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Referring to questions 2715, 2740 and 2746 on this site. The respondents to the mentioned questions (Allen Stairs, Peter Smith and Nicholas D. Smith) seem to concur that an omnipotent God need not be able to perform a dialectical task. This idea seems to presuppose that God is subject to (under) the order of the universe and that there is little or no ontological distance between God and creation. The problem with this view is that it seems to make God determined by his own law. If we should increase the ontological distance between God and creation, whereby placing God above (not subject to) his law, it would also be problematic because it seems to make God whimsical and untrustworthy. My question: Is it correct to think that issues about the relationship between God, law and creation (and the normative implications thereof) is what underlies the questions of the type “Can God make a rock that is too heavy to pick up”? Greetings, from South Africa
Eric Silverman
July 13, 2009
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There is a long theistic tradition in philosophy that agrees that being ‘omnipotent’ and ‘being able to do absolutely anything’ are two very different concepts. Calling God ‘omnipotent’ only means that God has an infinite amount of power… however, they may be things God can’t do for reasons othe... Read more
I've seen some people romanticize about philosophy in melancholic terms, as if it's a "symptom" of the depressed and sensitive minds to do philosophy. Is this generally true? Does the intricacy of philosophy require to some level quiet reserve and conscientiousness rather than an outgoing personality?
Peter Smith
July 13, 2009
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In my experience, philosophers -- I mean, at least, those earning a crust as professionals in universities -- are a pretty cheery bunch. And why not? We are actually being paid good money to have intellectual fun. We like talking and arguing. A lot. Preferably, in the excellent tradition of The Sym... Read more
Is there a difference between the words and expressions a person uses to say what he/she believes, and the beliefs themselves? Is one more important than the other?
Jennifer Church
July 10, 2009
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Certainly, there is a difference between saying "Harry is rude" and believing that Harry is rude since we can say things that we don't believe and we can believe things that we don't say. But I think your (first) question is about how closely the content of our words matches the content of our... Read more
I have read some recent material about dreams that seems to say Freud got it wrong. If my understanding is correct, dreaming is a by-product of moving information from short term to long term memory. A recurring dream is simply the result of a recent event that has a connection to a past event. And as with all events in our lives, the emotional context has an effect on how vivid the actual memories are and perhaps the dreams as well; but, the updating process - dreaming - is essentially meaningless in itself. From this, I conclude that many folks waste time and money on dream interpretation which is at best harmless entertainment and at worst harmful pseudoscience, especially if one acts on what they take to be a prophetic dream. What does philosophy of mind say about dreaming?
Jennifer Church
July 10, 2009
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Freud made many questionable claims about the function of dreaming (e.g. as the fulfilling of wishes) and the meaning of particular dream images. I wouldn't want to defend everything he says about dreams, but I do want to resist your conclusion that dreaming is "meaningless" and dream interpret... Read more
When Peter King recently decried Michael Jackson as a pedophile, Al Sharpton et. al were quick to point out that Jackson had never actually been convicted on sex offense charges. (This seems to me a very common way of arguing.) When it comes to allegations of wrongdoing, are all important considerations about what is reasonable to believe or maintain as true exhausted by the judicial process? If someone is found guilty or not-guilty of a crime, does this settle the matter, not simply of whether he should be legally punished or imprisoned, but also of how we should regard the allegations generally?
Oliver Leaman
July 10, 2009
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No, the law is not perfect or even adequate in assigning moral blame or approval, but then no smoke without fire does not work epistemologically or morally either.
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How can I know that I have (or have not) experienced the feeling or state or experience of 'hatred'?
Nicholas D. Smith
July 9, 2009
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As I understand it, hatred is something like anger, only whereas anger can be brief, hatred is much more durable.
Anger might lead you, while you are in its grip, to want to do something hurtful or harmful to another, or in some other way act in a way that is contrary to or which undermines or... Read more
Where can I find an exhaustive list of the formal fallacies of definition. I need this for my work, for controlling the content of data dictionaries and data models. This class of definitions has to be real, not nominal. Thanks in advance, Malcolm C.
Nicholas D. Smith
July 9, 2009
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There is a very good entry on definitions in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on-line), and a pretty good review of the various fallacies of definition in Wikipedia.
Happy hunting!
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Should business/corporations give to charity? Or should they return the profits to shareholders, and let them decide what to do with it?
Nicholas D. Smith
July 9, 2009
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In principle, the decisions made by corporate managers are, as a matter of contract and law, supposed to reflect and be answerable to the will of the shareholders. I can't think of any compelling reason to think that corporations should give to charity. But let's be clear what's at issue here... Read more
Does the fact that governments exercise coercion make statism immoral?
Nicholas D. Smith
July 9, 2009
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Depends on your view of things, obviously. If you are committed to the view that all forms of coercion are immoral, then this would be the result. But I don't know why anyone would think that. I (justifiably) exercise forms of coercion over my children, because there is simply no responsible... Read more
Why is it desirable to be judged by a jury of one's "peers"? We demand that our doctors, business executives and politicians be highly exceptional individuals. So why should we trust court decisions, which can often be both incredibly important and incredibly difficult, to random groups of laypersons?
Nicholas D. Smith
July 9, 2009
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This kind of objection often comes up, but I think is based upon a misunderstanding of what it means to be a "peer" in the required (legal) sense. One is my "peer" if one is a fellow citizen with all associated rights and responsibilities. That person doesn't have to be my equal in strength,... Read more