Recent Responses
Could you talk a little about the notion of "respecting people's beliefs"? Honestly, I don't respect anyone's beliefs. When someone starts rattling on about some belief they have, whether religious, ideological, or personal, I feel contempt for them. (I don't show it because I try to be polite.) I also don't like beliefs in myself. I try to root them out as much as possible. Is the notion of "respecting beliefs" supposed to just be political -- a way of saying that people shouldn't be discriminated against on the basis of their beliefs? Or are we really supposed to feel respect for the person sitting in front of us rambling on about vaccinations causing autism or Jesus saving their soul or whatever?
Peter Smith
June 24, 2009
(changed June 24, 2009)
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Actually, I very much doubt that you do try to root out beliefs as much as possible. After all, you believe -- on very good grounds! -- that apples aren't poisonous, that butter keeps better in the fridge, that New York is east of California, that Obama is President, that the moon isn't made of gr... Read more
What is the basis of a person's right to have children?
Andrew N. Carpenter
June 24, 2009
(changed June 24, 2009)
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I think it is also interesting to consider arguments suggesting that procreation should not be viewed as a fundamental human good that individuals should be able to enjoy when they choose to become parents and find themselves in a position to live up to the responsibilities of parenthood.
C... Read more
I may want to go to the kitchen because there is some food there and I want to eat. (Suppose that.) One of these desires is a "fundamental" desire (I want to eat) and the other one is merely "derivative". Are there better words usually used to express this difference between two kinds of desires? Do you think that most desires are, as I called them, "derivative" and that there is only a small set of "fundamental" desires (like the desires to be alive, healthy, free, without pain, and loved)?
Jean Kazez
June 20, 2009
(changed June 20, 2009)
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If I have a sudden hankering to eat raspberries, it strikes me that I might want not want to eat them as a means to any end. I just want to eat some raspberries. So it's not derivative in any causal sense--it's not that I want this because it's a means of getting something else, and it's not obvious... Read more
I may want to go to the kitchen because there is some food there and I want to eat. (Suppose that.) One of these desires is a "fundamental" desire (I want to eat) and the other one is merely "derivative". Are there better words usually used to express this difference between two kinds of desires? Do you think that most desires are, as I called them, "derivative" and that there is only a small set of "fundamental" desires (like the desires to be alive, healthy, free, without pain, and loved)?
Jean Kazez
June 20, 2009
(changed June 20, 2009)
Permalink
If I have a sudden hankering to eat raspberries, it strikes me that I might want not want to eat them as a means to any end. I just want to eat some raspberries. So it's not derivative in any causal sense--it's not that I want this because it's a means of getting something else, and it's not obvious... Read more
What is the basis of a person's right to have children?
Andrew N. Carpenter
June 24, 2009
(changed June 24, 2009)
Permalink
I think it is also interesting to consider arguments suggesting that procreation should not be viewed as a fundamental human good that individuals should be able to enjoy when they choose to become parents and find themselves in a position to live up to the responsibilities of parenthood.
C... Read more
What is the basis of a person's right to have children?
Andrew N. Carpenter
June 24, 2009
(changed June 24, 2009)
Permalink
I think it is also interesting to consider arguments suggesting that procreation should not be viewed as a fundamental human good that individuals should be able to enjoy when they choose to become parents and find themselves in a position to live up to the responsibilities of parenthood.
C... Read more
Is it wrong to lie when we're questioned on matters of our intimacy? I mean cases where the other reasonable option would be to refuse to answer but for some reason we prefer not to. More specifically, I mean cases where it was wrong to ask in the first place.
Jonathan Westphal
June 11, 2009
(changed June 11, 2009)
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'[I]n general truth-telling is morally preferable to lying . . .', Peter Fosl writes. This doesn't seem quite right. Lying is wrong, and telling the truth is right, not just a bit "morally preferable", even if there are worse things than lying. There seem to be too many ways of avoiding or de... Read more
I'm a scientist. The results of my research may generate technologies that could potentially be used in both and offensive and defensive military applications. These same technologies could potentially help people as well. Here are two examples: (1) My work could potentially create odor-sensing devices to target "enemies" and blow them up, but the same work could aid land-mine detection and removal. (2) My work could help build warrior robots, but it could also help build better prosthetics for amputees. For any given project, I have to decide which agency(ies) my lab will take money from. I do not want to decide based on the name of the agency alone: DARPA has funded projects that helped amputees and killed no one, while I would bet (but do not know for sure) that some work sponsored by the NSF has ultimately been used in military operations. So I'd like to base my decision on something more than the agency acronym. How can I start to get my head around this? What sorts of questions should I be asking myself and others to get a better handle on the ethical issues involved? What should I be reading? What kinds of *concrete* steps can I take to ensure that my research does more good than harm, regardless of where my funds come from? Open, peer-reviewed publication (instead of secret reports) seems like a good start, but I'd like more ideas. A slightly more abstract question: If my funds come from an agency that [I feel] does significant evil, is my work -- even if used for more good than evil -- officially tainted? Which philosophers have something useful to say about this question in a useful, practical way?
William Rapaport
June 7, 2009
(changed June 7, 2009)
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I am happy to read Miriam's and Thomas's replies to this question, because it is one that I somewhat unexpectedly faced when I switched from being a professional philosopher to being a professional computer scientist (albeit one with a highly philosophical bent!).
The first time the issue came t... Read more
I'm a scientist. The results of my research may generate technologies that could potentially be used in both and offensive and defensive military applications. These same technologies could potentially help people as well. Here are two examples: (1) My work could potentially create odor-sensing devices to target "enemies" and blow them up, but the same work could aid land-mine detection and removal. (2) My work could help build warrior robots, but it could also help build better prosthetics for amputees. For any given project, I have to decide which agency(ies) my lab will take money from. I do not want to decide based on the name of the agency alone: DARPA has funded projects that helped amputees and killed no one, while I would bet (but do not know for sure) that some work sponsored by the NSF has ultimately been used in military operations. So I'd like to base my decision on something more than the agency acronym. How can I start to get my head around this? What sorts of questions should I be asking myself and others to get a better handle on the ethical issues involved? What should I be reading? What kinds of *concrete* steps can I take to ensure that my research does more good than harm, regardless of where my funds come from? Open, peer-reviewed publication (instead of secret reports) seems like a good start, but I'd like more ideas. A slightly more abstract question: If my funds come from an agency that [I feel] does significant evil, is my work -- even if used for more good than evil -- officially tainted? Which philosophers have something useful to say about this question in a useful, practical way?
William Rapaport
June 7, 2009
(changed June 7, 2009)
Permalink
I am happy to read Miriam's and Thomas's replies to this question, because it is one that I somewhat unexpectedly faced when I switched from being a professional philosopher to being a professional computer scientist (albeit one with a highly philosophical bent!).
The first time the issue came t... Read more
If time travel were ever mastered, might it be possible to change the past in manners which wouldn't create paradoxes? Or are all possible changes inherently paradoxical? Also, if the past were successfully changed, is it possible that all of history would change, and we would have no recollection of the original timeline? Or is this idea inherently flawed? Thanks.
Nicholas D. Smith
June 4, 2009
(changed June 4, 2009)
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Any "change" in the past is inherently paradoxical (to say the least). In fact, I think it is actually worse than that: Such changes would involve making it both true and false in the history of our world that the changed event did (or did not) take place. That's a contradiction, not a parado... Read more