhauer's atheistic idealism, he doesn't have God to shore it all up,so how does he expect us to be idealists? Is Solipsism the true opposite of realism? Very perplexing. Thank You.......Bill H., Moraga,CA
Jasper Reid
August 21, 2011
(changed August 21, 2011)
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According to the view that Berkeley is here criticising, there are, in effect, two worlds. Indeed, there are two corporeal worlds. There is an ideal world, constituted by perceptions that have been placed directly into our minds by God, and including perceivable tables, chairs, and even human b... Read more
It makes sense to me that there should be nothing rather than anything. I find this issue rather mind boggling because obviously there is something. Fortunately I'm able to dismiss this issue and go on to other things. My only hope is that if there is an afterlife, and there are orientation sessions I will ask the lecturer (an angel?) about it. I'm just afraid that his reply will be a board with a bunch of incomprehensible formulae. My question is do philosophers deal with this issue or has it already been dismissed as undealable.
Thomas Pogge
August 20, 2011
(changed August 20, 2011)
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As your formulations nicely bring out, the problem here arises from the combination of two phenomena: that there is something rather than nothing, and that our mind finds it more natural (less surprising, less boggling, more sense-making) that there should be nothing rather than anything.
Our... Read more