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Dear philosophers, I have a question concerning politics and movies. Do people who boycott movies involving a certain actor/director/producer simply on the basis of the political views of that actor/director/producer acting reasonably? I wouldn't think so because a large part of how people decide whether to watch a movie or not is the history of the quality of the actor/director/producer's work and not that actor/director/producer's political views. What do you philosophers think?

Louise Antony February 17, 2011 (changed February 17, 2011) Permalink @font-face { font-family: "Cambria";}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; }div.Section1 { page: Section1; } I think there may be a couple of different questionshere. One is: do people have theright to refus... Read more

Justice

Is stealing money stolen from me more ethical than stealing money justly owned? If it is, and I believe that the government or the upper classes have unjustly appropriated money belonging to my working class family for generations, am I justified morally in giving false information to the IRS in order to avoid paying taxes?

Thomas Pogge February 17, 2011 (changed February 17, 2011) Permalink There are two weak spots in the reasoning you sketch. First, the expression "more ethical" is a bit slippery. If one does not pause to reflect, one may be fooled into thinking that, if something is more ethical, then it's ethical or permissible or (as you say at the end) morally justified.... Read more

Profession

I recently graduated with a BA in philosophy. I recently applied to many Ph.D and MA program. I feel that with philosophy as competitive as it is, my record will place me in a MA program first. What can I do to distinguish myself in a MA program, for my later application to a PHD. My hope is for a top 20 school, in my area of interest, what special activities are looked for coming from an MA. The following have been suggested from a variety of sources. Please advise, did I miss anything here, are any of these wrong? Thank you for any comments you might have, 1. Maintain an good GPA 2. Publish, in both graduate and professional journals 3. Don't rely only on your own university; become involved with other nearby departments. 4. Get teaching experience. (TA, Tutoring, Teaching critical thinking) 5. Teach at a community college level (some programs allow this) 6. Gain research experience (indexing, editing etc..) 7. Directed readings in areas of study, (I'm not sure if this would help for an MA, but it was mentioned for a BA) 8. Apply for grants & scholarships 9. Apply for academic & philosophical honors 10. Be fluent in at least one non-native language 11. Present papers at conferences 12. Purpose your theses with a PhD writing sample in mind and polish for several months before application time. 13. Focus on getting letters both from professors at your university and from more distinguished universities with which you are involved. 14. Become involved or start innovative programs (ex: UW's Northwest Center for Philosophy for Children). 15. Keep oneself engaged in the broader philosophical community (Leiter Reports, APA, Notre Dame Review etc...). 16. Create some connection between your university and the places you hope to do your PhD work (New York Consortium of Graduate Schools?).

Alexander George February 16, 2011 (changed February 16, 2011) Permalink My own view is that all this is incredibly wrong-headed. Singularly missing from this list is the project of immersing yourself in philosophical texts, thinking and talking to people about those texts and the issues they raise, and developing a deeper and subtler understanding of phil... Read more

Punishment

I am often appalled by how sadistically Americans and people of other nations regard their criminals. I am appalled because that very sadism itself reduces people to the level of evil as the people we punish. But how does one go about confronting the absolutely wicked notion that because we dislike a persons behavior we should inflict pain on that person thereby perpetuating the evil. Perhaps it can be argued that on utilitarian grounds that some evil should be permitted if it allows less evil to result in total. But that seems to go against the instinct that their is something immoral about being the author of an evil action even if the ends supposedly justify the means. It seems like an ethical system that acknowledges the truth that punishment is nothing more than a perpetuation of evil is utterly impotent. Is there any way at all to resolve this fundamental contradiction between morality and reality?

Oliver Leaman February 14, 2011 (changed February 14, 2011) Permalink There are a variety of ways of justifying punishment, not all utilitarian, and some would argue that punishing a criminal respects him or her since we apply a sanction to them which to some degree matches the crime. It is only sadistic if we enjoy their suffering, and surely most members... Read more

Logic

Is it impossible that there be two recursive sets T and T* of axioms (in the same language) such that their closures under the same recursive set of recursive rules is identical and yet there is no recursive proof of this fact? It seems impossible but a simple proof of this fact would help elucidate matters!

Daniel J. Velleman February 14, 2011 (changed February 14, 2011) Permalink Yes, I agree, under the alternative interpretation I proposed the word "recursive" in "recursive proof" is doing no work. So my interpretation is not entirely satisfactory either. I don't know which interpretation was meant, but both seem to be interesting questions.As for the gene... Read more

Logic

Is it impossible that there be two recursive sets T and T* of axioms (in the same language) such that their closures under the same recursive set of recursive rules is identical and yet there is no recursive proof of this fact? It seems impossible but a simple proof of this fact would help elucidate matters!

Logic

Is it impossible that there be two recursive sets T and T* of axioms (in the same language) such that their closures under the same recursive set of recursive rules is identical and yet there is no recursive proof of this fact? It seems impossible but a simple proof of this fact would help elucidate matters!

Logic

David Hume famously pointed out that there seems to be a logical gap that prevents us from concluding "ought" from "is". It seem to me that the truth of this general observation is still under discussion. Does deontic logic shine any light on this question, as one would expect it to, or does the problem morph into the question which form deontic logic should take?

Richard Heck February 13, 2011 (changed February 13, 2011) Permalink The question whether "is" implies "ought", in the most obvious form, is just the question whether: p --> Op, where "Op" means: p ought to be the case. We can consider deontic logics with and without that axiom, if we wish, and I suppose we might learn something from deontic logic about... Read more

Logic

Is it impossible that there be two recursive sets T and T* of axioms (in the same language) such that their closures under the same recursive set of recursive rules is identical and yet there is no recursive proof of this fact? It seems impossible but a simple proof of this fact would help elucidate matters!

Children Ethics

Do children have duties towards their parents? If they do, do these arise as a result of the parents' efforts on the child's behalf, or are they in some way structurally required, regardless of the parents' "performance"?

Charles Taliaferro February 12, 2011 (changed February 12, 2011) Permalink Great questions that have vexed many philosophers who have reflected on parenthood and debts of gratitude. Some philosophers (perhaps most famously John Locke) worked historically to limit the control of parents over children. Locke opposed what may be called patriarchalism and a t... Read more

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