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Generally we suppose that if there is any time lapse between event A and a subsequent event B, A cannot be the cause of B. But what if time were continuous, such that between any times t1 and t2, we might specify a distinct time t3? In that case, there would always be some time lapse between any two events: would that make causation as described impossible? Does conceiving of time as quantized solve the problem?
Donald Baxter
April 21, 2011
(changed April 21, 2011)
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Alternatively, Bertrand Russell uses the problem you raise to critique the Humean account of causation and propose a successor. See Russell's discussion of laws of change in his book The Analysis of Mind.
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Hi I understand how to apply derivation rules like the rules of inference etc. My question is do we have a method of proving the rules themselves? Is there a way to prove that If P then Q; P; therefore Q? Or do we accept these rules out of intuition?
William Rapaport
April 21, 2011
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Rules of inference are "primitive" (i.e., basic) argument forms; all other arguments are (syntactically) proved using them. So you could either say that the rules of inference are taken as primitive and not (syntactically) provable, or you could say that they are their own (syntactic) proof... Read more
Roger Ebert said some time ago that there are no video games that can compare with the great works of art in other mediums, such as poetry or literature or film. What kind of comparison is he talking about? Looking at more established art forms, it seems clearly nonsense to compare something like Beethoven's Ninth to Shakespeare's Hamlet, being so radically different mediums - yet we don't say that no play has yet matched any of the great musical compositions of our culture, or that no poem can compare with the great sculptures of the past. On what level, then, are two works from different mediums (like the Ninth Symphony and Hamlet) comparable? Is it just in there overall quality, and if so, how does one judge the overall quality of a work of art, independent from those features that set it apart from other art forms? It doesn't seem fair to say that Hamlet has more psychological depth than the Ninth, or that the Ninth is more harmonious and evocative than Hamlet. Is it, rather, a question of comparable contexts, comparable status and recognition, comparable influence?
Sean Greenberg
April 19, 2011
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It's not clear to me that when Ebert said that there are no video games that compare with great works of art in other media, he meant to imply that works in different media are comparable, as if there were some metric by which one could directly compare instances of different types of art. Eb... Read more
Do we judge a person's palate by whether they appreciate sophisticated beauty? Or do we judge beauty by whether it is appreciated by people with sophisticated palates?
Sean Greenberg
April 19, 2011
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This question seems to raise an aesthetic version of what has come to be known as the 'Euthyphro Question' (from Plato's dialogue Euthyphro), where it is asked if what is holy is holy because the gods love it, or if the gods love what is holy because it is holy. If one answers that what is ho... Read more
Is it possible for a physical object to be 1-dimensional?
Thomas Pogge
April 19, 2011
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Is it possible for a physical object to be four-dimensional? This depends a bit on what you mean by a "physical object". But it seems plausible to say that the could be a four-dimensional world with four-dimensional objects in it, and why should we not in talking about such a possible world call... Read more
Who is a better judge of what is right or wrong: the person who considers an ethical dilemma in the abstract, or the person is actually faced with making the dilemma? On the one hand, armchair philosophizing can leave us blind to the subtleties that come into play when actually making the decision. But on the other hand, the person who actually makes the decision can be subject to the cognitive biases that come with having a dog in the fight. Which of these problems is worse?
Thomas Pogge
April 19, 2011
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I don't think there can be a general answer to this question. Despite your singular ("the person") you are talking about very large sets of decisions, and it just isn't the case that all decisions in one set are better than all decisions in the other. You are certainly right that both factors (l... Read more
I have an ethical question. I own a business that provides services to corporations, both public and private. Today at lunch I was having a conversation with my business partner. He brought a proposal from a large public company's purchasing manager who had made it known to my business partner (since they were childhood friends) that he would give us this fairly substantial project if we offered him a kickback of 20% of the project cost, discreetly payable to him outside of the USA in cash. This purchasing manager would rubber-stamp approve our bid, even if it is high because we have to cover his kickback. I told my business partner that his friendly purchasing manager was not only doing something illegal, but also that he was unethical. I told him that we should not deal with such persons. My business partner posed this question to me - "How is this unethical? We routinely visit purchasing managers of other public companies and we take them and their key personnel out to lunch or to dinner to tell them of our services. Are we not also 'paying them off' with the cost of a meal?" I could not come up with a satisfactory reply other than saying that buying lunch for someone versus giving them a direct, and illegal, kickback was a large difference in degree. One was done out of social custom and customer outreach, whereas the other was done out of malice with the intent to defraud public shareholders. But on a philosophical note, I could not defend myself satisfactorily in this case. Please advise.
Thomas Pogge
April 19, 2011
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Lunch and dinner invitations are, in the United States, a normal part of doing business. By extending such an invitation, you are then not gaining an unfair advantage over your competitors who (insofar as they are interested in doing business with the same company) will -- or at least can -- als... Read more
Dear Philosophers (and especially Prof. Pogge), I can see why an empirical theory of DESCRIPTIVE ethics is possible, but can there be an empirical theory of NORMATIVE ethics? It seems to me that, in the final analysis, you cannot deduce "ought" from "is". If all people are born (have evolved) to be selfish and cruel, does it follow that we should be selfish and cruel? Shouldn't we be considerate and kind, even if we are not born with these attributes?
Thomas Pogge
April 18, 2011
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Just to clarify terminology. I would understand an empirical theory of ethics as one that explains the activities of a group of ethicists. An empirical theory of descriptive ethics would seek to explain the activities of those who describe ethical beliefs and practices; and an empirical theory o... Read more
In response to a previous question Sean Greenberg characterized philosophy as consisting of arguments? Is that true? Doesn't much of philosophy consist of description as well and isn't that different from argument? Is a defense of a description (which I think would require an argument) the same thing as the "description" itself? Hopefully that question made sense. Sean Greenberg's response was to a question about whether Shakespeare had a coherent philosophy. Wouldn't the idea that description is philosophy make the idea that Shakespeare has a coherent philosophy more plausible. (Also I suppose a person could use a brilliant philosophical insight without believing it and it doesn't have to fit together in the way Plato's Republic fits together) But then someone might say you can separate the philosophy from the text but I'm not so sure. Certainly something that transcends the text but is still coherently related to the text could be clearly exposited couldn't it? Is there any interest in literary theory by analytic theorists that addresses these kind of questions.
Charles Taliaferro
April 16, 2011
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Perhaps Professor Greenberg should reply to this, but here goes: I suggest that there are at least two ways of defining a philosophy. On one meaning, to have a philosophy is to have a worldview or a conception of yourself, the world, values, and so on. From this point of view, most peopl... Read more
One argument I've often heard in favor of vegetarianism is that we don't have to kill animals in order to survive. What if we, for biological reasons, were forced to eat other animals? If we couldn't digest plant matter, it would seem we wouldn't have a choice. By the logic of the argument, wouldn't that mean it would be less ethically problematic to kill other animals in order to feed?
Richard Heck
April 16, 2011
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But I think you have what philosophers call the "dialectic" of the argument here somewhat backwards. I take it that the argument for vegetarianism is suppose to be something like this: (i) The lives of animals are of moral significance, which is to say that one cannot permissibly kill an animal... Read more