Recent Responses
The moral question of whether abortion is wrong is whether or not it is a person. Well, I don't understand why people say that a fetus is not a person. How are a fetus and an infant any different. An infant doesn't understand the future just the way a fetus doesn't. At 14 weeks a fetus begins to move and "explore" the womb and itself. That shows some curiosity and some sort of "thinking". On a genetic level or the form of the fetus also at 14 weeks it is "a person". So then at the very least shouldn't abortion be illegal after that? If we should not kill an infant, which is very illegal, why can we kill a fetus which in many instances is on the same level as the infant? If anything we should not kill the fetus because it is innocent and the infant is not. An infant cries just to be held where it should cry because it needs something. Just as a small example.
Peter Smith
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
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There is more relevant discussion in response to Question 2107, where I remark on the moral differences between early fetuses and newborn infants that we seem to make in our thinking about the natural or accidental death of fetuses as against babies.
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Is Zeno's paradox really refuted by the fact of someone's walking? ("Solvitur ambulando" - L. Carroll)
Peter Smith
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
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Zeno most famous paradoxical argument seems to show that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise.
Plainly, the conclusion of Zeno's argument is false: that can be shown by Achilles just walking along, overtaking the tortoise! That's why the argument -- which seems to go from true premisses... Read more
In a hypothetical situation that could possibly have real-life implications, how should one decide between helping a small group of extremely sick individuals with only a small possibility of benefits (e.g., caring for AIDS patients without knowledge of whether or not your treatment will allow them to live) or helping many who have a greater chance of surviving (e.g., spending more time with individuals with proven treatable illnesses)? With either choice, it seems that there is a serious quandary. Should one elect to help the many, neglecting to care for those who are most likely to perish anyways? If so, is this justifiable by helping cure more while leaving those few sick individuals to fend for themselves?
Miriam Solomon
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
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According to the utilitarian approach, you should do the most good (or, what is likeliest to lead to the most good). And if you really are a utilitarian, you should look at all options, not just the two you mentioned (include options such as sending all your money to UNICEF, or becoming a... Read more
Some actions aren't regarded as morally wrong if their supposed "victim" consented to them. My question concerns whether the important thing is consent itself or, on the contrary, the desire (or the will) for the action. If someone does not consent but we know "beyond any reasonable doubt" that that person wants our action, wouldn't that be the same as if he or she consented? Certainly, if someone wants our action, in most situations he or she will ask for it or accept it, but in some cases this may be impossible (e.g., if that person is unconscious or for some other reason is not able to speak).
Sally Haslanger
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
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There are two separate questions here, one more general and the other more specific. On the general question about whether it is wrong to do something to someone (or for someone?) if they desire it but don't consent to it, I would argue that in most cases it is wrong. One might desire s... Read more
The moral question of whether abortion is wrong is whether or not it is a person. Well, I don't understand why people say that a fetus is not a person. How are a fetus and an infant any different. An infant doesn't understand the future just the way a fetus doesn't. At 14 weeks a fetus begins to move and "explore" the womb and itself. That shows some curiosity and some sort of "thinking". On a genetic level or the form of the fetus also at 14 weeks it is "a person". So then at the very least shouldn't abortion be illegal after that? If we should not kill an infant, which is very illegal, why can we kill a fetus which in many instances is on the same level as the infant? If anything we should not kill the fetus because it is innocent and the infant is not. An infant cries just to be held where it should cry because it needs something. Just as a small example.
Peter Smith
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
Permalink
There is more relevant discussion in response to Question 2107, where I remark on the moral differences between early fetuses and newborn infants that we seem to make in our thinking about the natural or accidental death of fetuses as against babies.
Log in to post commen... Read more
If a moral agent (a person) commits an act that he/she believes to be a morally right act, but it turns out the act is morally wrong, is that person blameworthy for committing it?
Eddy Nahmias
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
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Good question. And let's hope the answer is yes, since otherwise almost no one would be blameworthy for committing morally wrong acts. After all, it seems likely that Hitler, Stalin, Osama Bin Laden, Jim Jones (Jonestown massacre), dare I say, Dick Cheney, and many other people who have d... Read more
If a moral agent (a person) commits an act that he/she believes to be a morally right act, but it turns out the act is morally wrong, is that person blameworthy for committing it?
Eddy Nahmias
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
Permalink
Good question. And let's hope the answer is yes, since otherwise almost no one would be blameworthy for committing morally wrong acts. After all, it seems likely that Hitler, Stalin, Osama Bin Laden, Jim Jones (Jonestown massacre), dare I say, Dick Cheney, and many other people who have d... Read more
The moral question of whether abortion is wrong is whether or not it is a person. Well, I don't understand why people say that a fetus is not a person. How are a fetus and an infant any different. An infant doesn't understand the future just the way a fetus doesn't. At 14 weeks a fetus begins to move and "explore" the womb and itself. That shows some curiosity and some sort of "thinking". On a genetic level or the form of the fetus also at 14 weeks it is "a person". So then at the very least shouldn't abortion be illegal after that? If we should not kill an infant, which is very illegal, why can we kill a fetus which in many instances is on the same level as the infant? If anything we should not kill the fetus because it is innocent and the infant is not. An infant cries just to be held where it should cry because it needs something. Just as a small example.
Peter Smith
December 4, 2008
(changed December 4, 2008)
Permalink
There is more relevant discussion in response to Question 2107, where I remark on the moral differences between early fetuses and newborn infants that we seem to make in our thinking about the natural or accidental death of fetuses as against babies.
Log in to post commen... Read more
I am interested in who could be said to be the first atheist philosopher. Did all the ancient Greek philosophical big guns believe in gods, for example? More recently I know Hume published his atheist stuff anonymously for fear of reprisal and recrimination but before him the Elizabethan playwrights Christopher Marlowe and Thomas Kyd were "accused" of atheism so it was nothing new. So how far does it go back, especially as articulated by philosophers? Thanks in advance for your answers.
Jasper Reid
December 1, 2008
(changed December 1, 2008)
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The charge of atheism was levelled against countless philosophers over the centuries: but, historically, it usually signified nothing more than a criticism of the established state religion and/or a heretical view on the nature of God/gods, and not a flat denial that there was any existent be... Read more
I think that moralistic judgements and punishments are insidious: they make people do things out of shame, guilt and for the wrong reasons. It seems to me that they can hinder people from empathetically connecting with their own needs and the needs of others, that is moral judgements are metaphorical defensive walls that we erect as part of our outer shell. Allow me to illustrate what I mean. Suppose one child hits another. If the perpetrator's parent interferes and scolds their child using the moralistic language and punishments that is pervasive in society, e.g. 'you are a bad boy', or 'that was a wrong thing to do' and then banning from watching T.V. Now the usual response this will get is either: a) defensiveness, e.g. 'he started it' and/or b) if the perpetrator does refrain from similar behaviour in the future it will probably be because they want to avoid being punished. This could be contrasted to a parent attempting to empathise with why the child hit in the first place and drawing the child's attention to what needs of theirs and of the other child that are not being met. This is essentially Non-violent Communication (http://www.cnvc.org/). I have two related questions: first, is there any sustained criticism of the usage of moralistic judgments and punishments in the philosophical literature? [I have yet to come across any philosopher in the fields of political obligation and ethics who seriously and coherently suggests that all talk of obligations, duties and 'what one should do' is destructive.] Second, what justifications could be offered to defend the usage of moralistic language and punishments?
Lorraine Besser...
December 1, 2008
(changed December 1, 2008)
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In response to your first question, there is a pretty significant discussion in contemporary ethical theory regarding the concepts of obligation and duty. Elizabeth Anscombe, in “Modern Moral Philosophy” suggests that talk of duty is meaningless absent the existence of a lawgiver. Bot... Read more