Recent Responses
I strongly believe in non-violence and I try to teach this to my 4-year-old son. Nevertheless the result is that I reprove my son whenever he uses violence and at the same time their classmates hit him, probably because he is an “easy target”. Do I have the right to impose a “moral law” to my son, even though this law is not followed by most of the children and causes unhappiness to my son?
Lorraine Besser...
December 1, 2008
(changed December 1, 2008)
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The short answer to your question is that, strictly speaking, parents have a right to teach their children whatever they want. My guess is that you are really wondering whether or not you ought to be teaching your son non-violence, or whether or not you are justified in doing so. The... Read more
Many people find it natural to think that we cannot always apply modern moral standards to our judgment of people who lived far in the past. There is something counter-intuitive, for instance, about saying that a misogynist from 300BCE and a misogynist from 2008 are equally culpable. And this is seen in the fact that we don't often make much of such moral shortcomings in historical persons; we say that they were, in this respect, just a product of their times. Is this a tenable view? Is the ancient misogynist less guilty than the modern? If so, does this imply that morality is somehow relativistic?
Allen Stairs
November 30, 2008
(changed November 30, 2008)
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At least one difference between the misogynist of bygone days and his contemporary counterpart: the ancient misogynist probably suffered from a higher degree of non-culpable ignorance. He likely held factual beliefs about men and women that were widely shared, that underwrote his misogyny,... Read more
It seems to me that people are strangely concerned that determinism means that they don't have free will. Could you explain why this view is common? Even if a decision is a result how the universe was before they made someone makes their decision, part of the universe was them. So if they are the person who wanted to make the decision, how can they believe that they didn't have a choice. They did have a choice, they just made the one they wanted, because they didn't want the other choice. In short, why is determinism seen as so incompatible with free will?
Eddy Nahmias
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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I think this is a very interesting question, one that has inspired some of my recent research. It has been said that it is just obvious that determinism rules out free will. Here is Robert Kane:
In my experience, most ordinary persons start out as natural incompatibilists. They believe t... Read more
Tautology is popularly defined two main ways: 1) An argument that derives its conclusion from one of its premises, or 2) logical statements that are necessarily true, as in (A∨~A). How are these two definitions reconciled? The second definition is only a statement; it has no premises or conclusions.
Alexander George
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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There is a connection between (1) and (2) in that there is a connection between an argument's being a good one and some statement's being logically true. It can be stated somewhat generally like this: The argument whose premises are X1, X2, ..., Xn, and whose conclusion is Y is logica... Read more
Some proponents argue that in the judicial system, matters of policy reasons are best left in the hands of Parliament to decide. For instance, cases involving moralities which appear before the courts such as deviant sexual practices, assisted suicide and the likes where consent is clearly given and that these practices have not yet been made illegal/unlawful. In these cases, is it over the board to say that judges who decide based on the general consensus of morality in a particular society are interfering with one’s conduct (because it has not yet been made illegal/unlawful) even though it is generally understood that these practices are inherently wrong? Can this statement be countered by Dicey’s third postulate on the rule of law that the courts are the guardians of citizens’ rights and that judicial activism is necessary to solidify a common morality? Or is it best for a judge to merely sit back and apply the law as it is, despite knowing that had Parliament decided on these issues, it would be similar to the judge’s decision?
Peter S. Fosl
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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This question merits a much longer answer than I am capable of giving. But, with apologies for the compression, I'd say that the distinction between "activist" and "non-activist" judging is a popular-political distinction, not really one with much philosophical basis. Both the legislatu... Read more
Research in anthropology and related disciplines reveals that there is no strong evidence of any universal morals; there are no set of moral beliefs that are found uniformly across all existing countries or cultures. This has often been interpreted to mean that morality is unrelated to the existence of a deity. Some, however, believe that while the lack of universal morals is true it does seem that there is a universal sense of “oughtness”, or a universal tendency to justify what we do, or to place value judgments like “right” and “wrong” on behavior. From a philosophical perspective is this universal tendency toward morality better explained by a need to “get along” to increase fitness in our world (roughly a sociobiological explanation of morality), or is it perhaps better explained by our possessing an intrinsically moral nature, i.e. one that may exist because of the existence of a deity or deities (or even because life may continue after physical death without the existence of a deity). Sociobiology, if true, surely can provide sufficient grounds for the existence of morals; but I wonder whether this is a plausible and coherent explanation (e.g. where, for example, does the force or authority of morals come from?).
Peter S. Fosl
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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About universal morality: while it's true that among cultures (as among individuals within any culture) there are variation in moral beliefs (as well as scientific beliefs), there are general (nearly universal, so far as I can tell) moral categories. One finds incest regulations, for exa... Read more
Is it wrong to discriminate against people that are racist, homophobic or sexist, etc.?
Peter S. Fosl
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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Well, it would, I think, depend upon the context. Discriminating among people isn't itself an objectionable thing. One discriminates among different job applicants and among whom to marry or pursue a friendship. In cases like friendship, where moral discriminations are proper, there is... Read more
How can life be defined? What is the borderline between life and no life? Are virus alive? In human beings life starts in the conception? A person in coma or with cerebral palsy is alive? What would be the conditions for a robot to be considered as something alive? Sorry for my english.
Peter S. Fosl
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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Ah, but how can proper English be defined? Like life, there is, I'm afraid, no absolutely precise definition. The boundary is likely to move when considering different contexts (e.g. medical, legal, taxonomic, robotic, spiritual); and even in many of these contexts the boundary is likel... Read more
Tautology is popularly defined two main ways: 1) An argument that derives its conclusion from one of its premises, or 2) logical statements that are necessarily true, as in (A∨~A). How are these two definitions reconciled? The second definition is only a statement; it has no premises or conclusions.
Alexander George
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
Permalink
There is a connection between (1) and (2) in that there is a connection between an argument's being a good one and some statement's being logically true. It can be stated somewhat generally like this: The argument whose premises are X1, X2, ..., Xn, and whose conclusion is Y is logica... Read more
If one were to treat someone differently based on their appearance, would that be racism, or would it only be considered racism if the outcome of this action was to hurt or insult the person of "other race" in question? If I for instance helped colored people because of their color, I am treating them differently than other human beings. Many people encourage helping people of other races out, yet aren't we simply affirming they are different based on color if our action is motivated by the color of that person?
Sally Haslanger
November 29, 2008
(changed November 29, 2008)
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Good question. If race is a morally irrelevant feature of persons, to what extent should it matter (if at all) in deciding how to act?
To begin, it is worth noting that there is huge controversy about what to make of our ordinary racial categories. There seems to be a fairly wide co... Read more